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Abstract
Kinship and marriage systems represent the ways in which humans organize
relatedness and reproduction. The work presented in this thesis extends the
philosophical, theoretical, and methodological foundations of evolutionary
biology to the study of these aspects of human social behaviour.
Firstly, a game-theoretic analysis shows that the evolution of monogamous
marriage can be understood within the framework of inclusive fitness theory.
In this framework, the stability of monogamous marriage requires that
men transfer property to their wife’s offspring; consistently, the log-linear
analysis of marriage and transfer strategies across a worldwide sample of
societies shows that norms stipulating the transfer of land to wife’s offspring
exist in a larger proportion of monogamous than polygynous societies.
Secondly, phylogenetic comparative analyses of marriage and residence
strategies across societies speaking Indo-European languages reconstruct
early Indo-European society as practising monogamy and prevailing virilo-
cality with alternative neolocality. However, there is no evidence of co-
evolution of monogamy with neolocality in the history of these societies;
thus, it cannot be excluded that the observed association between marriage
and residence strategies is the artefact of a history of descent from a common
ancestor.
In line with the archaeological, historical, and ethnographic evidence,
these findings challenge explanations that link the emergence of monogamy
and neolocality to the development of idiosyncratic features of “western”
social organization; such explanations dominate the social sciences. More
generally, they illustrate the relevance of the evolutionary paradigm to the
study of kinship and marriage systems, contributing to the development of
a biologically based social anthropology.
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Definitions
The definitions in this list apply throughout the thesis, unless otherwise specified.
Where the terms are used with alternative meaning, this is stated explicitly in the text
(e.g. the use of “monogamy” to designate a mating rather than marriage strategy).
Ambilocality Residence of married couple with or near the kin of either spouse.
Monogamy Marriage allowed to only one spouse at any one time.
Neolocality Residence of married couple apart from the kin of either spouse.
Polyandry Marriage allowed to multiple husbands simultaneously.
Polygamy Marriage allowed to multiple spouses simultaneously.
Polygyny Marriage allowed to multiple wives simultaneously.
Uxorilocality Residence of married couple with or near the wife’s kin.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Retrospect
In The history of human marriage, Westermarck (1921, p. 104) wrote
Monogamy is the only form of marriage that is permitted among every
people. Wherever we find polygyny, polyandry, or group-marriage, we find
monogamy side by side with it. On the other hand, it is also in many cases
the only form of marriage which is permitted by custom or law. This may
be due to the mere force of habit ; or, possibly, to the notion that some
men must not appropriate a plurality of wives when others in consequence
can get none at all ; or to the feeling that polygyny is an offence against
the female sex ; or to the condemnation of lust.
This excerpt, from the third volume of Westermarck’s monumental opus, illustrates
some of the problems that have plagued the anthropological study of kinship and
marriage systems since its inception in the nineteenth century: for example, group-level
norms are confounded with individual behaviour, such that variation in behavioural
strategies within societies is contrasted with variation across societies. In the following
decades, these difficulties precipitated the field into “a subject in which specialists talked
only to each other (and some talked only to God)” (Fox 1983, p. 10). Couched in arcane
language and obscure conceptual categories, its basic assumptions came under severe
scrutiny during the second half of the twentieth century; by the end of the century,
anthropology had essentially repudiated what it once viewed as its “basic discipline”
(Fox 1967, p. 10; see discussion in Holy 1996, pp. 1–8).
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1.1. RETROSPECT
As in other domains in the behavioural sciences (e.g. Gintis 2007; Mesoudi et al.
2006), evolutionary biology offers a unified conceptual and analytical framework to
overcome these difficulties: after all, kinship and marriage systems represent “one
form of assortative mating which has the interesting component of culturally defined
categories” (Fox 1983, p. 3). Thus, the study of these features of social organization can
capitalize on the suite of theoretical and methodological tools used in the analysis of
social behaviour, both human and non-human (reviewed, respectively, in Dunbar and
Barrett 2007b and in Krebs and Davies 1993); this suite includes tools used in the study
of cultural behaviour, that is, behaviour that is acquired through social transmission
(Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 5; e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman 1981). In turn, to the extent that networks based on kinship and marriage
created the social niche in which our species evolved, understanding their workings
becomes crucial for understanding the evolution of human behaviour. Ultimately, a
comprehensive evolutionary account of the human phenomenon must be able to explain
why individuals organize relatedness and reproduction in the ways they do.
Anthropologists have generally resisted application of the evolutionary paradigm
to the analysis of kinship and marriage systems, the classic complaint being that
“social” and “biological” categories overlap but are not identical (Fox 1983, p. 3; e.g.
Sahlins 1976). At the same time, with few notable exceptions (e.g. Hughes 1986, 1988),
those advocating an evolutionary approach have generally failed to provide compelling
explanations to account for these discrepancies. For example, one of the most powerful
insights afforded by the evolutionary approach to the study of human behaviour is the
asymmetry that characterizes sexually reproducing species, deriving from the higher
potential rate of reproduction of males relative to females (see review in Brown et al.
2009). As discussed in Section 2.1, the cross-cultural prevalence of polygynous marriage
is readily explained on this notion; why a small but substantial proportion of societies
prescribe monogamous marriage is however not clear — mating is typically polygamous
in these societies. The discrepancy between the “social” category of marriage and
the “biological” category of mating would seem to disprove claims to the relevance of
evolutionary explanations to these aspects of human social life.
The work presented in this thesis seeks to elucidate the relevance of the evolutionary
paradigm to the study of kinship and marriage systems.
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1.2. PROSPECT
1.2 Prospect
In this section I provide a brief outline of the thesis (Section 1.2.1), followed by a
discussion of conceptual and methodological issues arising from application of the
evolutionary approach to the analysis of kinship and marriage systems; consideration
of these issues guides the analyses in Chapters 2 to 6. I focus on the conceptualization
of levels of explanation in Section 1.2.2 and on the statistical approaches used in cross-
cultural analysis in Section 1.2.3.
1.2.1 Aims and structure of the thesis
In this thesis I investigate the evolution of kinship and marriage systems, addressing
questions about their function, that is, their adaptive value in terms of differential
reproduction, and about their history (Section 1.2.2). I focus on variation across
societies in (i) marriage strategies, which specify how many spouses an individual may
be married to at any one time, (ii) transfer strategies, which determine how resources are
passed down the generations, and (iii) residence strategies, which regulate the pattern
of sex-biased dispersal of individuals at marriage.1
In Chapter 2 I present a candidate model, in an inclusive fitness framework, for
the evolution of monogamous marriage; in Chapter 3 I use cross-cultural data for a
worldwide sample of societies to test the association between marriage and transfer
strategies predicted by the theoretical analysis in Chapter 2. In Chapters 4 to 6 I use
cross-cultural data on marriage and residence strategies for societies speaking Indo-
European languages to reconstruct the pattern of change in these traits (Chapters 4
and 5) and their interactions (Chapter 6); the ethnographic context of these analyses
is introduced in Section 1.2.3.2.
Each chapter includes a review of the relevant background and of research related to
the specific case study, and a discussion of the findings. In Chapter 7 I discuss general
themes emerging from the work in the preceding chapters.
1The notion of “strategic behaviour” in this context indicates “choice” between alternative forms
of a given trait (Dunbar 2008, p. 132). I use this notion to designate “choice” at both the individual
and the societal level: for example, males “choose” between the alternative strategies of monogamous
and polygynous marriage in the analysis in Chapter 2, while societies “choose” between analogous
alternatives in the analyses in Chapters 4 and 6. This usage is justified on the assumption that social
norms emerge from the behavioural interactions of individuals over the generations, thereby capturing
the outcomes of evolved inclusive-fitness-maximizing behaviours (Hughes 1988, p. 18; Section 1.2.2).
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1.2.2 Levels of explanation
Investigating the evolution of a given behaviour involves asking questions about its
function and about its history. In the analysis of kinship and marriage systems, we
may ask why societies vary with respect to a particular set of norms, and how this
variation came about — for example, why do some societies prescribe monogamous
marriage, while the majority allow polygyny? Does the prevalence of this strategy
among Eurasian societies reflect social or ecological determinants, or is it simply an
artefact of history?
In Tinbergen’s (1963) schema, these represent two of four levels at which we may aim
to explain a given behaviour; the other two involve questions about the mechanisms,
physiological or psychological, resulting in the behaviour, and questions about its
ontogeny, that is, about the respective roles of genetic and environmental effects in
this process — for example, what induces some men to take a second wife in societies
that allow polygynous marriage, while other men settle for monogamy? Do men vary
in the propensity to seek multiple sexual partners, and is this related to whether they
engage in multiple marriages?
Function and history represent the ultimate causes of behaviour, mechanisms and
ontogeny its proximate causes (Mayr 1961). The four levels of explanation are logically
independent, in the sense that ignorance of the answer at one level does not preclude
us from asking questions at another (Dunbar 2008, p. 132): alternative hypotheses
compete within levels, not across them (Sherman 1988). Crucially, this implies that
even though the process of cultural inheritance is known to operate through different
dynamics than the process of genetic inheritance (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman 1981), we can ask evolutionary questions about cultural behaviours
without reference to the underlying mechanism of transmission (Dunbar and Barrett
2007a, p. 5). How a given behaviour is transmitted, whether genetically or through
social learning, is a proximate question (West et al. 2007b).1
Of course, full understanding of any phenomenon requires answers at all levels of
explanation; for humans, as for other species with social transmission of behaviour,
1Within this framework, understanding the interactions between the processes of genetic and
cultural evolution has been characterized as answering proximate questions about human behaviour
(e.g. Henrich and McElreath 2003), or as answering both proximate and ultimate questions (e.g.
Richerson and Boyd 2005).
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this involves taking into account both genetic and cultural evolution (Rogers 1988; see
Laland 2008 for discussion of the issue of non-human culture). One key advantage of
starting by addressing ultimate questions is that it forces us to treat human behaviour in
the general terms used to characterize the behaviour of other species; this, in turn, forces
us to think explicitly about where and how our species departs from the predictions
of the “biological” paradigm. Approaches that focus on the proximate determinants
of human behaviour typically sidestep this crucial issue (Henrich and McElreath 2003;
West et al. 2007b). Further, placing kinship and marriage systems in the wider context
of animal social behaviour provides a set of first principles for devising analytical traits
and categories that are theoretically justifiable and empirically useful. This is crucial
for clearing up the terminological confusion that has dominated the study of kinship and
marriage systems within anthropology, eventually leading to its demise (Section 1.1),
and which has fostered more confusion in other fields that have relied on previous
anthropological theorizing (see for instance Sections 5.1 and 5.4).
For example, the analysis in Chapter 2 asks under what conditions monogamous
marriage can maximize inclusive fitness where fitness is linked to resources and resources
are transferred across generations. Of course, variation in marriage strategies across
societies, or in other features of social organization, is unlikely to be based on
genetic differences (Hughes 1988, pp. 6–7). The inclusive fitness metaphor is used
in this case as shorthand for the assumption that social norms effect the “biological”
paradigm; that is, that they encode the cumulative outcomes of the inclusive-fitness-
maximizing behavioural tendencies of individuals (Alexander 1979b, p. 68). Irrespective
of its validity, this assumption represents a useful starting point for investigating the
complexity of human social systems, at least to the extent that it helps us conceptualize
previous anthropological observations about the distribution of marriage strategies,
and that it focuses further empirical work in this area (see for instance Sections 2.4
and 3.1). Next, we can ask through what proximate mechanisms these inclusive-fitness-
maximizing behavioural tendencies are realized. For example, in societies with status
differentiation based on ownership of resources, monogamous marriage and the transfer
of property to lineal heirs may reflect the conscious concern of individuals with the
preservation of status through the concentration of wealth (Rogers 1995; e.g. Goody
1976, discussed in Section 3.1.2); status and ownership of resources are typically linked
to fitness in these societies (see review in Hopcroft 2006; e.g. Nettle and Pollet 2008).
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Finally, we can ask to what degree the process of cultural evolution can lead to patterns
of behaviour that are inconsistent with the predictions of the “acultural” model (Rogers
1988). For instance, we can investigate how the evolutionary dynamics are affected by
proximate considerations relating to the transmission of mating preferences or of norms
regulating sexual behaviour (e.g. Mesoudi and Laland 2007). Importantly, these specific
questions about human social life become meaningful only within the wider context of
variation in animal social behaviour.
1.2.3 Cross-cultural analysis
To the extent that kinship and marriage systems determine the structure of human
societies, they likely played a key part in the unfolding of history. At the same
time, long-term population processes such as migration and diffusion likely shaped
the observed pattern of variation in kinship and marriage systems. Unravelling the
interactions between these facets of history becomes crucial for understanding the
evolution of human social organization, and of human behaviour more generally (Jones
2003; e.g. Gamble 2008; Gowlett 2008).
However, the statistical analysis of variation in cultural traits across societies
presents a major methodological issue: some societies are more closely related than
others, either by way of descent from a common ancestor or through contact. Con-
sequently, the assumption of independence of sample units is untenable for any cross-
cultural dataset (Dow 1993). Kinship and marriage systems appear to be “conservative”
features of social organization (Murdock 1949, p. 196); in the context of linguistic and
genetic variation, the effect of descent is strongest at the supra-regional level, while the
effect of contact prevails within regions (Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2001, 2006; Burton
et al. 1996; Guglielmino et al. 1995; Hewlett et al. 2002; Holden and Mace 1999; Jones
2003; Moylan et al. 2006).
The issue of the non-independence of sample units in cross-cultural analysis was
first recognized by Galton in response to the earliest application of statistical meth-
ods to cross-cultural data, Tylor’s (1889) study of norms relating to marriage and
descent (Jorgensen 1979). I employ two strategies to address “Galton’s problem”:
use of Murdock and White’s (1969) Standard Cross-Cultural Sample in Chapter 3
(Section 1.2.3.1) and of phylogenetic comparative methods in Chapters 4 to 6 (Sec-
tion 1.2.3.2).
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1.2.3.1 The Standard Cross-Cultural Sample
Murdock and White (1969) collated the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS )
with the aim to adequately represent the range of known cultural variation (that is,
avoiding biases towards regions that are overrepresented in the ethnographic record),
while minimizing the effects of descent and contact on the distribution of cultural
practices (Murdock 1977). To these ends, Murdock (1963b, 1966, 1967b, 1968) had
previously divided entries in the Ethnographic Atlas (EA) into sets including societies
that he believed to share similarities through descent and/or contact (see discussion in
Jorgensen 1979).1 From each set, Murdock and White (1969) sought to include in the
SCCS the society with the most extensive coverage; in any case, they excluded entries
that could not be focused (“pinpointed”) to a specific date and locality of observation.
This strategy produced a sample including 186 societies; empirical estimates indicate
that it was successful in reducing the degree of non-independence within the sample
(Dow 1989, 1993; Dow and Eff 2008; Murdock and White 1969), and in reducing
the amount of random error that derives from the use of non-focused data (Divale
1975). Finally, by establishing a standard sample, Murdock and White (1969) aimed to
facilitate integration of data and findings across studies. Currently, the SCCS codebook
boasts coded data for approximately 2000 variables (White et al. n.d.); for comparison,
the EA codebook includes coded data for approximately 100 variables for the 1267
societies in the sample (Gray 1999).
The quality and quantity of the SCCS data, combined with the reduction in the
degree of non-independence, make use of this sample the strategy of choice when
alternative approaches to cross-cultural comparison are not applicable (Gray 1996). For
example, phylogenetic comparative methods control for, rather than merely minimize,
the non-independence of societies, but their application becomes problematic when the
traits of interest show limited variation within language families (Section 1.2.3.2). I use
the phylogenetic comparative approach for the analyses in Chapters 4 to 6, but resort to
using the SCCS for the analysis in Chapter 3 because the traits under investigation in
this chapter (marriage and transfer strategies) show limited variation within the sample
of Indo-European-speaking societies analysed in Chapters 4 to 6. Further, in Chapter 3
I aim to control for the effect of religious affiliation on the distribution of marriage and
1The EA is a collection of coded ethnographic data published in instalments in the journal
Ethnology, starting with Murdock (1962) and summarized in Murdock (1967a,b).
22
1.2. PROSPECT
transfer strategies, and multivariate analysis is not implemented by the phylogenetic
comparative method used in Chapters 4 to 6. To give a concrete example of the scale of
analysis afforded by the SCCS (Section B.1), the twenty monogamous societies included
in the analysis in Chapter 3 are spread across all continents and speak languages
belonging to ten families and three isolates, with no more than three speaking languages
belonging to the same family. The three monogamous Indo-European-speaking societies
included in the analysis — Irish (Celtic sub-group), Armenians (Armenian sub-group),
and Punjabi (Indo-Iranian sub-group) — last shared a common ancestor 7300 years bp
(Gray and Atkinson 2003).
In any case, since clustering of variables still obtains in the SCCS , both by language
family and by region (Dow 1989, 1993; Dow and Eff 2008; Eff 2004; Murdock and White
1969; Murdock et al. 1978), results derived from analysis of this sample are best taken
as suggestive rather than as conclusive.
1.2.3.2 The phylogenetic comparative approach
Like human societies, species and other biological taxa are hierarchically related by
way of descent from a common ancestor. Evolutionary biologists employ phylogenetic
comparative methods to control for the resulting non-independence in analyses of
attributes across taxa (Felsenstein 1985; Harvey and Pagel 1991). Using a phylogenetic
tree to represent how the taxa are related, these methods infer likely evolutionary
scenarios that produced the observed distribution of the attribute(s) of interest across
the taxa. Besides testing for correlated evolution between traits, they can be used
to infer evolutionary pathways, to estimate rates of evolutionary change, and to
reconstruct ancestral states of the traits (see review in Felsenstein 2004, Chapter 25).
Mace and Pagel (1994) advocated the use of phylogenetic comparative methods
in cross-cultural analysis, to control for the component of non-independence resulting
from the descent of societies from a common ancestor. The component resulting from
contact comprises instances of “horizontal transmission” of traits across societies, for
example through copying. Societies lose or acquire cultural traits either through original
invention or through horizontal transmission; both represent pathways through which
functional associations between traits can arise. However, phylogenetic comparative
methods assume that traits are transmitted vertically, i.e. from parent to daughter
populations, along the branches of the phylogenetic tree model used to represent how
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the taxa are related; consequently, high rates of horizontal transmission may invalidate
their application to cross-cultural data (Borgerhoff Mulder 2001; Borgerhoff Mulder
et al. 2006; Nunn et al. 2006; Rogers and Cashdan 1997). Yet high rates of horizontal
transmission, in a process of “cultural infection” (Mace 2005, p. 203) where two or more
traits spread together across societies even though they are not functionally related, are
by definition problematic for any method used in cross-cultural research, since the basic
assumption of cross-cultural hypothesis testing is that traits tend to occur together if
they are functionally related (Murdock and White 1969). By contrast, phylogenetic
comparative methods outperform non-phylogenetic methods under a wide range of
simulated scenarios and levels of horizontal transmission (Currie et al. submitted; Nunn
et al. 2006). In Section 3.4 I discuss the “cultural infection” scenario in relation to the
spread of monogamous marriage alongside Christianity.
The analyses in Chapters 4 to 6 use a phylogenetic comparative method in a
Bayesian reversible jump (RJ) Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) framework (Pagel
and Meade 2005, 2006; Pagel et al. 2004). The Bayesian MCMC framework uses a
single tree or a sample of trees to represent how the taxa are related; use of a tree
sample removes dependence of the inferences upon any single phylogenetic hypothesis
(Section 4.1.2). This is particularly important for application of the phylogenetic
approach to cross-cultural data, since the reticulate nature of the interactions linking
human societies cannot be captured by any single tree model (see discussion in Bellwood
1996). In a similar way, the RJ-MCMC implementation of the approach removes
dependence of the inferences upon any single model of trait evolution; the model of trait
evolution specifies, for example, whether a trait is likely to be acquired and lost at the
same or at different rates. This is also crucial in the analysis of cultural traits, because
the mechanisms of trait change are usually unknown in this case. More generally,
the Bayesian MCMC framework estimates the degree of statistical uncertainty in the
parameters of interest to the comparative question (e.g. in the rates of trait change); this
provides an indication of the degree of confidence that can be placed in any particular
inference about the evolution of the trait(s).
Language trees as history Single trees representing human population history
for use in phylogenetic comparative analyses can be derived from application of
phylogenetic tree-building methods to linguistic data (e.g. Fortunato and Mace 2009;
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Holden and Mace 2003); samples of trees can be derived from application of these
methods to linguistic data in a Bayesian MCMC framework (e.g. Fortunato et al. 2006;
Jordan et al. 2009).
To date, the phylogenetic tree-building approach has been applied to Austronesian
(Gray et al. 2009; Gray and Jordan 2000), Bantu (Holden 2002; Holden et al. 2005;
Rexova´ et al. 2006), Indo-European (Gray and Atkinson 2003; Rexova´ et al. 2003;
Ringe et al. 2002), Papuan (Dunn et al. 2005), and Semitic (Kitchen et al. 2009)
languages, and has proven extremely successful in recovering human population history.
This approach is in fact intuitively close to the traditional comparative method of
historical linguistics (Atkinson and Gray 2005; Gray et al. 2007; Pagel 2009): both
aim to reconstruct the relationships among a set of languages, based on the similarities
and differences in lexical or structural features, and both model the relationships as
branching rooted trees, with internal nodes representing ancestral entities. Unlike
the traditional linguistic approach, however, the computational methods employed in
phylogenetic tree-building analysis make use of explicit criteria to choose among the
host of possible tree topologies — a non-trivial issue considering that, for instance, the
number of possible configurations is in the order of 5 ·1038 for a sample of 30 languages
(Felsenstein 2004, p. 24). Further, methods are available within the computational
approach that enable visualization of the degree to which linguistic relationships can
be modelled as a tree rather than as a network (e.g. Bryant et al. 2005; Holden
and Gray 2006; Nakhleh et al. 2005). For example, the basic vocabulary of Indo-
European languages appears “strikingly tree-like” (Bryant et al. 2005, p. 81) in these
visualization exercises (Atkinson et al. 2005; Bryant et al. 2005); basic vocabulary
includes items of vocabulary such as pronouns, body parts, and numerals, which
are less prone to innovation and borrowing (i.e. horizontal transmission) than other
meanings (Section 4.2.2). The ability to visualize conflicting signal caused by horizontal
transmission of the linguistic traits (e.g. words) used to build the trees addresses
concerns that tree models may be inappropriate given the reticulate nature of the
interactions linking human societies (e.g. Bateman et al. 1990; Boyd et al. 1997; Moore
1994). In any case, Bayesian MCMC phylogenetic tree-building methods are robust to a
wide range of simulated scenarios and levels of horizontal transmission of the linguistic
traits used to build the trees (Greenhill et al. 2009).
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Following traditional linguistic practice, most phylogenetic tree-building analyses
have used vocabulary data, which allow for time depths of approximately 8000± 2000
years (Gray 2005); relationships resulting from over 10,000 years of divergence can be
inferred from structural features, such as grammar and sound systems, but the relevant
data are currently available only for a small number of languages (e.g. Dunn et al.
2005). As a result, phylogenetic comparative analyses that use language trees generated
through computational methods are currently limited to the language family level; as
noted in Section 1.2.3.1, this can become problematic when the traits of interest show
limited variation within language families. The temporal reach of the phylogenetic
comparative approach can be extended beyond this level of analysis using multifamily
trees derived from the linguistic literature (e.g. Holden and Mace 1997, 1999); however,
this strategy forgoes the advantages of using a sample of trees, as opposed to a single
tree, within the Bayesian phylogenetic comparative framework.1
Ethnographic focus The tree sample used in the analyses in Chapters 4 to 6 was
generated by Pagel et al. (2007) through application of a phylogenetic tree-building
method, in a Bayesian MCMC framework, to Indo-European (IE) basic vocabulary
data collated by Dyen et al. (1992) (Section 4.2.2). In previous analyses of these
data, Gray and Atkinson (2003) used the same approach to test between the two main
competing hypotheses for the origin of the IE language family (see also Atkinson et al.
2005; Atkinson and Gray 2006a,b); they found support for the scenario proposed by
Renfrew (1987), which posits the expansion of IE languages from Anatolia with the
spread of agriculture beginning around 7000 to 6000 bce (Diamond and Bellwood 2003).
The alternative hypothesis, proposed by Gimbutas (1973a,b), places the homeland of
the language family in the Pontic steppes north of the Black Sea, and envisages an
1In principle, the use of gene trees as models of population history in phylogenetic comparative
analyses lifts the time and language family constraints imposed by the use of language trees generated
through computational methods (e.g. Holden and Mace 1997, 1999, for the use of molecular trees
obtained from the genetic literature). By using samples of trees generated from application of Bayesian
MCMC phylogenetic tree-building methods to molecular data, this approach would at the same time
enable implementation of the Bayesian phylogenetic comparative framework.
In practice, however, the use of gene trees as models of population history is problematic because
of the widespread discordance between the topologies of trees recovered from analysis of different
genes; this issue is currently being addressed through the development of multilocus approaches to
phylogenetic tree-building (see review and discussion in Degnan and Rosenberg 2009).
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expansion driven by nomadic horse-riding pastoralists starting after 4000 bce (Diamond
and Bellwood 2003).
Reconstructions of early IE social structure based on cross-cultural data have
been used in archaeology and linguistics to support the latter scenario, but this
practice has been marred by substantial methodological flaws and bias in interpretation
(Sections 4.1 and 5.1). The reconstructions of early IE marriage and residence strategies
in Chapters 4 and 5, obtained from application of the phylogenetic comparative
approach to cross-cultural data, provide an independent line of evidence against which
to evaluate previous inferences about early IE social structure. In turn, reconstructing
the historical processes that shaped variation in these traits across IE-speaking societies,
as well as their interactions (Chapter 6), is crucial for evaluating theoretical claims to
the centrality of the “nuclear family” to European, and indeed to “western”, social
organization; such claims abound in the social sciences, typically outside anthropolog-
ical circles (Goody 1996; Smith 1993).1 To put it with Fox (1997, p. x), ‘Sociology
. . . [got] bogged down in something called “the family” and an enterprise of “family
sociology” that was indeed the pursuit of a cultural construct rather than a cultural
universal’; analogous considerations can be extended to economics and demography. It
is in the search of these universals that anthropology and evolutionary approaches to
the study of kinship and marriage, combined, can offer the greatest contribution to our
understanding of human social behaviour.
1In anthropology, the “nuclear family” designates a family unit comprising parents and their
dependent children (Fox 1983, p. 36; Keesing 1975, p. 150; Parkin 1997, p. 28); technically, therefore,
nuclear families exist in societies practising monogamous and polygamous marriage (Murdock 1949,
pp. 1–2; see discussion in Fox 1983, pp. 36–40). Typically outside anthropology, as well as in everyday
parlance, this concept is used rather vaguely to designate the small isolated (i.e. monogamous and non-
extended) family type characteristic of “western” social organization (e.g. Smith 1993); throughout the
thesis, I enclose instances of this usage in quotes.
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Chapter 2
Evolution of monogamous
marriage by maximization of
inclusive fitness
2.1 Introduction
Eighty-three percent of human societies allow polygynous marriage (Murdock and
White 1969; Murdock and Wilson 1972). In humans, as in other sexually reproducing
species, the lower investment in gametes by males leads to the higher potential rate
of reproduction of individual males relative to individual females. This, coupled with
proximate constraints such as internal gestation and lactation, produces the typical
mammalian pattern of polygynous breeding, characterized by high male investment in
mating effort and high female investment in parental effort (Clutton-Brock and Vincent
1991; Trivers 1972). Extension of this paradigm to human social systems is used to
explain the cross-cultural prevalence of polygynous marriage (e.g. Low 2003, 2007;
Marlowe 2003). In some societies that allow polygynous marriage the majority of men
may be each married to a single wife, because few command sufficient skill or resources
to marry polygynously (White 1988). This marriage pattern, sometimes referred to
as “monogamy” (e.g. Marlowe 2003), is common among foragers and likely evolved
because of the benefits of biparental care to offspring survival (Low 2003, 2007).
Adapted from a manuscript in press as Fortunato, L. and Archetti, M. Evolution of monogamous
marriage by maximization of inclusive fitness. Journal of Evolutionary Biology.
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This is distinct from the system of social monogamy found in the remaining 17% of
societies, in which polygynous marriage is forbidden or disapproved (Murdock and
White 1969; Murdock and Wilson 1972). Current evolutionary explanations view
this marriage strategy as a mechanism of reproductive levelling (e.g. Alexander 1987;
Alexander et al. 1979; Bowles et al. 2003). A system of “socially imposed monogamy”
(Alexander et al. 1979, p. 420) would reduce within-group competition by suppressing
differences in reproductive success among men. Because of the attendant increase in
within-group co-operation, societies adopting this strategy would have an advantage
in competition with other groups. This would enable the cohesion of increasingly
larger societies, ultimately leading to the formation of large nations (Alexander et al.
1979, pp. 423, 432–433; Alexander 1987, pp. 71–73). However, social monogamy long
predates the establishment of large nation states (Herlihy 1995): while the diffusion
of norms prescribing monogamous marriage is commonly attributed to the spread
of Christianity, restrictions on polygynous marriage appear in the earliest historical
records (Westermarck 1921, p. 104; Section 3.4). For instance, Babylonian men
were legally entitled to an additional wife only under special circumstances, such
as illness or infertility of the first (as documented by the Codex Hammurabi, early
second millennium bce); strict monogamy was the only legally recognized form of
marriage in ancient Greece and Rome (Herlihy 1995; Scheidel 2009). More importantly,
the “socially imposed monogamy” model rests on the assumption that monogamous
marriage significantly reduces the variance in male reproductive success (Alexander
et al. 1979, p. 420). However, the historical and ethnographic evidence show that
dominant individuals invariably attain extraordinary reproductive success even where
marriage is strictly monogamous (Herlihy 1995; Low 2003; Scheidel 2009). Ancient
Rome is a case in point: despite the fanatical prescription of monogamous marriage,
wealthy men fathered children by large numbers of slave women (Betzig 1992a,b;
Herlihy 1995; Scheidel 2009).1
1Consistently, across data for 18 modern populations collated by Brown et al. (2009) we found no
significant difference in variance in male reproductive success between societies practising monogamous
marriage (n = 6, median: 10.0, range: 2.3–23.6) and societies practising polygynous marriage (n = 12,
median: 10.4, range: 8.1–24.4) (Mann-Whitney U = 27.00, z = −0.84, n.s., r = −0.20. We coded
societies on marriage strategy based on information in the original references in Brown et al. 2009, or
references therein; our coding corresponds to the mating system coding in Brown et al. 2009, except
for the Pimbwe, Dobe !Kung, and Ache, which we coded as practising polygynous marriage).
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Here we develop an inclusive fitness model to conceptualize variation in marriage
strategies across societies, and show that the evolution of monogamous marriage can
be understood within the framework of inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton 1964a,b).
We proceed in three steps. In the remainder of this section, we identify two candidate
factors that can make social monogamy advantageous over alternative marriage strate-
gies. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 we develop a game-theoretic model to show that these
factors can indeed result in monogamous marriage as a stable evolutionary strategy.
Finally, in Section 2.4 we discuss previous anthropological observations on the history
and cross-cultural distribution of marriage strategies in the context of the model.
Evolutionary accounts of marriage strategies typically assume that male reproduc-
tive success is constrained by access to females (e.g. Pollet and Nettle 2009). However,
in traditional human societies where individuals hold rights to property, inherited
wealth is a key determinant of reproductive success (see review in Hopcroft 2006), and
reproductive opportunities may be constrained more by ownership of resources than by
access to mates. In these societies, individuals are expected to transfer resources across
generations in ways that maximize the effect of the resources on their inclusive fitness
(Hrdy and Judge 1993; Rogers 1990). To the extent that there is a trade-off between
transmitting genes and transmitting wealth to the next generation (Rogers 1990), in
some cases the optimal strategy may be to concentrate resources in a limited number
of heirs. By definition, social monogamy channels a man’s property to the offspring of
a single wife; additionally, unigeniture (e.g. primo- or ultimogeniture) may be used to
avoid partitioning resources among them. In contrast, the property of a polygynous
man is typically divided among his wives’ offspring (although unigeniture may apply
within sets of siblings by the same mother) (Goody 1976; Gray 1964; Mair 1971). This
suggests that social monogamy may be advantageous where partitioning of resources
causes a depletion of their fitness value.
But in humans, as in other sexually reproducing species, the reproductive interests
of individuals in a socially monogamous pair only coincide if the male is the biological
father of the female’s offspring (Alexander 1987, p. 70). Therefore, males need to
balance the benefit of investing in closely related heirs with the risk of investing in
someone else’s offspring. If a man has a low probability of being the biological father
of his wife’s children, he may be better off investing in his sister’s: relatedness to
a sister is always certain (through one’s mother), as is relatedness to her offspring
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(Alexander 1974; Greene 1978). In fact, the transfer of a man’s property to his sister’s
sons is common in societies with frequent female extramarital sex (Flinn 1981; Hartung
1981). We extend this reasoning to incorporate the strategic behaviour of females: if
natural selection favours males who allocate resources based on their level of paternity,
in turn it may favour females who allocate paternity based on the degree of male
investment in their offspring. The resulting trade-off between paternity and investment
of resources may lead to social monogamy: males would benefit from increased levels
of paternity in their wife’s offspring, and females from exclusive investment of their
husband’s resources in their own offspring. Of course, this mechanism can only operate
if males have cues about paternity. In humans, in addition to direct phenotypic cues
(see review in Geary 2006), indirect behavioural cues may include the conformity of
females to norms regulating their sexual behaviour; such norms are found in the vast
majority of societies (Broude and Greene 1976).
2.2 Theoretical framework
We capture these intuitive arguments with a game-theoretic model, described in detail
in Section A.1. We focus on a population in which both males and females marry either
monogamously or polygamously, with w ≥ 1 wives for males and h ≥ 1 husbands for
females. Males transfer resources to the next generation “vertically” to their wives’
offspring or “diagonally” to their sister’s offspring (Figure 2.1). Females produce one
male and one female offspring; each sibling pair inherits resources δ from the parent
generation, with δ = δm + δf = 1 in a monogamous population in which all males
transfer vertically, and 0 ≤ δm ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ δf ≤ 1 the male and female contributions
to δ. The fitness of each sibling pair is given by δz, with z > 0, where z describes the
relationship between inherited resources and fitness; for z > 1, the fitness value of δ is
depleted when δ is partitioned among the offspring of multiple wives.
The probability p that a male is the biological father of his wife’s offspring depends
on the behaviour of females, who give their husbands either “high” paternity pH or
“low” paternity pL, with 0 < pL < pH ≤ 1. Females obtain an additional generic
advantage α from mating with other males besides their husbands, with αL > αH,
and αH = 0 for pH = 1. Males can infer their level of paternity from phenotypic or
behavioural cues.
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Figure 2.1: Inclusive fitness contributions for a focal male M and a focal female F. In the
parent generation crosses represent marriages, solid lines represent brother–sister relationships
(A: F’s husband; B: M’s wife; C: B’s brother). In the offspring generation B′ and F′ each
represent a sibling pair (B′: B’s offspring; F′: F’s offspring). Dashed arrows represent resource
transfers from parent to offspring generation. βi represents resources transferred to B′ (β1 if
M transfers vertically; β2 if B is polyandrous and her other husbands, excluding M, transfer
vertically; β3 if C does not marry; β4 if Cmarries and transfers diagonally); β2 is grey to indicate
that the resources are transferred by B’s husbands other than M (which are not shown), rather
than by B herself. φi represents resources transferred to F′ (φ1 if M does not marry; φ2 if
M marries and transfers diagonally; φ3 if F does not marry; φ4 if F marries and A transfers
vertically). See Section A.1 for details.
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Schematically, the inclusive fitness payoff for a focal maleM in the parent generation
is given by the fitness value of resources βi, inherited by the offspring B′ of his
w˚ ≥ 1 wives, plus the fitness value of resources φi, inherited by his sister’s offspring
F′, each scaled by the respective coefficient of relatedness (rMB′ or rMF′) (Figure 2.1
and Table 2.1). The subscript i = 1, . . . , 4 denotes the pathway through which resources
are transferred to the heir, as per Figure 2.1. w˚ 6= w for a mutant focal male whose
marriage strategy differs from the strategy of resident males, and w˚ = w in all other
cases. Resources are divided equally among the male’s wives’ offspring. This can be
written as
EM = w˚
(
β1 + β2 + β3 + β4
w˚
)z
rMB′ + (φ1 + φ2 + φ3 + φ4)zrMF′ .
Similarly, the inclusive fitness payoff for a focal female F is given by the fitness
value of resources βi, inherited by the offspring B′ of her brother’s w wives, plus the
fitness value of resources φi, inherited by her offspring F′, each scaled by the respective
coefficient of relatedness (rFB′ or rFF′), plus any advantage α˚ she obtains from mating
with other males besides her husbands (Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1). As in the previous
case, the subscript i = 1, . . . , 4 denotes the pathway through which resources are
transferred to the heir, as per Figure 2.1. α˚ 6= α for a mutant focal female whose
paternity strategy differs from the strategy of resident females, and α˚ = α in all other
cases. This can be written as
EF = w
(
β1 + β2 + β3 + β4
w
)z
rFB′ + (φ1 + φ2 + φ3 + φ4)zrFF′ + α˚.
The possible combinations of male and female strategies differ in inclusive fitness
payoffs; given these payoffs, we can derive evolutionarily stable equilibria consisting of
a pair of male and female strategies that cannot be invaded by rare mutants playing
alternative strategies (Maynard Smith 1982; Section A.2).
2.3 Results
Social monogamy is a stable evolutionary outcome under two scenarios (Section A.2
and Table A.1); both require “suspicious” males, that is, males who transfer vertically
if females are monogamous and provide “high” paternity, diagonally otherwise. In
the first scenario females always provide “high” paternity. In the second scenario
33
2.3. RESULTS
T
ab
le
2.
1:
Sy
m
bo
ls
us
ed
in
th
e
in
cl
us
iv
e
fit
ne
ss
pa
yo
ffs
Sy
m
bo
l*
Fo
ca
l
in
di
vi
du
al
M
F
R
es
ou
rc
e
tr
an
sf
er
s
to
B′
(β
i)
β
1
Ω
m˚
V
[δ
m
+
w˚
(δ
f/
h
)]
Ω
m
V
[δ
m
+
w
(δ
f/
h
)]
β
2
Ω
w˚
m
V
(h
−
1)
(δ
m
/w
+
δ f
/h
)
Ω
w
m
V
(h
−
1)
(δ
m
/w
+
δ f
/h
)
β
3
Ω
w˚
(1
−
Ω
)δ
m
Ω
w
(1
−
Ω
)δ
m
β
4
Ω
w˚
Ω
m
D
[δ
m
+
w
(δ
f/
h
)]
Ω
w
Ω
m
D
[δ
m
+
w
(δ
f/
h
)]
R
es
ou
rc
e
tr
an
sf
er
s
to
F′
(φ
i)
φ
1
(1
−
Ω
)δ
m
(1
−
Ω
)δ
m
φ
2
Ω
m˚
D
[δ
m
+
w˚
(δ
f/
h
)]
Ω
m
D
[δ
m
+
w
(δ
f/
h
)]
φ
3
(1
−
Φ
)δ
f
(1
−
Φ
)δ
f
φ
4
Φ
h
m
V
(δ
m
/w
+
δ f
/h
)
Φ
h˚
m˚
V
(δ
m
/w
+
δ f
/˚h
)
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
of
re
la
te
dn
es
s
(r
x
y
)
to
B′
[p˚
+
(h
−
1)
p
]/
2h
2
(p
/
2h
)[
(1
+
p
2
/h
)/
4]
to
F′
(1
/
2)
[(
1
+
p
2
/h
)/
4]
1/
2
*
T
he
su
bs
cr
ip
t
i
=
1,
..
.,
4
to
β
an
d
φ
de
no
te
s
th
e
pa
th
w
ay
th
ro
ug
h
w
hi
ch
re
so
ur
ce
s
ar
e
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
to
th
e
he
ir
,
w
hi
le
th
e
su
bs
cr
ip
ts
to
r
de
no
te
th
e
fo
ca
l
in
di
vi
du
al
x
(M
or
F)
an
d
he
ir
y
(B
′
or
F′
),
as
pe
r
F
ig
ur
e
2.
1.
Ω
de
no
te
s
th
e
m
ar
ri
ag
e
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
fo
r
m
al
es
,
Φ
th
e
m
ar
ri
ag
e
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
fo
r
fe
m
al
es
.
m
V
de
no
te
s
th
e
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
th
at
a
m
al
e
tr
an
sf
er
s
ve
rt
ic
al
ly
,
m
D
=
1
−
m
V
th
e
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
th
at
he
tr
an
sf
er
s
di
ag
on
al
ly
.˚
in
di
ca
te
s
an
y
at
tr
ib
ut
e
th
at
m
ay
de
pe
nd
on
th
e
re
le
va
nt
st
ra
te
gy
fo
r
th
e
fo
ca
li
nd
iv
id
ua
l,
su
ch
th
at
it
s
va
lu
e
m
ay
di
ffe
r
fr
om
th
e
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
va
lu
e
fo
r
th
e
re
si
de
nt
po
pu
la
ti
on
.
Se
e
Se
ct
io
n
A
.1
fo
r
de
ta
ils
.
34
2.3. RESULTS
Table 2.2: Conditions for the stability of “suspicious” monogamous males for pH = 1
Notation* Condition† Strategy of mutant males
a z < log 3/ log 2 Monogamous marriage with diagonal transfer
b‡ wP(δm/wP + δf)zpL < 1 Polygynous marriage with vertical transfer
c (2δm + δf + wPδf)z < 3 Polygynous marriage with diagonal transfer
* Corresponds to the labels used in Figure 2.2a. See Section A.2 for details.
† wP > 1 denotes the number of wives for a polygynous male.
‡ pL = 1 with females who always provide “high” paternity.
females are “astute”, that is, they provide “high” paternity if males are monogamous,
“low” paternity otherwise. Both combinations of male and female strategies result in
monogamous marriage, vertical transfer, and “high” paternity.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the two scenarios for pH = 1. In the first case, monogamy
can be advantageous where there is a fitness cost to dividing resources among the
offspring of multiple wives (i.e. for z > 1; condition b in Table 2.2; Figure 2.2a).
In the second case, because of the strategic behaviour of females, polygynous males
suffer a reduction in relatedness to wives’ offspring; consequently, monogamy can be
advantageous irrespective of whether the fitness value of resources is depleted through
division (i.e. for z > 0; condition b in Table 2.2; Figure 2.2b). Vertical transfer can
be advantageous where the benefit to a man of providing extra resources to his sister’s
offspring is offset by their lower relatedness relative to wife’s offspring (i.e. for z below
the threshold specified by condition c in Table 2.2; Figures 2.2a and 2.2b). Monogamy
and vertical transfer become increasingly advantageous as each wife provides a relatively
smaller share of the resources inherited by her offspring (i.e. as δm increases and/or
wP decreases; conditions b and c in Table 2.2; Figures 2.2a and 2.2b). Additionally,
in the second case the benefit to monogamy increases as the relatedness between a
polygynous male and his wives’ offspring decreases (i.e. as pL decreases; for pL < 1/wP,
any potential fitness benefit to polygyny is offset by the reduction in relatedness to
wives’ offspring, such that monogamy is stable for all values of δm; condition b in
Table 2.2; Figure 2.2b).
Figure A.1 in Section A.2 shows that these results hold for values of pH < 1.
Here pH = 0.5, which is likely an extremely low value of pH: men would attain on
average as much reproductive success by other men’s wives as by their own in a society
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(a) With monogamous females who always provide “high” paternity
(b) With “astute” monogamous females
Figure 2.2: Stability of “suspicious” monogamous males against mutant males with wP = 2,
wP = 4, or wP = 8, for pH = 1; wP denotes the number of wives for polygynous males, and pH the
paternity level of males with females who always provide “high” paternity and of monogamous
males with “astute” females. δm represents the relative male contribution to the resources
transferred to the offspring generation; z describes the relationship between resources and
individual fitness; pL represents the paternity level of polygynous males with “astute” females.
See Sections A.1 and A.2 for details. In (a) social monogamy is stable in the darker area, where
all conditions are met; a is the condition for stability against monogamous males who transfer
diagonally, b against polygynous males who transfer vertically, c against polygynous males who
transfer diagonally (Table 2.2). In (b) social monogamy is stable throughout the volume shown.
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with a paternity level of p < 0.5 (Hartung 1981). For comparison, in contemporary
populations men are the biological fathers of their putative children, on average, in
98.3% of cases if they have high confidence of paternity, and in 70.2% of cases if
they have low confidence of paternity; actual paternity levels must fall between these
values for most societies (Anderson 2006). Assuming that comparable paternity levels
characterized our species’ recent evolutionary past, this suggests that social monogamy
represented a stable outcome in the evolution of human social systems.
2.4 Discussion
These findings show that inclusive fitness theory can account for the evolution of
monogamous marriage, and for variation in marriage strategies across societies more
generally. Where resources are linked to fitness and are transferred across generations,
social monogamy may be a stable evolutionary outcome (i) if dividing resources among
the offspring of multiple wives causes a depletion of their fitness value and/or (ii) if
females grant husbands higher fidelity in exchange for exclusive investment of resources
in their offspring. In both cases, the benefit to monogamy increases as the relative
contribution of resources by females decreases.
The historical and ethnographic evidence suggest that these mechanisms likely
operated in shaping the evolution of human social systems. In the Old World, polygyny
prevails among African societies with subsistence economies based on pastoralism or
extensive agriculture (Goody 1976). The relationship between resources and fitness
documented for the Gabbra pastoralists of Kenya (Mace 1996) and for the Chewa
horticulturalists of Malawi (Holden et al. 2003) indicates that in pastoralism and
horticulture the fitness value of resources is not depleted through division. Among
the Gabbra, for example, parents provide on average ten camels to marry off a
son: three as bridewealth to the bride’s kin, and seven to the groom for starting an
independent household (Mace 1996). If the division of resources depleted their fitness
value, the reproductive success of men owning five camels would be less than half
the reproductive success of men owning ten. Conversely, men with five camels have
more than half the reproductive success of men with ten (Mace 1996). This is likely
because in both subsistence systems productivity is constrained more by availability
of labour than by ownership of the primary productive resources (Goody 1976): in
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pastoralist societies holdings of livestock can easily be increased through husbandry; in
horticultural societies the low productivity afforded by extensive agricultural techniques
means that land is rarely a scarce resource (Goody 1976; Gray 1964).
This is in stark contrast with the intensive agriculture practised in the historical
societies of Eurasia, where irrigation and ploughing led to increased productivity, which
in turn sustained continued population growth. Combined, increased productivity and
population growth caused shortages of land. As land scarcity increased, so did the
pressure to keep holdings above the minimum size required to set up a viable productive
and reproductive unit (Goody 1976; Hrdy and Judge 1993; Section 3.1.2). Under these
conditions of habitat saturation, the partitioning of estates depleted their value; in
extreme cases the reduction in value was so great that parents commonly designated a
single heir, at the expense of all other offspring, through systems of unigeniture (Hrdy
and Judge 1993; e.g. Boone 1986, 1988; Voland and Dunbar 1995).1
Consistent with our finding that social monogamy can be advantageous where the
value of resources is depleted through division, marriage was typically monogamous in
1Fraternal polyandry, in which a set of brothers marry a single wife, can also be viewed as a
mechanism for reducing the number of heirs to an estate by limiting the number of wives whose offspring
have claims to the estate (Goody 1976, p. 17; Goody 1990, Chapter 5). It likely serves this purpose,
as an extreme form of unigeniture, in the harsh highland desert environments of Tibet (e.g. Crook
and Crook 1988; see review and discussion in Barrett et al. 2002, pp. 224–233). As in the extensive
agricultural societies of sub-Saharan Africa, here the land requires high labour input and yields low
productivity; as in the other intensive agricultural societies of Eurasia, the risk of land shortages is
however high (in this case through low carrying capacity rather than through increased productivity
and population growth). This combination of ecological conditions may explain why Tibetan societies
resort to polyandry rather than to monogamy.
Polyandry is not a stable outcome of the model developed here; however, fraternal polyandry is not
an option in the current setup, since individuals have only one sibling of the opposite sex (Section 2.2).
Extension of the model to include fraternal co-husbands may make polyandry a stable outcome, by
increasing the payoff of this strategy to males. Interestingly, however, polygyny is generally allowed
alongside polyandry, both in Tibetan societies (e.g. Levine and Silk 1997) and elsewhere (e.g. Rivers
1906, for the Todas of South India), although it tends to occur in a small minority of cases; polygynandry
is a stable outcome even in the current setup. Theoretical analysis of this type is likely to play a key
role in clarifying the ultimate determinants of polyandrous marriage (e.g. Hughes 1982; Smith 1998),
while analysis of individual societies may clarify the proximate mechanisms involved (e.g. Levine and
Silk 1997). By contrast, the inclusion of polyandrous societies in cross-cultural analyses is problematic
(e.g. Section 3.2.1.1), because this strategy is exceedingly rare: only 2 (1.1%) of the 186 societies in
the SCCS and 7 (0.6%) of the 1267 societies in the EA are scored as polyandrous (Gray 1999; White
et al. n.d.). Investigation of samples including societies from a specific geographic region or linguistic
sub-group is likely to be more fruitful in this context than analyses of worldwide samples.
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the agrarian societies of Eurasia with economies based on intensive agriculture (Goody
1976). In line with our expectations, the relative contribution of women to production
is lower in these societies compared to other subsistence systems (Goody 1976; Murdock
and Provost 1973). Indeed, across societies access to new land for expansion is a key
ecological determinant of polygyny (White and Burton 1988), and within societies the
incidence of polygyny declines with increasing scarcity of land (White 1988). This
raises the possibility that restrictions on polygynous marriage emerged in the ancient
societies of Eurasia following the adoption of intensive agriculture, as ownership of
land became increasingly critical to economic success, and growing shortages of land
imposed greater costs on partibility. Cultural norms promoting high paternity, such
as ideologies of honour, virginity, and sexual fidelity, were common in these societies
(Mair 1971; Scheidel 2009). To the extent that these norms resulted in an increase in
average relatedness between a man and his wife’s offspring, our findings suggest that
they may have facilitated the establishment of social monogamy in this region.
Of course, any model can capture but a small fraction of variation in human
social systems, and must overlook the many historical contingencies, such as the
diffusion of religious beliefs (e.g. Goody 1983; Section 3.1.2), that may have influenced
their development. Yet placing this variation within an inclusive fitness framework
allows us to conceptualize general evolutionary mechanisms shaping the organization
of human societies. This finally resolves the crux of anthropological discussions about
whether the primary function of marriage is “economic and productive” or “sexual and
reproductive” (Goody 1973, p. 189). In evolutionary terms, the proximate economic
determinants of marriage underlie its ultimate reproductive function.
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Chapter 3
Log-linear analysis of marriage
and transfer strategies in the
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Background
If marriage strategies evolved to maximize the effect of inherited resources on inclusive
fitness, they will vary with transfer strategies, which determine how resources are passed
down the generations. On the model in Chapter 2, monogamy may be advantageous
over polygyny because, by definition, it concentrates resources in a limited number
of heirs, and/or because females may grant higher fidelity to husbands who invest
exclusively in their offspring. In any case, monogamous marriage is only stable if men
transfer resources vertically, that is, to their wife’s offspring.1
In this chapter I use cross-cultural data to test the predicted association between
monogamous marriage and the vertical transfer of a man’s property, as reflected in
social norms regulating marriage and inheritance.
1By contrast, the polygamous equilibria generated by the model (not shown) indicate that
polygynous and polygynandrous marriage can also be stable if men transfer resources diagonally, that
is, to their sister’s offspring. As discussed in Section 2.4, polyandrous marriage is never stable in the
current setup.
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3.1.2 Related research
To my knowledge, Goody’s (1976) argument represents the only attempt to formally
link monogamous marriage to an emphasis on the transfer of property to lineal heirs.
The argument focuses on what Goody (1976) terms “diverging devolution”, that is, the
transfer of parental property to both sons and daughters, in the form of inheritance or
dowry. Diverging devolution is contrasted with systems of “homogenous inheritance”,
where property is transferred only “homogeneously”, that is, between individuals of
the same sex; typically, the property of a sonless man is inherited by his collateral
male kin rather than by his daughters. Diverging devolution prevails in Eurasia, while
homogenous inheritance is practically universal in sub-Saharan Africa.
Central to Goody’s (1976) argument is the notion that the higher productivity
and consequent population expansion that accompanied the development of intensive
agriculture in Eurasia led to scarcity of land in the region; this generated a tendency
to retain control of scarce productive resources “within the basic productive and repro-
ductive unit, which in the large majority of cases is the nuclear family” (Goody 1976,
p. 20), by favouring children as heirs at the expense of collateral kin. In this context,
the provision of daughters with property served as a mechanism to preserve their status,
by securing them access to husbands of appropriate standing. In turn, husbands were
typically required to match the wife’s resources, leading to the establishment of a
“conjugal fund” in which the spouses and their children enjoyed rights. Polygynous
marriage (but not polygynous mating, e.g. through concubinage) becomes problematic
where husbands and wives pool property in this way: for the purpose of inheritance,
for example, a man would need to differentiate between his offspring based on the
amount of resources their mothers contributed at marriage. Consequently, conjugal
community of property is rare among the polygynous, homogenous inheritance societies
of sub-Saharan Africa. According to Goody (1976, p. 90) this explains why “the major
Eurasian societies have definite tendencies towards monogamy.”
Goody (1976) found evidence of association between diverging devolution and
monogamous marriage in the EA. Further analyses found evidence that advanced
agriculture and stratification are causally linked to diverging devolution, which is in turn
causally linked to the occurrence of father’s brother’s daughter marriage, endogamy,
the prohibition of premarital sex, and monogamous marriage. To asses the validity of
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these inferences in the face of Galton’s problem (Section 1.2.3), the analyses had been
replicated on several sub-samples of the EA, including the SCCS , yielding qualitatively
similar results (Goody 1976, p. 27; e.g. Buckley and Goody 1974; Goody et al. 1971).
Goody (1976, p. 143) recognized Christianization as a potential confounder, but
did not explicitly assess its effect on these inferences. In fact, he never questioned their
validity despite discussing at length, in later historical work (Goody 1983, 2000), the
role of Christianization on “the development of the family and marriage in Europe” —
to use the title of his 1983 book on the topic. This work centres around the notion
that the maintenance of the Christian Church as an institution required ownership
of property. Thus, following the establishment of the Church in the fourth century
ce, marked by the conversion of Emperor Constantine in 312 and the subsequent
Christianization of the Roman Empire, the ecclesiastical hierarchies initiated a series
of changes in kinship and marriage systems aimed at restricting the range of legitimate
heirs, and ultimately at diverting property away from kin groups and into the Church.
Some of these changes, like the prohibition of divorce and of remarriage, counteracted
the strategies that diverging devolution societies typically use to compensate for the
absence of lineal heirs; others, including the promotion of monogamous marriage and
the emphasis on children as heirs to the exclusion of collateral kin, simply extended the
conjugal focus characteristic of these societies.
Thus, the evidence for association between monogamous marriage and an emphasis
on the transfer of property to lineal heirs may reflect a functional relationship, as
proposed by Goody (1976), or it may be contingent upon the interference of the Church
in the kinship and marriage systems of European societies, as proposed by Goody
(1983). In any case, the significance of this evidence for the present analysis is unclear,
because vertical transfer as defined in Chapter 2 subsumes diverging devolution as well
as inheritance by sons to the exclusion of daughters; the latter falls under homogenous
inheritance in Goody’s (1976) categorization.
3.1.3 Rationale and objective
The theoretical analysis in Chapter 2 predicts an association between monogamous
marriage and the vertical transfer of property. Previous cross-cultural analyses found
evidence of association between monogamous marriage and an emphasis on the transfer
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of property to lineal heirs, but failed to control for the potentially confounding effect
of Christianization on the distribution of marriage and transfer strategies.
Here I test the predicted association using data on marriage and transfer strategies
for societies in the SCCS , including information on religious affiliation to control for
the potentially confounding effect of Christianization. As discussed in Section 1.2.3.1,
the SCCS is a sample of 186 societies that is broadly representative of human cultural
variation in time and space, and minimizes the effects of descent and contact on the
distribution of cultural practices.
3.2 Data and methods
3.2.1 Cross-cultural data
The SCCS is distributed in electronic form through the World Cultures journal
website (http://worldcultures.org/); I used version SCCSvar1-2008Map.sav of the
database, obtained on 31 August 2007. Variable identifiers in Sections 3.2.1.1 to 3.2.1.3
follow White et al.’s (n.d.) SCCS codebook. All variables used were recoded into binary
form, because the number of cases required for the statistical analysis increases rapidly
with number of levels per variable (Section 3.2.2). The data in binary form and maps
of their geographical distribution are in Section B.1.
3.2.1.1 Marriage strategy
I coded societies as practising monogamous or polygynous marriage based on SCCS
variable 79. This variable scores societies on the social composition of the prevailing
form of family organization, defining monogamy in terms of the prohibition or disap-
proval of polygyny (Murdock and Wilson 1972). The information is pinpointed in time
and space to the focal SCCS communities (Section 1.2.3.1).
I excluded the two polyandrous societies and collapsed the two categories for
polygynous marriage (limited polygyny, i.e. less than 20% of males having plural wives,
and general polygyny, i.e. more than 20% of males having plural wives). This produced
a sample with 31 (16.8%) of 184 societies coded as monogamous and 153 (83.2%) coded
as polygynous (Table B.1 and Figure B.1b).
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3.2.1.2 Transfer strategy
The SCCS scores societies separately on the norms regulating the disposition of a man’s
property in land and of his other goods such as livestock, tools and other artefacts,
accumulated food stores, and money (respectively “real” and “movable” property,
variables 278 and 279; after Murdock 1963a). These variables were originally coded
for the corresponding societies in the EA (White et al. n.d.); the available sources do
not state whether or in which cases the information refers to the focal communities
in the SCCS , i.e. whether it is pinpointed to these communities in time and/or space
(Section 1.2.3.1).
I included both variables in the analysis, because different inheritance rules may
prevail for different types of property (Lowie 1920, p. 255; Murdock 1949, p. 38). For
each type of property I coded societies for the presence or absence of norms resulting in
vertical transfer, as defined in Section 2.2. The “presence” category subsumed all cases
in which the inheritance rules stipulate a man’s wife’s offspring as his primary heir
(including cases where other patrilineal relatives take precedence over wife’s offspring).
The “absence” category subsumed all cases in which the inheritance rules stipulate
a man’s sister’s offspring as his primary heir (including cases where other matrilineal
relatives take precedence over sister’s offspring), and cases in which men do not hold
individual rights in the type of property in question or in which no rules regulate
the transfer of such rights. Where other relatives, typically younger brothers, take
precedence over wife’s or sister’s offspring, property reverts to wife’s or sister’s offspring
when there are no surviving individuals in the designated category of kin (Murdock
1949, p. 37). Because absence of rights and absence of rules are conflated in a single
category in the SCCS variables, it was not possible to exclude from the analysis societies
in which men do not hold individual rights in property; this would have been preferable
for the purpose of testing the predicted association, since the model in Chapter 2 focuses
on variation in marriage and transfer strategies across societies with intergenerational
transfer of resources (Section 2.2).
Based on this coding, norms stipulating the vertical transfer of land were present
in 83 (53.5%) of 155 societies and absent in 72 (46.5%) (Table B.1 and Figure B.1c);
norms stipulating the vertical transfer of movables were present in 117 (77.0%) of 152
societies and absent in 35 (23.0%) (Table B.1 and Figure B.1d).
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Table 3.1: Derivation of binary coding for religious affiliation
Variable 2002* Variable 713†
– Classical Mixture Preclassical
– – – – Other
Christianized Christianized Christianized Christianized –
Other Other Other Other –
* Dichotomized (Section 3.2.1.3). The dash indicates missing data.
† “Classical” represents classical religions; “mixture”, mixture of classical and preclassical
religions; “preclassical”, preclassical religions (Section 3.2.1.3). The dash indicates missing
data.
3.2.1.3 Religious affiliation
I coded societies for the presence or absence of Christianization by combining the two
SCCS variables that provide information on religious affiliation. Variable 713, originally
in Whyte (1978b), scores the odd-numbered societies in the SCCS as practising a
classical or preclassical religion, or a mixture of the two; the classical religions are
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. The information in this variable is
pinpointed in time and space to the focal SCCS communities (Section 1.2.3.1), with
the exception of two societies (Whyte 1978a); the latter two were not included in the
analysis because they lacked data on one or more of the other variables (Section 3.2.2).
Variable 2002, based on Korotayev (2003, 2004), specifies the affiliation of societies
practising one of the classical religions. The information in this variable is pinpointed
to the focal SCCS communities in approximately 50% of cases (A. Korotayev, pers.
comm., 13 May 2008; Section 1.2.3.1).
To resolve discrepancies between the codings, I dichotomized variable 2002 and
combined it with variable 713 as per Table 3.1. This produced a sample with
Christianization present in 26 (24.1%) of 108 societies and absent in 82 (75.9%)
(Table B.1 and Figure B.1e).
3.2.2 Statistical analysis
I inferred the multivariate pattern of association among marriage strategy, the two
transfer strategies, and religious affiliation across societies in the SCCS through
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hierarchical log-linear analysis. Log-linear analysis is a technique used to model cell
counts in contingency tables of a set of two or more categorical variables, with the aim
to produce the simplest possible model that can accurately predict the observed cell
counts (Agresti 2007, Chapter 7; Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, Chapter 16). This model
corresponds to the simplest possible set of associations among levels of the variables
that yields cell counts not significantly different from the observed ones.
In the hierarchical implementation of log-linear analysis, the final model is obtained
by initially constructing a “saturated” model, which includes terms capturing all of the
possible interactions among the variables: the expected cell counts produced under this
model perfectly match the observed data. Successively, these terms are removed one
at the time through a process of hierarchical backward elimination, starting from the
highest-order interaction. After each removal, a goodness-of-fit test evaluates the fit
between the expected cell counts produced under the simpler model and the observed
data: if expected and observed counts differ significantly, the eliminated effect is
retained for inclusion in the final model. This process is repeated until no further
terms can be removed without significantly worsening the fit of expected and observed
cell counts.
The optimal model is evaluated in terms of the overall fit of expected and observed
cell counts, as measured by a goodness-of-fit statistic such as the likelihood ratio χ2,
and in terms of cell-by-cell fit, as measured by standardized residuals. “Good” models
have non-significant values of the goodness-of-fit statistic, indicating that the expected
cell counts they generate are not significantly different from the observed counts.
Standardized residuals provide an indication of the deviation between expected and
observed counts for each cell, with values in excess of ±1.96 indicating poor fit.
I performed the analysis using the SPSS HILOGLINEAR and SPSS LOGLINEAR
programmes (SPSS Inc. 2006), following the procedure described in Tabachnick and
Fidell (2007, pp. 890–908).
3.3 Results
The usable sample for the log-linear analysis consisted of 87 societies with data on all
four variables (Table 3.2); all of the 24 cells in the six two-way contingency tables for this
sample had expected frequencies greater than one, while three (12.5%) had expected
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Table 3.2: Cross-tabulation of the variables for the 87 cases included in the log-linear analysis*
Marriage Land Movables Religion
Christianized Other
Monogamous Vertical Vertical 8 10
Other 0 0
Other Vertical 0 1
Other 1 0
Polygynous Vertical Vertical 6 30
Other 0 1
Other Vertical 3 15
Other 3 9
* “Marriage” represents the marriage strategy; “land”, the transfer strategy for land; “mov-
ables”, the transfer strategy for movables; “religion”, the religious affiliation.
frequencies smaller than five. A minimum sample of 5 · 24 = 80 is recommended with
four binary variables; up to 20% of cells with expected frequencies smaller than five is
acceptable (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, pp. 861–862).
As shown in Table 3.3a, the hierarchical log-linear procedure identified a model that
included all four first-order effects (transfer strategy for movables, marriage strategy,
religious affiliation, transfer strategy for land) and three of the six possible two-way
associations (the interaction between transfer strategies for the two types of property,
the interaction between marriage strategy and transfer strategy for land, the interaction
between marriage strategy and religious affiliation). The model had a likelihood ratio
χ2(8) = 4.50 with 95% confidence limits from 0.00 to 6.52, p = 0.81, indicating a
good fit between the observed frequencies and the expected frequencies generated by
the model. Accordingly, the standardized cell residuals ranged from −0.73 to 1.05,
indicating that none of the 16 cells in the classification table produced by the model
was an outlier.
Inclusion of the four one-way effects in the model means that, for each variable,
the distribution of cases across the two levels was skewed (Spicer 2005, p. 209). The
standardized parameter estimates in Table 3.3b provide an indication of the relative
strength of the effects in predicting cell frequencies. Of the 87 societies in the sample
(Table 3.2), 73 (83.9%) presented norms stipulating the vertical transfer of movables,
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Table 3.3: Summary of the hierarchical log-linear model
(a) Significance tests (partial likelihood ratio χ2) and 95% confidence intervals
Effect* χ2(1) 95% CI p-value
First-order Movables 43.84 21.73–73.64 < 0.001
Marriage 26.80 10.35–50.93 < 0.001
Religion 24.44 8.90–47.66 < 0.001
Land 6.15 0.24–19.72 0.013
Second-order Movables by land 20.49 6.58–42.08 < 0.001
Marriage by land 5.94 0.20–19.33 0.015
Marriage by religion 5.77 0.16–19.03 0.016
(b) Raw (λ) and standardized (λ/SE) log-linear parameter estimates
Effect*† λ λ/SE
First-order Movables −1.09 −4.08
Marriage 0.73 3.58
Religion 0.43 3.13
Land 0.05 0.16
Second-order Movables by land 0.90 3.37
Marriage by land 0.50 2.53
Marriage by religion 0.33 2.40
* “Marriage” represents the marriage strategy; “land”, the transfer strategy for land; “mov-
ables”, the transfer strategy for movables; “religion”, the religious affiliation.
† Each effect is summarized by a single parameter value, with one level of a variable taking the
positive value of the parameter and the other taking the negative value.
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Figure 3.1: Mosaic plots of the two-way interactions included in the hierarchical log-linear
model. The area of each cell in a plot is proportional to the number of observations in the cell.
“Marriage” represents the marriage strategy; “land”, the transfer strategy for land; “movables”,
the transfer strategy for movables; “religion”, the religious affiliation.
67 (77.0%) practised polygyny, 66 (75.9%) were not Christianized, and 55 (63.2%)
presented norms stipulating the vertical transfer of land.
The three two-way effects included in the model indicate that marriage strategy
and transfer strategy for land were associated with each other and, respectively, with
religious affiliation and with transfer strategy for movables, and that these effects
were not confounded (Spicer 2005, p. 209). The standardized parameter estimates
in Table 3.3b show that the interaction between the transfer strategies for the two
types of property was the strongest predictor of cell frequencies, while the other two
effects were of comparable magnitude.
The direction of the two-way effects included in the model is illustrated by the
mosaic plots in Figure 3.1. Norms stipulating the vertical transfer of land were present
in 54 (74.0%) of 73 societies with analogous norms for the transfer of movables,
compared to 1 (7.1%) of 14 societies lacking such norms for movables (Table 3.2
and Figure 3.1a). Norms stipulating the vertical transfer of land were present in
18 (90.0%) of 20 monogamous societies, compared to 37 (55.2%) of 67 polygynous
societies (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1b). Christianization was present in 9 (45.0%) of 20
monogamous societies, compared to 12 (17.9%) of 67 polygynous societies (Table 3.2
and Figure 3.1c).
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3.4 Discussion
The log-linear analysis of marriage strategy, transfer strategies for land and movables,
and religious affiliation across societies in the SCCS shows that norms stipulating
the vertical transfer of land exist in a significantly larger proportion of monogamous
societies, compared to polygynous societies. This is consistent with the association
between monogamous marriage and the vertical transfer of property predicted by the
theoretical analysis in Chapter 2. Additionally, the log-linear analysis shows that norms
stipulating the vertical transfer of land exist in a significantly larger proportion of
societies with analogous norms for the transfer of movables, compared to societies
without such norms. However, despite the convergence of transfer strategies for the
two types of property, there is no association between marriage strategy and transfer
strategy for movables. Together, these findings suggest that monogamous societies tend
to specifically regulate the vertical transfer of land. This bolsters the interpretation
of anthropological observations on the distribution of marriage strategies provided in
Section 2.4: historically, the emergence and prevalence of monogamous marriage among
the land-based societies of Eurasia were driven by the depletion in value resulting from
the partitioning of estates among multiple heirs. As noted in Section 2.4, availability of
land is a key correlate of polygynous marriage, both within and across societies (White
1988; White and Burton 1988).
Finally, the log-linear analysis shows that Christianization is present in a signifi-
cantly larger proportion of monogamous societies, compared to polygynous societies.
This finding supports explanations of the distribution of marriage strategies that
posit an association between monogamy and Christianization (e.g. Goody 1983). At
the same time, however, it challenges those explanations that avoid discussing the
origin and occurrence of this marriage strategy by dismissing it as a by-product
of Christianization.1 The inferred pattern of association strongly diverges from the
pattern expected if monogamous marriage were explained away by Christianization.
1For example, under the heading The conjugal union, Zonabend (1996, p. 56) refers only in passing
to monogamous marriage, and even then indirectly, arguing that “Western societies are familiar with
polygyny, though they do not approve of it (the Christian Church was very quick to condemn it as a
sign of paganism)”; in the remainder of the section, which extends over four and a half pages, he details
various ethnographic examples of polygynous and polyandrous marriage.
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Consistently, the historical and ethnographic evidence conflict with the “cultural
infection” scenario implicit in explanations that view monogamy as a by-product of
Christianization (Section 1.2.3.2), whereby societies “passively” adopt monogamous
marriage alongside Christianity. As noted in Section 2.1, restrictions on polygynous
marriage are recorded in the earliest historical documents, and monogamous marriage
was established in ancient Greece and Rome prior to Christianization. The Christian
Church formally opposed polygynous marriage only since at least 600 ce, possibly
incorporating the Roman custom into its doctrine (Cairncross 1974, pp. ix, 221).
Further, the Church’s attempts to eradicate polygyny were typically met with resistance
(Cairncross 1974, pp. 60–61). In sub-Saharan Africa for example, where Christian
missionary efforts began as early as in the fifteenth century, the prescription of
monogamous marriage clashed with the deeply rooted polygynous aspirations of local
leaders, and of the male population in general (Harries 1953, pp. 336–337). Possibly to
counteract the spread of Islam in the region, driven by its compatibility with polygyny,
de facto plural marriage has been tolerated among African Christians, and in some
cases openly sanctioned (Cairncross 1974, pp. 213–214). Incidentally, an analogous
situation may account for the co-occurrence of polygyny and Christianization in some
of the SCCS societies included in the analysis.
Elsewhere, the adoption of monogamous marriage was likely mediated by changes
in other aspects of social organization that accompanied the spread of the Christianity.
Among the native Mexican and Andean populations, for example, polygynous marriage
had been the exclusive prerogative of the e´lites in pre-colonial times. With the
introduction of monogamous marriage by the Church following the Spanish conquest
in the sixteenth century, these groups typically replaced polygyny with concubinage;
“Christian marriage” was largely established in Mexico and in Peru by the end of
the century (Bernand and Gruzinski 1996, pp. 164, 176–181). Interestingly, however,
the Church’s imposition of monogamous marriage coincided with introduction by the
Spanish Crown of private property and will-making (Bernand and Gruzinski 1996,
pp. 172–173). Thus it is possible that changes in the control and transfer of property
facilitated the establishment of monogamous marriage in these groups.
On this evidence, “cultural infection” explanations for the distribution of monog-
amous marriage seem too simplistic. In the African case the relative rates of spread
across societies of Christianity and Islam appear to have been affected by the societies’
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marriage strategy, rather than vice versa; in the American case, the acquisition of
monogamous marriage was likely mediated by changes in other aspects of social
organization that accompanied the spread of Christianity. Rather, the evidence suggests
a more interesting question: historically, why have some societies resisted monogamous
marriage, while others appear to have readily adopted it? The anthropological
observations discussed in Section 2.4 indicate that the distribution of marriage strategies
reflects property considerations, which in turn reflect ecological determinants. For
example, the deeply rooted polygynous aspirations of sub-Saharan African men may
reflect the benefits afforded by polygynous marriage in horticultural and pastoralist
societies, and this may explain the resistance to monogamous marriage encountered by
Christian missionaries in the region.
On the model developed in Chapter 2, property considerations of this type represent
the proximate pathways through which the ultimate function of marriage is effected
(Section 1.2.2); the concern of parents with preservation of the status of their children
discussed by Goody (1976) provides a candidate psychological mechanism (although
in Goody’s framework the preservation of status is viewed as the ultimate cause of
monogamous marriage, e.g. Goody 1969; Section 3.1.2). The analysis presented in
this chapter supports a corollary prediction of the model, but the evidence is to be
taken as suggestive. Potential confounders include the error introduced by Galton’s
problem — as discussed in Section 1.2.3.1, use of the SCCS minimizes, but does not
control for, the effects of descent and contact on the distribution of cultural practices
— and the error introduced by the use of data not pinpointed in time and/or space
to the focal SCCS communities (Section 3.2.1), which may account, for example, for
the co-occurrence of polygyny and Christianization in some entries in the sample. A
conclusive test of the model will come from investigation of the archaeological and
historical sources documenting the emergence of monogamous marriage (Section 2.1),
and from investigation of the historical and ethnographic evidence describing transitions
between marriage strategies (e.g. the recent shift from polygyny to monogamy in several
Muslim countries, or the shift from monogamy to polygyny among the Mormons during
the nineteenth century; Cairncross 1974, p. 222). Importantly, the analyses presented
in the previous and present chapters provide a robust theoretical framework to guide
and focus these investigations.
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Chapter 4
Reconstructing the history of
marriage strategies in
Indo-European-speaking societies
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background
Explanations for monogamous marriage have centred around the prevalence of this
practice in Eurasia (Holy 1996, pp. 62–63), linking its emergence to the development
of idiosyncratic features of societies in the region. These include, for example, the
establishment of large nation states (e.g. Alexander 1987; Section 2.1) and democracy
(e.g. Fox 1997), the spread of Christianity (e.g. Goody 1983, 2000; Section 3.4), the
onset of industrialization and urbanization (e.g. Betzig 1982, 1986; van den Berghe
and Barash 1977) and of economic development more generally (e.g. Gould et al.
2008). Consistently, cross-cultural analyses show that societies scoring high on scales
measuring “societal complexity” tend towards monogamous marriage (Levinson and
Malone 1980, p. 37; e.g. Blumberg and Winch 1972; Lee 1979; McNett 1973; Osmond
1965, 1969; Sheils 1971).
By focusing on the cross-cultural distribution of marriage strategies, these studies
fail to account for their history. As discussed in Sections 2.1 and 3.4, restrictions
on polygynous marriage appear in the earliest historical records, long predating
the development of aspects of social organization typically associated with Eurasian
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societies, and with “societal complexity” and “modernization” more generally. In
this chapter I reconstruct the pattern of change in marriage strategies in the history
of societies speaking IE languages, using cross-cultural data in the systematic and
explicitly historical framework afforded by the phylogenetic comparative approach
(Section 1.2.3.2).
As discussed in Section 1.2.3.2, phylogenetic tree-building analyses of linguistic
data support Renfrew’s (1987) hypothesis for the origin of the IE language family,
which envisages an expansion from Anatolia with the spread of agriculture starting
between 7000 and 6000 bce. This scenario involves an early split of IE languages from
their sister group, the extinct Anatolian family, which comprises the extinct languages
Hittite, Palaic, Lydian, Luwian, and Lycian; together, IE and Anatolian form the Indo-
Hittite language family (Ruhlen 1991, pp. 325–327). Consistent with this scenario, I use
the term “Proto-Indo-European” (PIE) for the hypothetical ancestor of IE languages
and “Proto-Indo-Hittite” (PIH) for the hypothetical ancestor of Indo-Hittite languages,
and for the hypothetical “proto-societies” that spoke them. Other classifications, based
on alternative explanations for the origin of the IE language family, use PIE for the
ancestor of IE and Anatolian languages (i.e. they classify Anatolian languages as IE;
e.g. Mallory and Adams 2006). To avoid confusion, in this chapter and in Chapters 5
and 6 I have changed instances of the latter usage to the one stated here.
4.1.2 Related research
Early IE marriage strategies have been reconstructed on the basis of linguistic and
ethnographic evidence. The linguistic evidence is, at best, tenuous. The correspondence
of the Middle Irish (Celtic sub-group, c. 900–1200 ce) and Avestan (Iranian sub-
group, first millennium bce) terms for “concubine, wanton woman” suggests that
PIH society recognized some form of polygynous mating, if not polygynous marriage;
this interpretation is supported by the use of specialized terms to designate legitimate
children (Huld and Mallory 1997, p. 123). A second line of evidence relates to the
concept of widowhood: while it is possible to reconstruct a PIH term for “widow”,
there is no corresponding term for “widower”. One interpretation of this pattern is that
male widowhood was not recognized in PIH society because men married polygynously,
such that the death of one wife did not affect their marital status (Huld 1997, p. 642).
Implicit in this interpretation are however a number of unrealistic assumptions, for
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example that all PIH men married multiple wives and that they rarely, if ever, outlived
their wives; both represent demographic impossibilities.
Based on the ethnographic evidence, Murdock (1949, p. 349) reconstructed “an
Eskimo type of social structure in the prehistory of the Indo-European peoples.” The
defining features of this type of social organization are the presence of the Eskimo
system of cousin terminology and the absence of exogamous unilineal kin groups;
additional typical characteristics include the presence of monogamy, independent
nuclear families, and neolocality, but variant sub-types characterized by non-neolocal
marital residence may feature polygyny and extended families (Murdock 1949, p. 227).1
The reconstruction was inferred from the social organization of five societies speaking
IE languages, representing four of the major sub-groups of the language family.
Specifically, the social systems of Yankees (Germanic sub-group) and Ruthenians
(Slavic sub-group) are of the Eskimo type, the social systems of Albanians (Albanian
sub-group) and Ossets (Indo-Iranian sub-group) include features suggesting “Eskimo
antecedents”, while the social system of the Kurds (Indo-Iranian sub-group) is not
incompatible with the Eskimo type. Quite apart from the small number of societies
upon which the reconstruction was based, Murdock’s (1949) approach presents a serious
methodological issue. According to Fox (1967, p. 262), modern IE terminologies for
kin and affines (in-laws) tend to show a much stronger bias towards the nuclear family
than was the case for early IE terminological systems. This brings into question the
validity of inferences about past social organization drawn from kinship and affinal
terminologies (see Section 5.1.2).
Finally, Fortunato and Mace (2009) used the ethnographic evidence in a phyloge-
netic comparative framework, to test the hypothesis of co-evolution of bridewealth with
polygyny (Hartung 1982) and of dowry with monogamy (Gaulin and Boster 1990) in a
sample of 51 societies speaking IE languages. This analysis reconstructed monogamy
with dowry as the most likely state at the root of a phylogenetic tree representing
the historical relationships among the 51 societies; in addition, the tree included
Hittite, thus the root of the tree corresponded to PIH (Sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.2). The
1In the Eskimo type of cousin terminology all cousins are equated with each other but differentiated
from siblings. Unilineality refers to kin groups organized around principles of matri- or patrilineal
descent. Neolocality indicates residence of married couples apart from the kin of either spouse
(Section 5.1.1).
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reconstruction was obtained using the maximum-likelihood phylogenetic comparative
method developed by Pagel (1994) and implemented in Discrete (Pagel n.d.); this
method estimates the evolutionary scenario that is most likely to have produced the
observed distribution of states of the two traits across taxa at the tips of the tree. The
tree was generated through phylogenetic tree-building analysis of the corresponding 51
speech varieties in Dyen et al.’s (1992) IE basic vocabulary database (Section 4.2.2),
using a maximum-parsimony optimality criterion, as implemented in PAUP* 4.0b4a
(Swofford 2002); this approach finds the tree or set of trees that optimizes the degree of
fit to the data. However, the use of a “best” tree for phylogenetic comparative analysis
is problematic, because results are affected by the topology and other parameters (e.g.
branch lengths) of the tree used (e.g. Martins and Housworth 2002; Section 1.2.3.2).
Thus, while controlling for the effect of descent on the distribution of cultural practices,
Fortunato and Mace’s (2009) reconstruction may be contingent upon the phylogenetic
tree model used to represent how the societies are related.
4.1.3 Rationale and objective
For the most part, previous attempts to infer early IE marriage strategies from linguistic
and ethnographic data have failed to use a systematic and explicitly historical approach.
Where such an approach has been taken, the available methods did not account for
uncertainty in the phylogenetic tree model used to represent population history.
Here I employ a phylogenetic comparative method, in a Bayesian RJ-MCMC
framework, to reconstruct the pattern of change in marriage strategies in the history of
societies speaking IE languages. As discussed in Section 1.2.3.2, this approach provides
information about the degree of statistical uncertainty in estimation of parameters of
interest to the comparative question (e.g. in the rates of trait change or in the values of
the ancestral states of the trait). The effect of phylogenetic uncertainty is accounted for
by estimating parameters over a probability sample of trees; similarly, uncertainty in
the model of trait evolution is accounted for by estimating parameters over a probability
sample of models. This yields estimates that are not dependent on any specific model
of how the taxa are related or of how the trait has evolved.
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4.2 Data and methods
I used data on marriage strategy from the EA (Gray 1999; Murdock 1967b) for a sample
of societies speaking IE languages (Section 4.2.1). The cross-cultural data were mapped
onto a sample of trees representing how the societies are related, obtained by Pagel et al.
(2007) from tree-building analysis of Dyen et al.’s (1992) IE basic vocabulary database
(Section 4.2.2). On the cross-cultural data and tree sample I used the phylogenetic
comparative method developed by Pagel and colleagues (Pagel and Meade 2005, 2006;
Pagel et al. 2004) to reconstruct ancestral states of marriage strategy (Section 4.2.3).
4.2.1 Cross-cultural data
The EA is distributed in electronic form through the World Cultures journal. Variable
identifiers in this section follow Gray’s (1999) EA codebook. The data in binary form
and maps of their geographical distribution are in Section B.2.
I collated the cross-cultural sample by matching societies scored as speaking IE
languages (based on EA variable 98) with speech varieties in Dyen et al.’s (1992)
IE basic vocabulary database (Section 4.2.2), where needed using information from
additional ethnographic and linguistic sources (e.g. Gordon 2005; Levinson 1991–1996;
Price 1989; Ruhlen 1991). I also checked for correspondence between speech varieties
in the linguistic database and the 62 societies in the EA with linguistic affiliation
unknown and located in East Eurasia or in the Circum-Mediterranean region (based
on EA variable 91).
In some cases, more than one speech variety in the linguistic database could be
matched with the same society in the EA. For example, Dyen et al. (1992) include five
entries for Greek: three for dialectal forms (Greek D, Greek K, Greek ML), one for
modern Greek (Greek Mod), and one for modern spoken Greek (Greek MD), the latter
compiled from dictionary data. In these cases, where available I selected the variety
derived from dictionary data, which is likely to be less specific than other entries;
alternatively, I selected the variety with data for the greatest number of meanings
(Section 4.2.2), or the first variety listed in Dyen et al. (1992, pp. 99–101).
The phylogenetic tree model used to represent how societies are related captures
the process of diversification of taxa from a common ancestor; therefore, I included in
the sample only societies located in Eurasia, corresponding to the geographic range of
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IE languages before 1492 ce (Diamond and Bellwood 2003). I excluded the Icelanders
because the EA description for this society refers to 1100 ce, while the descriptions for
the 27 societies included in the sample refer to the “ethnographic present”, with dates
ranging from 1880 to 1960 ce, and median 1945 ce (Murdock 1967b).
I coded societies as monogamous (state M) or polygynous (state P) based on EA
variable 9, which scores societies on the prevailing form of family organization (after
Murdock 1962). I collapsed the five categories for polygynous marriage, thus ignoring
the distinction between limited and general polygyny (Section 3.2.1.1), between general
polygyny with sororal and non-sororal co-wives, and between general polygyny with co-
wives occupying the same or distinct dwellings. This produced a sample with 18 (66.7%)
of 27 societies coded as monogamous and 9 (33.3%) coded as polygynous (Table B.2
and Figure B.2b).
4.2.2 Tree sample
I used Pagel et al.’s (2007) posterior probability sample of 750 phylogenetic trees to
represent how societies in the cross-cultural sample are related by way of descent
from a common ancestor. Trees are present in the sample in proportion to their
posterior probability, which is the probability of the tree conditional on the data and
model of word evolution used in the tree-building analysis, and can be interpreted
as the probability that the tree is correct (Huelsenbeck et al. 2001). The consensus
tree in Figure 4.1 summarizes the 750 trees in the sample. For example, the Ibero-
Romance speech varieties included in the tree-building analysis (Brazilian, Portuguese
ST, Spanish, and Catalan) share an ancestor in 84% of the trees in the sample
(indicated by the arrow); the probability that they are a “monophyletic” group is thus
0.84, given the data and model of word evolution used in the tree-building analysis.
As discussed in Section 4.1.3, use of a tree sample instead of a single “best” tree
amounts to incorporating phylogenetic uncertainty in the comparative analysis; the
degree of phylogenetic uncertainty at several of the nodes in Figure 4.1 emphasizes the
importance of doing so in this case.
Pagel et al. (2007) inferred the posterior probability distribution of trees from Dyen
et al.’s (1992) IE basic vocabulary database, using the Bayesian MCMC phylogenetic
tree-building method developed by Pagel and Meade (2004). The linguistic database
includes word forms and cognacy judgements for 95 modern IE speech varieties
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Figure 4.1: Majority-rule consensus tree of Pagel et al.’s (2007) sample of 750 trees for 84
IE speech varieties and three outgroups. The tree includes nodes present in > 50% of trees in
the sample, plus other compatible groupings; the value above each node is the node’s posterior
probability as a percentage. The arrow marks the ancestor of the Ibero-Romance varieties.
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(languages, dialects, and creoles) across the Swadesh 200-word list of items of basic
vocabulary; two or more word forms are cognate if they share a common origin.
Swadesh lists consist of cross-culturally universal items of vocabulary such as pronouns,
body parts, and numerals, which are less prone to innovation and borrowing (i.e.
horizontal transmission) than other meanings (Swadesh 1952; Section 1.2.3.2).
The tree-building analysis was performed on a data matrix obtained from the
linguistic database as follows. First, Pagel et al. (2007) excluded eleven speech varieties
suspected of methodological bias by Dyen et al. (1992), and added data for three extinct
varieties (Hittite, Tocharian A, Tocharian B) to be used as “outgroup” taxa. Outgroups
provide information on the direction of change in the data by virtue of being distantly
related to the groups under investigation, the “ingroup” taxa; they are used in tree-
building for determining ancestor-descendant relationships (Felsenstein 2004, p. 6). As
noted in Section 4.1.1, Hittite belongs to the extinct sister-group to the IE languages,
the Anatolian sub-group; the two known dialects of Tocharian, A and B, are extinct
IE speech varieties (Ruhlen 1991, p. 325). Second, Pagel et al. (2007) transformed the
linguistic data into a binary matrix, with 87 rows corresponding to the speech varieties
and 4049 columns corresponding to classes of cognates; speech varieties were coded for
presence or absence of word forms belonging to each cognate class.
I obtained the tree sample from Mark Pagel. I pruned the trees to retain only
the speech varieties corresponding to the 27 societies in the cross-cultural sample (Sec-
tion 4.2.1), plus the outgroup Hittite, using Andrew Meade’s programme BayesTrees. I
preferred this strategy, over the alternative of generating a tree sample for the speech
varieties included in the analysis (e.g. Fortunato et al. 2006), because the accuracy of
phylogenetic tree-building grows with increased sampling of taxa (e.g. Zwickl and Hillis
2002). Hittite was retained for consistency with previous work (Fortunato et al. 2006;
Fortunato and Mace 2009), but was assigned no marriage strategy data for the purpose
of the comparative analysis (Section 4.2.3).
4.2.3 Comparative analysis
Reconstruction of ancestral states using the phylogenetic comparative method devel-
oped by Pagel and colleagues (Pagel and Meade 2005, 2006; Pagel et al. 2004) is
performed using BayesMultistate, available as part of the BayesTraits package (Pagel
and Meade n.d.) from http://www.evolution.rdg.ac.uk/BayesTraits.html. Unless
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otherwise specified, the information in this section is based on Pagel and Meade (2005,
2006), Pagel et al. (2004), and on the BayesTraits manual (Pagel and Meade n.d.). I
describe the method and its application in detail in Appendix C.
Given the cross-cultural data and tree sample, BayesMultistate uses parameters qMP
and qPM to describe the evolution of the trait “marriage strategy” on a tree. qMP
and qPM measure the instantaneous rates of change respectively from monogamy to
polygyny (i.e. from state M to state P) and from polygyny to monogamy (i.e. from
state P to state M); they are used to define the probabilities of these changes, the
probabilities of the two states at internal nodes on the tree, and the likelihood of
the data, which is the probability of the data given the tree and the model of trait
evolution specified by the rates (Pagel 1994, 1997, 1999; Section C.1). In the likelihood
calculations BayesMultistate treats taxa that are not assigned comparative data, like the
outgroup Hittite in this case (Section 4.2.2), as taking any state with equal probability.
In Bayesian RJ-MCMC mode, BayesMultistate uses RJ-MCMC methods to estimate
the posterior probability distributions of rate parameters, of ancestral states at internal
nodes on a tree, and of the possible models of trait evolution specified by the rate
parameters, as described in Sections C.1 and C.2. Four model categories are possible
in this case: that qMP and qPM take distinct positive values, that they take the
same positive value, or that either one is set to zero while the other takes a positive
value. The posterior probability of a parameter value is a quantity proportional to
its likelihood of having produced the observed data, and represents the probability of
the parameter value given the data and model of trait evolution. Schematically, the
posterior probability distributions are estimated by running RJ-MCMC chains that
sample states in the model of trait evolution in proportion to their posterior probability,
across trees in the tree sample; a state in the model consists of model category, values
of the rate parameters, and ancestral state probabilities. Combining estimates over the
sample produced by a chain amounts to “averaging” inferences over uncertainty in the
phylogeny, in the parameters of the model of trait evolution, and in the model itself
(Section 4.1.3).
I performed five sets of analyses, each comprising five separate chains started from
random seeds (Section C.3). One set estimated the posterior probability distributions
of states M and P at internal nodes on the consensus tree summarizing the tree
sample. The means of the posterior probability distributions of states M and P
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at a given node, denoted p(M|node) and p(P|node), are multiplied by the posterior
probability of the node itself, denoted p(node), to produce the combined probabilities
of the two states at the node, denoted p(M) and p(P); p(M|node) + p(P|node) = 1,
thus p(M) + p(P) = p(node). This means that if reconstruction of the node itself is
uncertain, i.e. if p(node) < 1, the value of p(node) sets an upper limit to the confidence
that can be placed in the ancestral state reconstructions for the node. As a rule of
thumb, confidence can be placed in reconstructions with combined probabilities ≥ 0.70.
The other four sets of analyses were used to assess explicitly the relative “fit” of
states M and P at nodes PIH and PIE. For each node, one set of analyses was run
with the node fixed (“fossilized”) to state M and one with the node fixed to state P.
The posterior probability distributions of loge(likelihood) values sampled by the chains
reflect how well a given fossil state fits the node; a measure called the “Bayes factor”,
which is used to compare posterior probability distributions (Kass and Raftery 1995;
Raftery 1996), provides an indication of the strength of the evidence in favour of one
state over the other at the node. The Bayes factor for state M over state P is denoted
BMP. 2 loge(BMP) is approximated as twice the difference between loge[H(likelihood)]
for a chain fixed on state M and loge[H(likelihood)] for a chain fixed on state P, where
loge[H(likelihood)] is the natural logarithm of the harmonic mean of the likelihood
values. In theory, values of 2 loge(BMP) > 0 represent evidence for state M and values
of 2 loge(BMP) < 0 evidence for state P. Specifically, the evidence for a given state is
“weak” for 0 < |2 loge(BMP)| < 2, “positive” for 2 < |2 loge(BMP)| < 5, “strong” for
5 < |2 loge(BMP)| < 10, “very strong” for |2 loge(BMP)| > 10 (Raftery 1996, p. 165). In
practice, however, harmonic means of likelihood values may vary across runs: they are
expected to converge to the same value if the chains are run to infinity. Consequently,
I take the conservative approach recommended by Pagel and Meade (n.d.), which
disregards any evidence for either state given by |2 loge(BMP)| < 2.
I determined the RJ-MCMC chain specifications through preliminary maximum-
likelihood and MCMC runs, all with nodes not fossilized. These specifications,
explained in detail in Section C.3, ensure that the RJ-MCMC chains sample parameter
space adequately and ultimately converge to the posterior probability distribution of
states in the model of trait evolution. I ran the RJ-MCMC chains for 108 iterations,
sampling every 103, with an additional burn-in of 106, and rate deviation set to 50.
All chains used a uniform prior on the models and an exponential prior on the rate
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parameters; the mean of the exponential prior was seeded from a uniform hyperprior
on the interval 0–10. The shape of the prior distribution (exponential or gamma) and
the interval of the hyperprior (0–10 or 0–20) only marginally affected the mean of the
posterior probability distributions of loge(likelihood) values and of ancestral states,
returning qualitatively similar results.
For each set of analyses, convergence to the posterior probability distribution of
states in the model of trait evolution was assessed by comparing the samples returned by
the separate chains, through visual inspection of (i) time-series plots of loge(likelihood)
values, (ii) the posterior probability distributions of model categories, and (iii) the
average deviation of parameter estimates across runs. The near-independence of
sampling events was judged from the autocorrelation of the loge(likelihood) values of
successive states sampled by the chains. In all cases, these diagnostics indicated that
the chains sampled the target distributions adequately.
4.3 Results
For each set of analyses, I compared the loge[H(likelihood)] values for the states in
the model of trait evolution sampled by the separate chains at convergence; I present
results for the chain that returned the median value of the loge[H(likelihood)].
I discuss the ancestral state estimation at nodes on the consensus tree in Sec-
tion 4.3.1 and the fossilization of nodes PIH and PIE in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Estimation of ancestral states on the consensus tree
At convergence, the chain sampled states in the model of trait evolution with mean
loge(likelihood) ± SD = −11.43 ± 0.93 (range: −21.34 to −9.94; auto-correlation
coefficient: r = 0.003; mean acceptance rate: 22.9%; Section C.3).
I discuss separately the posterior probability distribution of model categories
returned by the chain (Section 4.3.1.1) and the ancestral state estimates over all model
categories (Section 4.3.1.2).
4.3.1.1 Posterior probability distribution of model categories
The chain sampled the four possible model categories with the frequencies reported in
Table 4.1a: for example, qMP and qPM were assigned to the same rate class in 87.8% of
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the 105 sampled points (model category 1). Over the four model categories, rates were
assigned to 1.01± 0.08 non-zero classes (mean ± SD; range: 1–2 non-zero classes); this
indicates that the evolutionary transitions that produced the observed distribution of
states of marriage strategy across societies in the sample can be described by a simple
model of trait evolution based on only one non-zero rate class.
Nodes PIH and PIE reconstructed as monogamy with high posterior probabilities
under model categories 1, 3, and 4, and as polygyny with p(P|node) = 1 under model
category 2 (Table 4.1b). In the latter category, transitions from monogamy to polygyny
are excluded, because qMP is set to zero. This forces nodes PIH and PIE to reconstruct
as polygyny: under this category, any variation in states of marriage strategy at the
tips of the tree is the result of transitions from polygyny to monogamy. In other
words, the presence of polygyny at the tips could not be accounted for if PIH and/or
PIE reconstructed as monogamy. However, models in category 2 returned a mean
loge(likelihood) value 1.67 units worse than models in the category that returned the
best mean loge(likelihood) value (category 1, Table 4.1a), and 1.47 units worse than
the mean loge(likelihood) value over the four model categories. This suggests that the
evolutionary scenario described by model category 2 (“deep” polygyny; no transitions
from monogamy to polygyny) is unlikely to have produced the observed distribution of
states of marriage strategy across societies in the sample.
4.3.1.2 Posterior probability distributions of ancestral states
Over the four model categories, nodes PIH and PIE reconstructed as monogamy with
high posterior probabilities (Table 4.1b). The posterior probability distribution is more
strongly skewed towards high values for state M at node PIE, as reflected in the higher
value of p(M|node) at this node (Figures 4.2 and 4.3).
Monogamy reconstructed with high posterior probabilities through to nodes A and
B on the consensus tree summarizing the tree sample, but phylogenetic uncertainty
limits the confidence that can be placed in these inferences (Figure 4.4 and Table 4.2).
Node D (the common ancestor of societies speaking Italic, Germanic, and Celtic
languages) and node F (the common ancestor of societies speaking Baltic and Slavic
languages) reconstructed as monogamy with high posterior probabilities. Node E (the
common ancestor of societies speaking Indian and Iranian languages) reconstructed as
polygyny with high posterior probability.
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p(M | node) ± SD = 0.70 ± 0.27, p(P | node) ± SD = 0.30 ± 0.27
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Figure 4.2: Posterior probability distributions of states M and P at node PIH.
p(M | node) ± SD = 0.83 ± 0.31, p(P | node) ± SD = 0.17 ± 0.31
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Figure 4.3: Posterior probability distributions of states M and P at node PIE.
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Panjabi ST
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Kashmiri
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Figure 4.4: The consensus tree of Figure 4.1 for 27 IE speech varieties plus Hittite. The
value above each node represents the node’s posterior probability, p(node), as a percentage.
Tips are colour-coded to represent the marriage strategy of the corresponding societies (white:
monogamy; black: polygyny; Hittite was not assigned marriage strategy data). Nodes are
colour-coded to represent the combined probabilities of the two states [white: p(M) ≥ 0.70;
black p(P) ≥ 0.70; other nodes have combined probability < 0.70 for both states].
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Table 4.2: Ancestral states of marriage strategy at selected nodes on the consensus tree
Node*† p(node) p(M|node) ± SD (range) p(P|node) ± SD (range)
A 0.49 0.77± 0.29 (0.00–1.00) 0.23± 0.29 (0.00–1.00)
B 0.78 0.82± 0.31 (0.00–1.00) 0.18± 0.31 (0.00–1.00)
C 0.48 0.61± 0.21 (0.00–1.00) 0.39± 0.21 (0.00–1.00)
D 0.78 0.93± 0.08 (0.50–1.00) 0.07± 0.08 (0.00–0.50)
E 1.00 0.08± 0.09 (0.00–1.00) 0.92± 0.09 (0.00–1.00)
F 1.00 0.96± 0.04 (0.50–1.00) 0.04± 0.04 (0.00–0.50)
* The letters correspond to the node labels in Figure 4.4.
† The combined probabilities, p(M) and p(P), are obtained as p(M) = p(M|node) · p(node) and
p(P) = p(P|node) · p(node) (Section 4.2.3).
The uncertainty in the reconstructions at the base of the consensus tree means that
a host of scenarios can explain the distribution of states of marriage strategy at the
tips (Figure 4.4). Polygyny was acquired at least once on the tree, between nodes PIE
and E, and possibly a second time in the branch leading to Albanian G. A minimum
of two reversals to monogamy occurred, one in the branch leading to Panjabi ST and
one in the branch leading to Singhalese.
4.3.2 Fossilization of nodes PIH and PIE
At convergence, the chains fossilizing nodes PIH and PIE sampled states in the model
of trait evolution as shown in Table 4.3 (Section C.3).
Comparison of the loge[H(likelihood)] values yields 2 loge(BMP) ≈ 1.66 at node
PIH (Table 4.3a), corresponding to no evidence for monogamy over polygyny by
the conservative criteria used, and 2 loge(BMP) ≈ 3.35 at node PIE (Table 4.3b),
corresponding to positive evidence for monogamy over polygyny.
Overall, these results confirm the ancestral state estimates obtained with nodes not
fossilized (Section 4.3.1.2); in particular, the magnitude of the evidence for monogamy
at node PIE reflects the strong skew towards high values for state M in the posterior
probability distribution (Figure 4.3).
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Table 4.3: Summary parameters for the samples returned by the fossilization chains
(a) Node PIH
Parameter Fossil state
M P
Mean loge(likelihood) ± SD −11.44± 0.78 −12.82± 0.80
Range of loge(likelihood) values −20.91 to −9.91 −21.05 to −10.74
Autocorrelation coefficient r 0.001 −0.001
Mean acceptance rate 21.0% 24.8%
loge[H(likelihood)] −12.60 −13.43
(b) Node PIE
Parameter Fossil state
M P
Mean loge(likelihood) ± SD −11.27± 0.76 −13.19± 1.01
Range of loge(likelihood) values −21.07 to −9.94 −21.98 to −10.74
Autocorrelation coefficient r −0.001 0.001
Mean acceptance rate 21.3% 25.1%
loge[H(likelihood)] −12.38 −14.05
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4.4 Discussion
The phylogenetic comparative analysis of marriage strategies across societies speaking
IE languages provides evidence in support of PIE monogamy; this pattern likely
extended back to PIH, but the evidence is only suggestive. Polygyny evolved at least
once, possibly twice, throughout the history of IE-speaking societies, but uncertainty
in some of the “deep” reconstructions means that alternative evolutionary scenarios
cannot be excluded. This uncertainty emphasizes the need for an explicitly historical
approach when deriving inferences about past social organization from cross-cultural
data, and to cross-cultural comparison more generally. In turn, the uncertainty in the
phylogenetic model used to represent how the societies are related by descent stresses
the importance of avoiding “best tree” approaches in phylogenetic comparative analysis.
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, Fortunato and Mace (2009) used a “best” tree in
the phylogenetic comparative analysis of marriage strategies and strategies of wealth
transfer at marriage in IE-speaking societies. The present findings suggest that their
reconstruction of PIH monogamy is not contingent upon the phylogenetic tree used.
Further, while the outgroup Hittite was not assigned marriage strategy data in the
present analysis (Section 4.2.2), it was coded as monogamous in Fortunato and Mace’s
(2009); this was necessary because the phylogenetic comparative method they used
did not allow missing data (Pagel n.d.).1 The present findings indicate that the
reconstruction by Fortunato and Mace (2009) is not contingent upon the state they
assigned to the outgroup. Applying a phylogenetic comparative approach to the
1The marriage strategy coding for Hittite in Fortunato and Mace (2009) was based on information
from the Hittite code of laws, a compendium of approximately 200 clauses dating back to at least
1650 bce (Bryce 2002, p. 34). Several clauses of the code deal with marriage and with the property
and inheritance rights of spouses and their offspring; the fact that no reference is made to multiple
wives in this context suggests that only monogamous marriages were officially recognized (Bryce 2002,
pp. 132–133). However, the code also stipulates that a man’s widow be married to his brother, father,
or father’s brother (Bryce 2002, p. 131; Gurney 1975, p. 101; Hoffner 1997, p. 152). The relevant
clause does not specify that the widow be married to a wifeless kinsman, thus it is possible — and
indeed likely in the case of marriage to the man’s father or father’s brother — that this provision
resulted in polygynous unions (Bryce 2002, p. 132). Finally, the Hittite king was expected to supply
the kingdom with royal progeny to fulfil political, administrative, and diplomatic office, a reproductive
onus accomplished through a harem of secondary wives and concubines (Bryce 2002, pp. 27–29). This
suggests that polygynous mating, if not polygynous marriage, was sanctioned in at least one case;
however, there is no evidence to indicate that this applied to other members of Hittite society (Bryce
2002, p. 132).
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marriage transfer strategy data, in a Bayesian MCMC framework, Fortunato et al.
(2006) showed that the reconstruction of PIH dowry is similarly robust to phylogenetic
tree model and coding of the outgroup.
More generally, these reconstructions push the origin of monogamous marriage into
prehistory, well beyond the earliest instances documented in the historical record.
This implies that the archaeological and genetic evidence for the nuclear family in
prehistoric populations may reflect a monogamous marriage strategy; on their own,
the archaeological and genetic data can at best provide clues about a monogamous
mating pattern. For example, Haak et al. (2008) found evidence, through analysis of
aDNA samples, of genetic relatedness of one adult male and one adult female with
two children recovered in one burial at the site of Eulau, Germany, a late Neolithic
community (c. 2600 bce) attributed to the Corded Ware culture; they argued that this
establishes “the presence of the classic nuclear family in a prehistoric context in Central
Europe” (Haak et al. 2008, p. 18229). Similarly, Bentley et al. (2008) identified a nuclear
family, comprising an adult male, an adult female, a mature female, and two children,
through analysis of the isotopic signatures of skeletal remains in the communal grave
at Talheim, Germany, an early Neolithic community (c. 4900–4800 bce) attributed to
the Linear Ware culture; previous analysis of the teeth had revealed high similarity
between the male and the children, suggestive of genetic relatedness. The Corded
Ware and Linear Ware cultures are archaeological horizons of northern and central
Europe associated with populations speaking IE languages (Mallory 1997a,b). The
phylogenetic comparative analysis in this chapter shows that monogamous marriage
prevailed among prehistorical IE-speaking societies located in Europe. At least to the
extent that evidence from a single grave can substantiate claims such as Haak et al.’s
(2008), this suggests that the burial patterns may reflect the monogamous marriage
strategy of the Eulau and Talheim communities.
Larger-scale analyses of Y-chromosome data provided evidence for a later increase
in effective male population size compared to effective female population size, across
European (Dupanloup et al. 2003; Pereira et al. 2001) and worldwide (Dupanloup
et al. 2003) samples. One possible interpretation of this pattern is that the difference
in effective populations was caused by a regime of polygynous mating, which resulted
in greater variance in reproductive success for males than for females (Dupanloup et al.
2003; Pereira et al. 2001). Further, Dupanloup et al. (2003) interpreted the delayed
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increase in the effective male population as evidence for a relatively recent shift from
polygynous to monogamous mating; based on Pritchard et al.’s (1999) estimates for
the timing of expansion of Y-chromosome data, they linked this shift to the emergence
of food production, between 10,000 and 5000 years ago in Europe and Asia and more
recently elsewhere, when “Nuclear families replaced the polygamous, extended-family
compounds typical of hunting-gathering populations” (Dupanloup et al. 2003, p. 96).1
The reconstruction of PIE monogamy presented in this chapter, with monogamy likely
extending back to PIH, falls within this temporal interval (Section 4.1.1), suggesting
that monogamous marriage had emerged in Eurasia by that time. However, Dupanloup
et al.’s (2003) interpretation holds only to the extent that the shift to the “nuclear
family”, i.e. from polygynous to monogamous marriage, coincided with a shift from
polygynous to monogamous mating, with consequent reduction in the variance in male
reproductive success. As noted in Section 2.1, the historical and ethnographic evidence
suggest that variance in male reproductive success is comparable in societies practising
monogamous and polygynous marriage.
Finally, and most importantly, the phylogenetic comparative analysis confutes
explanations linking the emergence of monogamous marriage to the development of
features of social organization typically associated with “complex”, “modern” societies
located in Eurasia. The work presented in Chapters 2 and 3 situates variation
in marriage strategies in the context of variation in ecological factors, linking the
prevalence of monogamy across Eurasian societies to the development of intensive
modes of production. Diamond (1998) has convincingly argued that the relative
greater “complexity” of these societies, and their consequent “modernization”, can
also be attributed to ecological determinants that facilitated the emergence of food
production in the region. This raises the possibility that ecological factors act as
a confounding variable in the observed relationship between marriage strategies and
indicators of “societal complexity” and “modernization”. An appeal to “complexity”
and “modernization” as the terminus of explanation amounts to providing a proximate
answer to ultimate questions about the evolution of marriage strategies.
1As discussed in Section 1.2.3.2, technically the “nuclear family” exists in societies practising
monogamous and polygamous marriage. Instead, Dupanloup et al. (2003) use the concept as
synonymous with non-extended and monogamous family organization.
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Chapter 5
Reconstructing the history of
residence strategies in
Indo-European-speaking societies
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background
Residence strategies regulate the dispersal of individuals at marriage; like dispersal
strategies in other species, they determine the pattern of differential access of individ-
uals to kin (Strier 2008). By structuring the spatial arrangement of individuals within
groups, this feature of social organization represents one key factor influencing the
pattern of co-operation and competition among relatives within groups (Section 6.1).
Reconstructing the history of residence strategies is thus crucial to understanding the
evolution of human social behaviour. In anthropology, the notion of the centrality of
residence to social structure is captured by the influential theory, advanced by Lowie
(1920) and formalized by Murdock (1949, pp. 221–222), according to which changes
in residence drive changes in descent system and kinship terminology (see review in
Levinson and Malone 1980, pp. 105–113).
In this chapter I reconstruct the pattern of change in residence strategies in
the history of societies speaking IE languages, using the phylogenetic comparative
approach outlined in Chapter 4; in Chapter 6 I use this approach to investigate
the co-evolutionary interactions of residence strategies with marriage strategies in
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IE-speaking societies. Accurate inference of early IE residence is also important for
correctly describing the homeland and trajectory of dispersal of the IE language family:
reconstructions of this aspect of social organization have been used in linguistics and
archaeology to constrain hypotheses about the origin and spread of IE languages
(Section 1.2.3.2). For example, Gimbutas (1991) excluded Anatolia and south-eastern
and central Europe as potential IE homelands because the Neolithic communities living
in these regions were “matrifocal”, whereas early IE society was reconstructed as
patrilineal and patrilocal (cited in Mallory 1997c, p. 483).
Definitions of residence strategies have varied across time and across authors, and
this has generated considerable confusion in the literature (Levinson and Malone 1980,
pp. 100–101; e.g. Goodenough 1956; Murdock 1962). For example, in the EA Murdock
(1967b) terms residence with or near the husband’s male patrilineal kin “patrilocal” if
the patrikin are aggregated in patrilocal and patrilineal groups, “virilocal” if they are
not. In contrast, Fox (1967, p. 84) uses “patrilocal” for residence with the husband’s
father, and “virilocal” for residence with the husband’s group more generally. The
degree of terminological sophistication implicit in these definitions seems redundant
in the absence of theoretical justification: all scenarios involve the movement of wives
to their husband’s kin at marriage, as opposed to the movement of husbands to their
wife’s. Therefore, I follow Keesing (1975, p. 37) in using “virilocality” for residence with
or near the husband’s kin, “uxorilocality” for residence with or near the wife’s kin, and
“neolocality” for residence apart from the kin of either spouse; this usage is preferable
because it reflects the literal meaning of the terms (Parkin 1997, p. 31). However, use
of the simpler definitions does not imply that residence is unrelated to other aspects
of social organization; rather, by focusing on the spatial arrangement of individuals
within groups, it avoids incorporating in the analyses any unnecessary assumptions
about these relationships that may be built into the convoluted categorizations.
5.1.2 Related research
Like marriage strategies (Section 4.1.2), early IE residence strategies have been recon-
structed on the basis of linguistic and ethnographic evidence. The linguistic evidence
is more substantial in this case, but its interpretation has been strongly biased towards
virilocality by the purportedly “male-centred” structure of early IE society (Clackson
2007, pp. 201–206; e.g. Anthony 2007, p. 92). I discuss the linguistic arguments in
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detail to highlight the “anthropological absurdity” (Szemere´nyi 1977, p. 196) of some
of the conclusions drawn from them.
Much of the discussion about early IE residence revolves around the reconstructed
terminology for affines (in-laws) (reviewed in Clackson 2007, pp. 201–206). Terms that
can be related to the PIH form are used in Indo-Iranian, Latin, Germanic, Celtic, and
Albanian languages for the in-laws of husband and wife, but only for wife’s in-laws
in Greek, Slavic, Baltic, and Armenian languages. One possible interpretation of this
pattern is that the original terms were used in PIH for the in-laws of husband and
wife, and that Greek, Slavic, Baltic, and Armenian languages independently developed
terms for husband’s in-laws (Hettrich 1985; Szemere´nyi 1977). The use of one set of
terms for both classes of affines in PIH is explained by assuming that PIH residence
was neolocal, such that husbands and wives had equal access to their in-laws. In turn,
the fact that the terms related to the PIH form are invariably used for wife’s in-laws
in Greek, Slavic, Baltic, and Armenian languages is explained by assuming that the
shift in meaning was caused by a shared change in social structure. For example, a
transition from neo- to virilocality in the ancestor of speakers of these languages would
explain the restriction in meaning of the PIH-derived terms to wife’s in-laws: if the
wife joined her husband’s kin at marriage, she would have greater contact with her
in-laws than the husband with his; this would result in wives eventually co-opting the
original PIH terms for designating their in-laws (Clackson 2007, p. 205). Consistent
with this scenario, languages using derivatives of the reconstructed PIH terms for wife’s
in-laws only are located at the centre of the IE geographic range; with the exception
of Albanian, languages using derivatives of the reconstructed terms for affines on both
sides are located on its eastern and western edges (Clackson 2007, p. 205; Hettrich
1985).
An alternative interpretation prevails in the literature, following Delbru¨ck (1889),
which posits that PIH speakers used the original terms only for wife’s in-laws. The
fact that no specific terms can be reconstructed for husband’s in-laws is explained by
assuming that affines in this class were designated in PIH through generic terms: for
example, Greek uses a generic term for wife’s father, wife’s brother, and daughter’s
husband. In turn, the use of generic terms for husband’s in-laws is explained by
assuming that PIH residence was virilocal: if the wife joined her husband’s kin at
marriage, the husband would have limited contact with his wife’s kin and would not
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need specific terms to designate them (Clackson 2007, pp. 201, 205). Consistent with
this scenario, the reconstructed PIH term for the verb “lead” is related to the Indo-
Iranian term for “bride” (attested in Avestan, Iranian sub-group, first millennium bce,
and in Sanskrit, Indic sub-group, c. 1000 ce onwards) and to terms used in languages
belonging to the North-Western group to indicate the act of becoming married from the
male perspective (attested in New English, Germanic sub-group, c. 1500 ce onwards;
in New Welsh, Celtic sub-group, c. 1500 ce onwards; in Old Prussian, Baltic sub-
group, c. sixteenth to eighteenth centuries ce; and in Lithuanian, Baltic sub-group,
c. eighteenth century ce onwards) (Mallory and Adams 2006, p. 207). This suggests
that the PIH bride was “led away” at marriage to join the house of her husband or
husband’s kin (e.g. Mallory 1989, pp. 83, 123). However, the use of terms for “lead” in
the context of marriage may relate to some aspect of the wedding ceremony rather than
to residence customs (Clackson 2007, p. 205). Further, residence of the wife in the house
of her husband constitutes virilocality if the husband resides with his (father’s) kin, and
neolocality otherwise (Section 5.1.1). This terminological confusion likely stems from
an obsolete definition of residence strategies that subsumes both cases, the former as
“viripatrilocality”, under “patrilocality” (e.g. Szemere´nyi 1977).
More importantly, all of the 137 terminologies listed in Morgan’s (1871) Systems of
consanguinity and affinity of the human family include specific terms for at least some
of the husband’s in-laws (Goody 1959). Thus, a system like the one ascribed to PIH
under this scenario, lacking specific terms for all of the husband’s affines, is not attested
in the ethnographic record. The terminology that more closely resembles the system
reconstructed for PIH obtains among the Laguna of the Western Pueblos, who have a
specific term for “husband’s father” but not for “wife’s father”, and no recorded terms
for “wife’s siblings”. Ironically, however, the Laguna lack a specific term for “wife’s
father” because they are uxorilocal (and matrilineal): husbands marry in and designate
their father-in-law as “father”. On this evidence, the only plausible conclusion that can
be drawn from the prevailing reconstruction of PIH affinal terminologies is that PIH
society was uxorilocal (and matrilineal). It comes as no surprise, then, that supporters
of the “male-centred” structure of early IE society should omit Goody’s (1959) careful
analysis from their discussions of early IE residence (e.g. Mallory 1997c).
If bias in interpretation of the linguistic evidence can be attributed to the excessive
reliance of Indo-Europeanists on “the discarded hypotheses of social anthropology”
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(Goody 1959, p. 91), bias in interpretation of the ethnographic data can be attributed
to their reliance on discarded methods. For example, Mallory (1997c, p. 483) adduces
the prevalence of virilocality among the historically attested IE-speaking societies in
favour of this residence strategy for early IE society. However, distributional reasoning
of this type, based on unsystematic and ahistorical use of the ethnographic evidence,
can easily lead to spurious inference about the history of cultural practices (Fortunato
2008; Fortunato et al. 2006; Section 4.1).
Murdock’s (1949, p. 349) reconstruction, based on the distribution of aspects of
social organization across societies speaking languages belonging to the major divisions
of the IE family, was discussed in Section 4.1.2. The Eskimo system of social
organization attributed to early IE society under this reconstruction features neolocality
in its typical form and non-neolocal residence in its variant sub-types.
5.1.3 Rationale and objective
As with marriage strategies (Section 4.1.3), previous reconstructions of early IE
residence strategies have relied on unsystematic and ahistorical use of the linguistic
and ethnographic evidence. Additionally, in this case inferences have been plagued by
substantial bias in interpretation.
The phylogenetic comparative approach used in Chapter 4 provides a systematic
and explicitly historical framework for investigating cross-cultural variation (Sec-
tion 1.2.3.2). Here I use this approach to reconstruct the pattern of change in residence
strategies in the history of IE-speaking societies, and to formally evaluate one of the
scenarios derived from the linguistic evidence (Section 5.1.2). Assuming that PIH
speakers used the same terms for the in-laws of husbands and wives, the shared
restriction in meaning in Greek, Slavic, Baltic, and Armenian languages, in which
PIH-derived terms are used only for wife’s in-laws, has been attributed to a shared
transition from neo- to virilocality. I reconstruct the residence strategy for the ancestor
of speakers of these languages and, for comparison, for the ancestor of speakers of
Indo-Iranian, Latin, Germanic, Celtic, and Albanian languages, in which PIH-derived
terms are used for the in-laws of both husbands and wives. If the former did indeed
experience a shift from neo- to virilocality, the reconstructions at the two nodes should
differ substantially.
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5.2 Data and methods
Following the procedure set out in Section 4.2, I used data on residence strategy from the
EA (Gray 1999; Murdock 1967b) for a sample of 27 IE-speaking societies (Section 5.2.1),
mapped onto Pagel et al.’s (2007) sample of trees (Section 5.2.2). On the cross-cultural
data and tree sample, I used the phylogenetic comparative method implemented in
BayesMultistate to reconstruct ancestral states of residence strategy (Section 5.2.3).
5.2.1 Cross-cultural data
I obtained the cross-cultural sample as described in Section 4.2.1. The data in binary
form and maps of their geographical distribution are in Section B.2.
The EA scores societies separately for prevailing and alternative modes of residence
(variables 12 and 14, respectively; Gray 1999), the latter defined as “culturally pat-
terned alternatives to, or significant deviations from, the prevailing profile” (Murdock
1967b, p. 156); a strategy is defined as prevailing when it exceeds the other in frequency
by a ratio greater than 2 to 1. I included information from both variables in the
analyses, thus addressing the persistent criticism of cross-cultural research that this
approach ignores intra-societal variability in cultural practices (Burton and White 1987;
Levinson and Malone 1980, p. 9). In order to give higher weight to the prevailing mode
of residence, I assigned each society three columns of data: two identical columns
specifying the prevailing pattern and a third column specifying the alternative pattern
(Section 5.2.3). The prevailing mode was used at all three columns for societies scored as
not presenting an alternative mode. This arbitrary weighting scheme broadly captures
the definitions of prevailing and alternative modes of residence used in the EA codes.
For each mode of residence, I coded societies as neolocal (state N), uxorilocal
(state U), or virilocal (state V), as defined in Section 5.1.1. State V subsumed both
cases in which the husband’s male patrilineal kin are aggregated in patrilocal and
patrilineal groups, and cases in which they are not; as noted in Section 5.1.1, these
are termed respectively “patrilocal” and “virilocal” in the EA. I used the dual state
UV for ambilocal societies, in which residence is established optionally with (or near)
the kin of either spouse and with approximately equal frequency (Murdock 1967b;
Section 5.2.3). For example, the Afghans are scored in the EA as practising patrilocality
with no alternative, and were coded “V, V, V”. The Byelorussians are scored as
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practising prevailing ambilocality with alternative neolocality, and were coded “UV,
UV, N”. The Greeks are scored as practising prevailing virilocality with alternative
neolocality, and were coded “V, V, N”. This produced a sample with 2 (7.4%) of
27 societies coded as practising prevailing ambilocality (both practising alternative
neolocality), 5 (18.5%) coded as practising prevailing neolocality (with 1 practising
alternative uxorilocality and 1 practising alternative virilocality), and 20 (74.1%) coded
as practising prevailing virilocality (with 9 practising alternative neolocality and 2
practising alternative uxorilocality) (Table B.2 and Figures B.2c and B.2d).
5.2.2 Tree sample
I obtained the tree sample as described in Section 4.2.2. The outgroup Hittite
was assigned no residence strategy data for the purpose of the comparative analysis
(Section 5.2.3).
5.2.3 Comparative analysis
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, BayesMultistate uses the cross-cultural data and tree
sample to estimate parameters in the model of trait evolution (Section C.1). In this case
the comparative data consisted of three “sites”, two representing the prevailing mode
of residence and one representing the alternative mode, each taking three states (N,
U, V) (Section 5.2.1). In analyses with multiple sites, BayesMultistate uses information
from the sites simultaneously to estimate a single set of rate parameters specifying the
model of trait evolution. Three states require six rate parameters — in this case, qNU,
qNV, qUN, qUV, qVN, qVU.
As noted in Section 4.2.3, in the likelihood calculations BayesMultistate treats
taxa that are not assigned comparative data, like the outgroup Hittite in this case
(Section 5.2.2), as taking any state with equal probability. Similarly, BayesMultistate
treats taxa that are assigned multiple states at a site as taking those states with equal
probability at the relevant site; this applied to the two societies that were assigned the
dual state UV, representing ambilocality. BayesMultistate’s treatment of these cases is
consistent with the definition of ambilocality, where residence with husband’s or wife’s
kin occurs with approximately equal frequency (Section 5.2.1).
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, in Bayesian RJ-MCMC mode BayesMultistate uses RJ-
MCMC chains to produce a posterior probability sample of states in the model of trait
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evolution (Sections C.1 and C.2). I performed eight sets of analyses, each comprising
five separate chains started from random seeds (Section C.3). One set estimated the
posterior probability distributions of states N, U, and V at internal nodes on the
consensus tree summarizing the tree sample; the chains returned separate distributions
for prevailing and alternative modes of residence. The means of the posterior probability
distributions of states N, U, and V for a given node, p(N|node), p(U|node), and
p(V|node), are multiplied by the posterior probability of the node, p(node), to produce
the combined probabilities of the three states at the node, p(N), p(U), and p(V);
p(N|node) + p(U|node) + p(V|node) = 1, thus p(N) + p(U) + p(V) = p(node). As
noted in Section 4.2.3, the value of p(node) sets an upper limit on the confidence that
can be placed in the reconstructions at the node. As a rule of thumb, confidence can
be placed in reconstructions with combined probabilities ≥ 0.70.
A further six sets of analyses fossilized nodes PIH and PIE: for each node, one set
of analyses was run with the node fixed to state N, one with the node fixed to state
U, and one with the node fixed to state V. BayesMultistate does not allow sites to
be fossilized separately, therefore each run fixed all three sites to the same state. As
discussed in Section 4.2.3, the fossilization procedure is used to assess the relative “fit”
of the alternative states at a node; in this case, the chains returned a single posterior
probability distribution of loge(likelihood) values, which effectively “averaged” the fit
of the fossil state at the node across the three sites. I used the Bayes factor procedure
described in Section 4.2.3 to assess the strength of the evidence in favour of one state
over another at a given node.
The final set of analyses used BayesMultistate’s “most recent common ancestor”
(MRCA) approach to estimate the posterior probability distributions of states N, U,
and V at two nodes. One node represented the ancestor of societies speaking languages
in which PIH-derived terms are used only for wife’s in-laws (Greek, Slavic, Baltic,
and Armenian languages); the other represented the ancestor of societies speaking
languages in which PIH-derived terms are used for in-laws on both sides (Indo-Iranian,
Latin, Germanic, Celtic, and Albanian languages). I denote these nodes “CORE” and
“EDGE”, respectively, to reflect the geographic distribution of the two sets of languages
(Section 5.1.2 and Table 5.1). As discussed in Section 5.1.3, one scenario derived from
the linguistic evidence assumes that a transition from neo- to virilocality occurred in
the ancestor of the first set of societies (corresponding to node CORE); a difference in
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Table 5.1: Speech varieties included in the MRCAs
MRCA Sub-group* Speech variety†
CORE Armenian Armenian Mod
Baltic Lithuanian ST
Greek Greek MD
Slavic Bulgarian, Byelorussian, Czech, Russian, Serbocroatian,
Ukrainian
EDGE Albanian Albanian G
Celtic Irish B
Germanic Dutch List
Indo-Iranian Afghan, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kashmiri, Ossetic, Panjabi
ST, Persian List, Singhalese, Waziri
Latin Italian, Portuguese ST, Rumanian List, Spanish, Walloon
* After Clackson (2007, p. 201).
† After Dyen et al. (1992).
the reconstructions at the two nodes, reflecting the shift in residence strategies at node
CORE, would provide evidence for this scenario. By definition, a node representing the
MRCA of a set of taxa exists in all trees in a tree sample: in some it includes only the
taxa of interest, while in others it includes additional taxa besides the taxa of interest.
Therefore, MRCAs have p(node) = 1, such that p(N|node) = p(N), p(U|node) = p(U),
and p(V|node) = p(V) at nodes CORE and EDGE. The chains returned separate
posterior probability distributions for prevailing and alternative modes of residence.
I determined the RJ-MCMC chain specifications through preliminary maximum-
likelihood and MCMC runs, all with nodes not fossilized. As noted in Section 4.2.3,
these specifications ensure that the RJ-MCMC chains sample parameter space ade-
quately and ultimately converge to the posterior probability distribution of states in
the model of trait evolution (Section C.3). I ran the RJ-MCMC chains for 108 iterations,
sampling every 103, with an additional burn-in of 106, and rate deviation set to 30.
Under maximum-likelihood the covarion model for trait evolution improved the mean
loge(likelihood) by 2.6 units, and was therefore implemented by the RJ-MCMC chains;
this model allows rates to vary within and between branches of a tree. All chains used
a uniform prior on the models and an exponential prior on the rate parameters; the
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mean of the exponential prior was seeded from a uniform hyperprior on the interval
0–10. The shape of the prior distribution (exponential or gamma) and the interval
of the hyperprior (0–10 or 0–20) only marginally affected the mean of the posterior
probability distributions of loge(likelihood) values and of ancestral states, returning
qualitatively similar results.
Convergence of the chains to the target distributions and near-independence of
sampling events were assessed as described in Section 4.2.3. In all cases, the diagnostics
indicated that the chains sampled the target distributions adequately.
5.3 Results
For each set of analyses, I compared the loge[H(likelihood)] values for the states in
the model of trait evolution sampled by the separate chains at convergence; I present
results for the chain that returned the median value of the loge[H(likelihood)].
I discuss the ancestral state estimation at nodes on the consensus tree in Sec-
tion 5.3.1, the fossilization of nodes PIH and PIE in Section 5.3.2, and the ancestral
state estimation at the MRCAs in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.1 Estimation of ancestral states on the consensus tree
At convergence, the chain sampled states in the model of trait evolution with mean
loge(likelihood) ± SD = −44.13 ± 1.61 (range: −55.47 to −39.87; auto-correlation
coefficient: r = 0.017; mean acceptance rate: 28.8%; Section C.3).
I discuss separately the posterior probability distribution of model categories
returned by the chain (Section 5.3.1.1) and the ancestral state estimates over all model
categories (Section 5.3.1.2).
5.3.1.1 Posterior probability distribution of model categories
The chain sampled 268 model categories, with rates assigned to 1.76 ± 0.46 non-zero
classes (mean ± SD; range: 1–4 non-zero classes). Therefore, some of the evolutionary
transitions specified by the six rate parameters are not required for explaining the
observed distribution of states of residence strategy across societies in the sample.
This is illustrated by Table 5.2, which presents the ten model categories sampled
most frequently by the chain, accounting for 73.2% of the 105 sampled points; the
82
5.3. RESULTS
Table 5.2: Rate classes and frequencies for selected model categories
Model category Rate class* Frequency†
qNU qNV qUN qUV qVN qVU Absolute Relative cumulative
1 0 0 0 0 0 Z 17209 0.172
2 0 0 0 0 1 Z 15793 0.330
3 0 1 1 1 0 Z 10163 0.432
4 0 1 1 Z 0 Z 6253 0.494
5 0 0 0 Z 0 Z 5638 0.551
6 0 1 1 0 0 Z 4997 0.601
7 0 0 0 Z 1 Z 3617 0.637
8 0 0 0 1 1 Z 3349 0.670
9 0 0 1 0 1 Z 3084 0.701
10 0 0 Z 0 1 Z 3083 0.732
...
...
100 Z 0 0 0 0 0 14 0.994
* “Z” denotes rates assigned to the zero class. “0” and “1” denote two distinct non-zero rate
classes; rates with the same value are assigned to the same non-zero rate class. For example,
under model category 1 qNU, qNV, qUN, qUV, and qVN are assigned to the same non-zero rate
class, that is, they take the same positive value, while qVU is assigned to the zero rate class,
that is, it is set to zero.
† The relative cumulative frequency of a model category is obtained by summing the absolute
frequency of sampled points in the model category to the absolute frequencies of sampled
points in all preceding categories, and then dividing by the total number of sampled points in
all categories [e.g. (17, 209 + 15, 793)/105 = 0.330 for model category 2].
hundredth most frequently sampled category is included for comparison. In the top
ten model categories rate parameter qVU was always set to zero, while the other five
rate parameters were set to zero or assigned to one or two non-zero classes.
Consistently, over all model categories the mean value of qVU was an order of
magnitude smaller than the mean values of the other five rate parameters (Figure 5.1).
qVU specifies transitions from viri- to uxorilocality; uxorilocality is observed only
in the two ambilocal societies, Byelorussian and Dutch List, as prevailing mode of
residence, and as alternative mode in Singhalese, Italian, and Armenian Mod (Table B.2
and Section 5.3.1.2). This suggests that the acquisition of uxorilocality is more likely
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Figure 5.1: Rate parameters describing the evolution of residence strategy. Over all model
categories, the mean ± SD is 5.93 ± 3.80 for qNU, 8.50 ± 4.92 for qNV, 7.98 ± 5.87 for qUN,
6.35± 5.44 for qUV, 3.89± 1.81 for qVN, and 0.16± 0.68 for qVU.
to have occurred through neolocality than through virilocality throughout the history
of societies in the sample.
5.3.1.2 Posterior probability distributions of ancestral states
Over all model categories, node PIE reconstructed as prevailing virilocality and alter-
native neolocality with high posterior probabilities; reconstructions for node PIH were
in the same direction but less certain (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). The posterior probability
distributions are more strongly skewed towards high values for state V (as prevailing
mode) and state N (as alternative mode) at node PIE, as reflected in the higher values
of, respectively, p(V|node) and p(N|node) at this node.
Prevailing virilocality and alternative neolocality reconstructed with high posterior
probabilities through to nodes A, B, and C on the consensus tree summarizing the
tree sample, but phylogenetic uncertainty limits the confidence that can be placed
in these inferences (Figure 5.4 and Table 5.3). Node D (the common ancestor of
societies speaking Italic, Germanic, and Celtic languages) reconstructed as alternative
neolocality with high posterior probability, but this inference is similarly affected by
phylogenetic uncertainty. Node E (the common ancestor of societies speaking Indian
and Iranian languages) reconstructed as prevailing virilocality with high posterior
probability. Node F (the common ancestor of societies speaking Baltic and Slavic
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p(N | node) ± SD = 0.20 ± 0.08, p(U | node) ± SD = 0.16 ± 0.08, p(V | node) ± SD = 0.64 ± 0.14
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Figure 5.2: Posterior probability distributions of states N, U, and V at node PIH.
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p(N | node) ± SD = 0.06 ± 0.08, p(U | node) ± SD = 0.04 ± 0.05, p(V | node) ± SD = 0.90 ± 0.12
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Figure 5.3: Posterior probability distributions of states N, U, and V at node PIE.
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languages) reconstructed as prevailing virilocality and alternative neolocality with high
posterior probabilities.
The uncertainty in the reconstructions at basal nodes on the consensus tree, coupled
with uncertainty at more distal nodes, makes this pattern compatible with a wide
range of evolutionary scenarios, for both modes of residence. As prevailing mode
(Figure 5.4a), neolocality was acquired at least twice on the tree, once in the branch
leading to Russian and once in the ancestor of societies speaking Italic languages
(Portuguese ST, Spanish, Walloon, Rumanian List, Italian), and possibly a third time
in the branch leading to Rumanian List. Uxorilocality was acquired twice, once in
the branch leading to Byelorussian and once in the branch leading to Dutch List,
resulting in ambilocality in both cases; this may have involved a transition from
viri- to uxorilocality in the branch leading to Byelorussian (Section 5.3.1.1). At least
one transition occurred from neo- to virilocality, in the branch leading to Portuguese
ST. Formulation of an evolutionary scenario for alternative mode is made difficult
by the additional uncertainty in the reconstructions at several internal nodes on the
consensus tree (Figure 5.4b); in any case, uxorilocality was acquired at least three
times, once in the branch leading to Singhalese, once in the branch leading to Italian,
and once in the branch leading to Armenian Mod. As discussed in Section 5.3.1.1, the
acquisition of uxorilocality is more likely to have occurred through neolocality than
through virilocality.
5.3.2 Fossilization of nodes PIH and PIE
At convergence, the chains fossilizing nodes PIH and PIE sampled states in the model
of trait evolution as shown in Table 5.4 (Section C.3).
Comparison of the loge[H(likelihood)] values at node PIH yields 2 loge(BNU) ≈ 0.15,
corresponding to no evidence for neo- over uxorilocality, 2 loge(BNV) ≈ −1.36,
corresponding to no evidence for viri- over neolocality, and 2 loge(BUV) ≈ −1.51,
corresponding to no evidence for viri- over uxorilocality (Table 5.4a).
Comparison of the loge[H(likelihood)] values at node PIE yields 2 loge(BNU) ≈ 3.15,
corresponding to positive evidence for neo- over uxorilocality, 2 loge(BNV) ≈ −4.36,
corresponding to positive evidence for viri- over neolocality, and 2 loge(BUV) ≈ −7.51,
corresponding to strong evidence for viri- over uxorilocality (Table 5.4b).
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As noted in Section 5.2.3, these posterior probability distributions effectively
“average” the fit of the fossil state at a node over the three sites, that is, over prevailing
and alternative modes of residence; therefore, the strength of the evidence in favour
of any particular state at the node is likely to be underestimated. This may partly
explain the lack of evidence for any state, at least by the conservative criteria used
(Section 4.2.3), at node PIH. In any case, the results broadly confirm the ancestral state
estimates obtained with nodes not fossilized (Section 5.3.1.2). The lack of evidence for
any state at node PIH may partly reflect the moderate skew in the posterior probability
distributions of the three states at this node, for the two modes of residence (Figure 5.2).
By contrast, the magnitude of the evidence for virilocality at node PIE reflects the
strong skew in the posterior probability distribution towards high values for state V as
prevailing mode of residence (Figure 5.3a).
5.3.3 Estimation of ancestral states at the MRCAs
At convergence, the chain sampled states in the model of trait evolution with mean
loge(likelihood) ± SD = −44.13 ± 1.61 (range: −56.03 to −39.84; auto-correlation
coefficient: r = 0.022; mean acceptance rate: 28.8%; Section C.3).
Nodes CORE and EDGE reconstructed as prevailing virilocality and alternative
neolocality with high posterior probabilities (Figures 5.5 and 5.6); the posterior prob-
ability distributions are qualitatively similar for the two MRCAs. This indicates that
there is no evidence in the cross-cultural data, combined with the model of population
history described by the linguistic data, for a shift from neo- to virilocality at node
CORE. Node CORE corresponds to the ancestor of societies speaking languages in
which derivatives of the reconstructed PIH affinal terms are used only for wife’s in-
laws; as discussed in Section 5.2.3, one of the scenarios derived from the linguistic
evidence assumes a shift from neo- to virilocality at this node. Rather, the posterior
probability distributions suggest that the pattern of prevailing virilocality and alter-
native neolocality reconstructed for PIE, and possibly for PIH, was likely maintained
through to both MRCAs (Section 5.3.1.2).
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p(N | node) ± SD = 0.06 ± 0.08, p(U | node) ± SD = 0.04 ± 0.05, p(V | node) ± SD = 0.90 ± 0.12
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Figure 5.5: Posterior probability distributions of states N, U, and V at node CORE.
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p(N | node) ± SD = 0.08 ± 0.10, p(U | node) ± SD = 0.05 ± 0.06, p(V | node) ± SD = 0.87 ± 0.14
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p(N | node) ± SD = 0.78 ± 0.20, p(U | node) ± SD = 0.18 ± 0.21, p(V | node) ± SD = 0.05 ± 0.06
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Figure 5.6: Posterior probability distributions of states N, U, and V at node EDGE.
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5.4 Discussion
The phylogenetic comparative analysis of residence strategies across IE-speaking soci-
eties provides evidence in support of prevailing virilocality with alternative neolocality
for PIE. This pattern likely extended back to PIH, but uncertainty in the recon-
structions suggests that limited confidence can be placed in inferences about PIH
residence drawn from the cross-cultural data. The uncertainty may, at least in part,
reflect the conflicting scenarios about this aspect of PIH social organization derived
by Indo-Europeanists based on the linguistic data. One of these scenarios envisages a
shift from neo- to virilocality in the ancestor of societies speaking languages that use
derivatives of the reconstructed PIH affinal terms only for wife’s in-laws; the present
analysis finds no evidence for such a shift in the cross-cultural data. There is evidence
against uxorilocality for PIE and that, throughout the history of IE-speaking societies,
the acquisition of uxorilocality is more likely to have occurred through neolocality
than through virilocality. These findings bolster interpretations of the archaeological
evidence that emphasize the “non-matricentric” structure of early IE society; however,
the finding of alternative neolocality alongside prevailing virilocality counters the notion
that early IE society was strongly “patricentric”.
The pattern of prevailing virilocality with alternative neolocality reconstructed for
PIE and for the ancestor of societies speaking Baltic and Slavic languages concurs
with the results of strontium isotope analyses of teeth recovered from burials at four
prehistoric sites in Germany: three from the early Neolithic attributed to the Linear
Ware culture (Bentley et al. 2002; Price et al. 2001) and one late from the late
Neolithic attributed to the Corded Ware culture (Haak et al. 2008). Across these
sites, the isotopic evidence yields a consistent pattern of “non-local” females and
“local” males; because strontium isotope signatures in tooth enamel track the geological
location of individuals during childhood, this indicates the migration of females in
adult life. Assuming that the migration was linked to residential changes of females
at marriage, this pattern is compatible with any system of non-uxorilocal residence
(neo- or virilocality).1 As discussed in Section 4.4, the Linear Ware and Corded
1Pace Haak et al. (2008, p. 18229), who claim that “This indicates the practice of exogamy and
patrilocality”. Neo- and virilocality both involve the movement of females at marriage; discrimination
between these strategies requires information about the movement of males with respect to their kin
within the community. The archaeological evidence does not provide this degree of resolution.
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Ware archaeological horizons are associated with IE-speaking peoples; spanning across
northern and central Europe, their range included the area later covered by Baltic and
Slavic languages (Mallory 1997a,b).
High rates of female migration in the prehistory of Europe have been argued also
on genetic data. Comparing geographic and genetic distances across a sample of
European populations, Seielstad et al. (1998) found that genetic distance increases
with geographic distance at a higher rate for the Y chromosome than for mtDNA
and autosomal loci. This means that Y-chromosome variants are more clustered
geographically than other genetic markers, a pattern that can be explained through
the assumption of a sustained regime of virilocality in the past. However, the degree
to which residence strategies operating on a local scale can explain the continent-
wide pattern of migration observed by Seielstad et al. (1998) has been questioned,
both on theoretical (e.g. Stoneking 1998; Wilkins and Marlowe 2006) and on empirical
grounds (e.g. Kumar et al. 2006; Wilder et al. 2004). In addition to residence strategies,
the genetic structuring of human populations will be affected by the permeability of
marital boundaries, that is, by the pattern of endo- and exogamy across groups, and
by higher-scale demographic processes associated with historical events, for example
the intermarriage of in-coming males with local females, leading to the introgression
of Y chromosomes but not mtDNA, typical of colonization events (Lawson Handley
and Perrin 2007). Incorporating the fine-scale inferences of past residence strategies
presented here into genetic analyses of sex-biased migration may help untangle these
processes, and ultimately provide a better understanding of the population dynamics
that shaped genetic variation in Europe.
The variability in residence strategies reconstructed for PIE and for the ancestor of
societies speaking Baltic and Slavic languages, with different prevailing and alternative
modes of residence, is also likely to have an effect on the observed pattern of genetic
diversity. Such variability is documented early in the historical record. For example,
the Hittite code of laws, which dates back to at least 1650 bce (Bryce 2002, p. 34;
Section 4.4), makes reference to cases in which the husband would take the wife “to
his house”, and cases in which the wife would “die in her father’s house” (Bryce 2002,
pp. 120–121; Hoffner 1997, pp. 181–182). The former scenario may indicate either
neo- or virilocality, depending on whether a man’s house corresponded to his father’s;
virilocality was likely if the man was his father’s heir (Hoffner 1997, p. 181). The
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latter scenario may refer to cases where a husband became an antiyant-, literally “one-
entering-into (his wife’s family)” (Bryce 2002, p. 124; Hoffner 1997, p. 182), and thus
possibly to uxorilocality. This type of marriage was practised in the families of wealthy
slave men who, through the payment of kusata, acquired an in-marrying son-in-law of
free birth; in turn, this granted that their grandchildren were born free (Bryce 2002,
pp. 123–124). More generally, its function may have been to import men into families
with shortages of male members: for example, the king’s daughter’s husband was to
become king in the absence of male heirs to the throne (Bryce 2002, pp. 28–29, 124).
As discussed in Section 6.4, this variability suggests that residence strategies represent
flexible social responses across descendants of PIH, and across human societies more
generally.
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Chapter 6
Co-evolutionary analysis of
monogamy and neolocality in
Indo-European-speaking societies
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Background
On the model developed in Chapter 2, monogamous marriage evolved as the outcome
of male-female conflict over the allocation of paternity and the investment of resources,
possibly coupled with ecological conditions that favoured the transfer of wealth to
a limited number of heirs. By contrast, the “socially imposed monogamy” model
views monogamous marriage as a mechanism of reproductive levelling, which evolved
because of the benefits accrued to groups from minimizing male-male conflict over
access to females (Alexander 1987, pp. 71–73; Section 2.1). In addition, monogamous
marriage is argued to minimize male-female conflict over the production and rearing
of offspring, especially where features of social organization limit opportunities for
husbands and wives to divert resources to their respective kin. As noted in Section 5.1.1,
residence strategies determine the pattern of access of individuals to kin: in this context,
neolocality may have favoured the evolution of monogamous marriage by reducing the
degree of differential access of husbands and wives to their own relatives (Alexander
1987, pp. 70–71). On this view, monogamous marriage represents the outcome of
“complete cooperation” (Alexander 1987, p. 70) between spouses.
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The association between monogamy and neolocality assumed by the “socially
imposed monogamy” model largely rests on the observation that both practices prevail
across societies organized in nation-states (e.g. Alexander 1987, p. 71), that is, across
“the most complex of human social groups” (Alexander 1979a, p. 259; Section 4.1.1).
However, ahistorical reasoning about the association between traits, based on their dis-
tribution, can easily lead to spurious inferences (Section 1.2.3), just like distributional
arguments can lead to spurious inferences about the pattern of change in the traits
(Sections 4.1 and 5.1).
Building on the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5, here I use the phylogenetic compara-
tive approach to investigate the interaction between marriage and residence strategies
in the history of IE-speaking societies. Indirectly, this assesses the validity of the notion
of association between monogamy and neolocality, the defining features of the “nuclear
family”, implicit in theories that make this family type central to European social
organization; as noted in Section 1.2.3.2, such theories dominate the social sciences
(Goody 1996; Smith 1993).
6.1.2 Related research
To my knowledge, no formal test exists of the association between monogamous
marriage and neolocal residence. Yet the potential divergence of interests between
spouses in societies practising non-neolocal residence was noted as early as by Lowie
(1920, p. 71), who remarked that “the rule of residence may produce a stressing of
one side of the family and in so far forth interfere with the bilateral symmetry of
family relations.” This is because under non-neolocal residence, and in particular where
marriage is exogamous with respect to the community, individuals of the dispersing sex
come to rely on their spouse’s kin for resources, as opposed to their own. Coupled
with the fact that, by definition, non-neolocal residence results in the aggregation of
individuals in extended families, this may create an asymmetry of interests between
spouses (Murdock 1949, pp. 18, 202).
For example, polygyny is “particularly congenial” (Murdock 1949, p. 206) to
virilocality, where men live with their relatives while their wives are isolated from their
own kin: in such a system the corporate interests of related males, for instance where
property is owned collectively, may increase the payoffs to husbands from investing
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in their kinsmen at the expense of their wives’ offspring (Murdock 1949, pp. 206–
208; e.g. Goody 1970). It follows that neolocality will minimize opportunities for
diverting resources to one’s own relatives, by isolating both husbands and wives from
their respective kin, and by preventing the formation of extended kin groups (Murdock
1949, pp. 203–204). Alexander’s (1987, pp. 70–71) conjecture extends the reasoning to
argue that the confluence of interest between spouses will be maximized under these
conditions, leading to the co-occurrence of monogamy and neolocality across societies.
6.1.3 Rationale and objective
Previous theorizing about human family systems has assumed a functional association
between monogamous marriage and neolocal residence, as these practices tend to occur
together. However, the co-occurrence of traits across societies may reflect the history
of the traits rather than a functional relationship between them.
Building on the ancestral state reconstructions in Chapters 4 and 5, here I use the
phylogenetic comparative approach, in a Bayesian RJ-MCMC framework, to perform
a co-evolutionary analysis of marriage and residence strategies in the history of IE-
speaking societies. This approach provides a stringent test of presumed functional
associations: two traits are taken to have co-evolved, suggestive of a functional
relationship, only if they can be shown to have tended to change together throughout
the history of the taxa under investigation. In other words, this approach discounts any
evidence of association between traits that cannot be distinguished from associations
arising from the pattern of descent of the taxa from a common ancestor.
6.2 Data and methods
Following the procedure set out in Sections 4.2 and 5.2, I used data on marriage and
residence strategies from the EA for a sample of 27 IE-speaking societies (Section 6.2.1),
mapped onto Pagel et al.’s (2007) sample of trees (Section 6.2.2). On the cross-cultural
data and tree sample, I used the phylogenetic comparative method developed by Pagel
and colleagues (Pagel and Meade 2005, 2006; Pagel et al. 2004) to test the hypothesis
of co-evolution between monogamous marriage and neolocal residence; this method
requires that the comparative data be coded in binary form (Section 6.2.3).
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6.2.1 Cross-cultural data
I obtained the cross-cultural sample as described in Section 4.2.1. The data in binary
form and maps of their geographical distribution are in Section B.2.
For marriage strategy, I coded societies as polygynous (state 0) or monogamous
(state 1) as described in Section 4.2.1. For residence strategy, I combined the
information on prevailing and alternative modes of residence, obtained as described
in Section 5.2.1, into a binary variable, with societies coded as non-neolocal (state 0) or
neolocal (state 1) (Section 6.2.3). Theoretically, this coding was justified on the grounds
that any degree of neolocality is assumed to weaken extended family organization, even
where the prevailing mode of residence is non-neolocal (Murdock 1949, p. 208).
This produced a sample with monogamy present in 15 (93.8%) of 16 neolocal
societies and absent in 1 (6.2%), and with monogamy present in 3 (27.3%) of 11 non-
neolocal societies and absent in 8 (72.7%) (Table B.2 and Figures B.2b and B.2e).
6.2.2 Tree sample
I obtained the tree sample as described in Section 4.2.2. The outgroup Hittite was
assigned no marriage or residence strategies data for the purpose of the comparative
analysis (Section 6.2.3).
6.2.3 Comparative analysis
Co-evolutionary analysis using the phylogenetic comparative method developed by
Pagel and colleagues (Pagel and Meade 2005, 2006; Pagel et al. 2004) is performed using
BayesDiscrete, available as part of the BayesTraits package (Pagel and Meade n.d.) from
http://www.evolution.rdg.ac.uk/BayesTraits.html. Unless otherwise specified,
the information in this section is based on Pagel and Meade (2005, 2006), Pagel et al.
(2004), and on the BayesTraits manual (Pagel and Meade n.d.). I describe the method
and its application in detail in Appendix C.
BayesDiscrete uses the cross-cultural data and tree sample to estimate parameters
in the model of trait evolution for two binary traits (Section C.1). In this case the
comparative data consisted of one trait representing the marriage strategy, with states
0 (polygynous) and 1 (monogamous), and one trait representing the residence strategy,
with states 0 (non-neolocal) and 1 (neolocal) (Section 6.2.1). This produces four
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Figure 6.1: Rate parameters describing the evolution of marriage and residence strategies.
combinations of states for the two traits, as shown in Figure 6.1, e.g. combination
2 or (0, 1) for polygynous marriage with neolocal residence.
In BayesDiscrete a series of transition rate parameters qij describes the joint evolution
of the two traits on a tree. These rate parameters measure the instantaneous rate
of change from combination “i” to combination “j”, which corresponds to the rate of
change between two states of one trait while holding the state of the other trait constant.
For example, rate parameter q12 describes transitions from combination 1 (0, 0) to
combination 2 (0, 1), that is, changes from non-neolocal to neolocal residence against a
background of polygynous marriage; similarly, rate parameter q34 describes transitions
from combination 3 (1, 0) to combination 4 (1, 1), that is, changes from non-neolocal to
neolocal residence against a background of monogamous marriage (Figure 6.1). Rate
parameters describing simultaneous transitions in the two traits, corresponding to the
diagonals of the diagram in Figure 6.1, are set to zero: this amounts to assuming that
the probability of the two traits changing simultaneously is negligibly small. As in
BayesMultistate (Section 4.2.3), the rate parameters are used to define the probabilities
of the corresponding changes, the probabilities of the two states at internal nodes on
the tree, and the likelihood of the data; taxa that are not assigned comparative data
for a given trait, like the outgroup Hittite in this case (Section 6.2.2), are treated in
the likelihood calculations as taking either state for the trait with equal probability.
Eight rate parameters yield 21,146 model categories, in which two or more rate
parameters are set to take equal or distinct positive values; additionally, one or more
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rate parameters can be set to zero. Of the 21,146 possible categories, 51 (0.24%)
conform to independent trait evolution: in these categories the rate of change in one
trait is not affected by the state of the other trait, that is, q12 = q34, q13 = q24,
q21 = q43, and q31 = q42. All other model categories conform to dependent trait
evolution, because they assign rates within one or more of these pairs to different rate
classes; this means that the rate of change in one trait does depend on the state of
the other trait. For example, q12 = q34 specifies that the rate of change from non-
neolocal to neolocal residence does not depend on whether marriage is polygynous or
monogamous; q12 6= q34 indicates that it does (Figure 6.1).
Like BayesMultistate (Section 4.2.3), in Bayesian RJ-MCMC mode BayesDiscrete
uses RJ-MCMC chains to produce a posterior probability sample of states in the
model of trait evolution (Sections C.1 and C.2). The proportions of model categories
conforming to dependent and independent evolution sampled by the chains provide
a direct estimate of the posterior probability that the traits evolved dependently or
independently. The theoretical prior odds is (21, 146 − 51)/51 = 413.63: this means
that if all model categories had equal posterior probability, the chains would sample
categories conforming to dependent evolution approximately 414 times more frequently
than categories conforming to independent evolution. The Bayes factor, obtained as
the ratio of the posterior odds returned by the chains to the prior odds, provides an
estimate of the posterior probability of the two evolutionary models. The Bayes factor
for dependent over independent evolution is denoted BDI. Values of BDI > 1 represent
evidence for dependent trait evolution, values of BDI < 1 evidence for independent trait
evolution. Equivalently, the Bayes factor can be expressed on a logarithmic scale, with
2 loge(BDI) > 0 representing evidence for dependent trait evolution and 2 loge(BDI) < 0
evidence for independent trait evolution. The strength of the evidence in favour of one
model over the other is assessed against the scales in Table 6.1.
This implementation of the Bayes factor assumes all model categories to be equally
likely, and may result in conservative estimates of support for dependent trait evolution.
This is because, in practice, the processes underlying the evolution of the two traits may
involve fewer than the eight transitions specified by rate parameters qij. If the “true”
number of rate parameters involved in producing the observed distribution of states of
the traits is less than eight, the number of possible model categories will be less than
21,146; in this case model categories conforming to independent evolution, which require
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Table 6.1: Scales for interpretation of the Bayes factor*
|BDI| |2 loge(BDI)| Evidence for evolutionary model
1 to 3 0 to 2 Weak
3 to 12 2 to 5 Positive
12 to 150 5 to 10 Strong
> 150 > 10 Very strong
* After Raftery (1996, p. 165).
a maximum of four distinct rate classes, will represent a higher proportion of all the
possible categories, and the “true” prior odds will be lower than the theoretical value.
Consequently, the posterior to prior odds Bayes factor obtained using the theoretical
value of the prior odds will be lower than the “true” Bayes factor.
This issue can be circumvented through an alternative implementation of the
Bayes factor. This involves running a second chain that is constrained to visit model
categories conforming to independent evolution. The posterior probability distribution
of loge(likelihood) values sampled by the first chain, having removed visits to model
categories conforming to independent evolution, is then compared to the posterior
probability distribution of loge(likelihood) values sampled by the second chain. In this
case, 2 loge(BDI) is approximated as twice the difference between loge[H(likelihood)] for
the first chain and loge[H(likelihood)] for the second chain, where loge[H(likelihood)]
is the natural logarithm of the harmonic mean of the likelihood values. The strength of
the evidence in favour of one model over the other is assessed against the logarithmic
scale in Table 6.1. Because loge[H(likelihood)] may be unstable (Section 4.2.3), Pagel
and Meade (n.d.) recommend taking a conservative approach, which disregards any
evidence for either model given by |2 loge(BDI)| < 2.
I estimated support for dependent trait evolution using both implementations of
the Bayes factor. This involved running two sets of analyses: one, termed RJ-
unconstrained, in which chains were free to visit all possible model categories, and
one, termed RJ-constrained, in which chains were constrained to visit categories
conforming to independent trait evolution. Each set of analyses comprised five separate
chains started from random seeds (Section C.3). I determined the RJ-MCMC chain
specifications through preliminary maximum-likelihood and MCMC runs. As for
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BayesMultistate (Section 4.2.3), these specifications ensure that the RJ-MCMC chains
sample parameter space adequately and ultimately converge to the posterior probability
distribution of states in the model of trait evolution (Section C.3). I ran the RJ-MCMC
chains for 108 iterations, sampling every 103, with an additional burn-in of 106, and rate
deviation set to 60. Under maximum-likelihood the covarion model for trait evolution
improved the mean loge(likelihood) by between 0.6 and 3.7 units, depending on the
model specifications, and was therefore implemented by all RJ-MCMC chains; as noted
in Section 5.2.3, this model allows rates to vary within and between branches of a tree.
All chains used a uniform prior on the models and an exponential prior on the rate
parameters; the mean of the exponential prior was seeded from a uniform hyperprior
on the interval 0–10. The shape of the prior distribution (exponential or gamma) and
the interval of the hyperprior (0–10 or 0–20) only marginally affected the mean of the
posterior probability distributions of loge(likelihood) values and of ancestral states,
returning qualitatively similar results.
Convergence of the chains to the target distributions and near-independence of
sampling events were assessed as described in Section 4.2.3. In all cases, the diagnostics
indicated that the chains sampled the target distributions adequately.
6.3 Results
For both sets of analyses, I compared the loge[H(likelihood)] values for the states in
the model of trait evolution sampled by the separate chains at convergence; I present
results for the chain that returned the median value of the loge[H(likelihood)].
I discuss separately the posterior probability distribution of model categories
returned by the RJ-unconstrained chain (Section 6.3.1) and the estimates of support
for dependent trait evolution obtained from the two implementations of the Bayes
factor (Section 6.3.2). For convenience, a summary of the results of the ancestral state
reconstructions from Sections 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 is in Figure 6.2.
6.3.1 Posterior probability distribution of model categories
At convergence, the RJ-unconstrained chain sampled states in the model of trait
evolution with mean loge(likelihood)± SD = −18.86± 1.34 (range: −30.67 to −14.65;
auto-correlation coefficient: r = 0.055; mean acceptance rate: 33.2%; Section C.3).
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The chain sampled 2855 model categories, with rates assigned to 1.86±0.45 non-zero
classes (mean ± SD; range: 1–4 non-zero classes). This indicates that the evolutionary
processes that produced the observed distribution of states of marriage and residence
strategies across societies in the sample involved fewer than the eight transitions
specified by rate parameters qij. For example, the ten model categories sampled most
frequently by the chain, which account for 18.2% of the 105 sampled points, included
only one or two non-zero rate classes; these are shown in Table 6.2, together with the
hundredth most frequently sampled category, which is included for comparison. The
fifth most frequently sampled category sets all rates equal to each other, conforming to
independent evolution, while the other nine most frequently sampled categories conform
to dependent evolution.
6.3.2 Estimation of support for dependent trait evolution
Of the 105 points sampled by the RJ-unconstrained chain, 98.67% corresponded to
model categories conforming to dependent evolution and 1.33% to categories conforming
to independent evolution, yielding a posterior odds of 74.36. Comparison of the poste-
rior to the prior odds yields BDI = 0.18 or, on a logarithmic scale, 2 loge(BDI) = −3.43.
This corresponds to no evidence for dependent trait evolution or, equivalently, to
positive evidence for independent trait evolution (Table 6.1).
Because the RJ-unconstrained chain sampled a restricted sub-set of all possible
model categories, with no categories including five or more distinct non-zero rate
classes, the posterior to prior odds BDI may underestimate the evidence for dependent
trait evolution. The alternative implementation of the Bayes factor may provide
a more accurate estimate of support for dependent trait evolution. In this case,
the posterior probability distribution of loge(likelihood) values sampled by the RJ-
unconstrained chain, having excluded categories conforming to independent evolution
(Figure 6.3a), is compared to the posterior probability distribution of loge(likelihood)
values sampled by the RJ-constrained chain (Figure 6.3b). At convergence, the RJ-
constrained chain sampled states with mean loge(likelihood) ± SD = −20.12 ± 0.79
(range: −27.94 to −16.37; auto-correlation coefficient: r = 0.003; mean acceptance
rate: 35.8%; Section C.3). Comparison of the loge[H(likelihood)] values yields
2 loge(BDI) ≈ 2[(−20.56) − (−20.78)] = 0.44, and thus no evidence for dependent
evolution by the conservative criteria used (Table 6.1). This reflects the substantial
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Table 6.2: Rate classes and frequencies for selected model categories
Model category Rate class* Frequency†
q12 q13 q21 q24 q31 q34 q42 q43 Absolute Relative cumulative
1 0 0 0 Z 0 0 Z 0 5471 0.055
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Z 0 4636 0.101
3 Z 0 0 0 0 0 0 Z 1987 0.121
4 0 1 1 Z 1 1 Z 0 1069 0.132
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 912 0.141
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 Z 0 864 0.149
7 Z 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 837 0.158
8 0 0 0 0 0 Z 0 0 832 0.166
9 0 0 0 Z 0 0 0 0 790 0.174
10 0 0 0 Z 0 0 Z 1 779 0.182
...
...
100 0 1 0 1 0 1 Z 0 242 0.531
* “Z” denotes rates assigned to the zero class. “0” and “1” denote two distinct non-zero rate
classes; rates with the same value are assigned to the same non-zero rate class. For example,
under model category 1 q12, q13, q21, q31, q34, and q43 are assigned to the same non-zero rate
class, that is, they take the same positive value, while q24 and q42 are assigned to the zero rate
class, that is, they are set to zero.
† The relative cumulative frequency of a model category is obtained by summing the absolute
frequency of sampled points in the model category to the absolute frequencies of sampled
points in all preceding categories, and then dividing by the total number of sampled points in
all categories [e.g. (5471 + 4636)/105 = 0.101 for model category 2].
overlap in the posterior probability distributions of loge(likelihood) values sampled by
the two chains (Figure 6.3).
In sum, both implementations of the Bayes factor returned no support for dependent
trait evolution, indicating that there is no evidence for the hypothesis of co-evolution of
monogamy and neolocality in the history of IE-speaking societies. To put these results
in perspective, a non-phylogenetic analysis of the sample would return significantly
higher odds of monogamous marriage for neolocal than for non-neolocal societies [odds
ratio (15/1)/(3/8) = 40.0, p = 0.0006, one-tailed Fisher exact test]. This means
that any evidence for correlated change in the two traits that may exist in the data
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Figure 6.3: Posterior probability distributions of loge(likelihood) values.
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cannot be untangled from the patterning produced by the phylogenetic relationships
among societies in the sample. The ancestral state reconstructions for the two traits,
summarized in Figure 6.2, imply only one instance of potentially correlated change,
between nodes PIE and E, leading from the presence of monogamy and neolocality in
PIE to the absence of both in the ancestor of societies speaking Indo-Iranian languages
(node E); a second instance is possible between node PIE and Albanian G, leading to the
absence of monogamy and neolocality in the latter, but existence of the intervening node
is itself uncertain (node A). In contrast, the co-occurrence of monogamy and neolocality
in societies speaking Balto-Slavic languages is explained away by the presence of both
practices in their ancestor (node F). Similarly, the co-occurrence of these practices in
societies speaking Italic languages (Portuguese ST, Spanish, Walloon, Rumanian List,
Italian) is explained away by their presence in the ancestor of the Italic sub-group; this
pattern may extend back to include societies speaking Germanic and Celtic languages
(Dutch List and Irish B), but phylogenetic uncertainty limits the confidence that can be
placed in the reconstruction of neolocality for the ancestor of the Italic-Germanic-Celtic
sub-group (node D).
6.4 Discussion
The phylogenetic comparative analysis of marriage and residence strategies across
IE-speaking societies indicates that the observed association between monogamy and
neolocality may be tracking the descent of societies from a common ancestor rather than
a functional link between the two practices. While investigation of a larger sample may
provide stronger support for the hypothesis of co-evolution, this seems unlikely given
the tight clustering of marriage and residence strategies within linguistic sub-groups.
Thus, the analysis provides no evidence to support Alexander’s (1987, pp. 70–71)
conjecture that neolocal residence favoured the evolution of monogamous marriage
by increasing the payoffs to husbands and wives from attending to their shared
reproductive interests. More generally, this challenges the notion, prevalent in history
and sociology of the family and in demography, of the centrality of the “isolated nuclear
family” to the social organization of Europe, and of western Europe in particular
(Goody 1996; Smith 1993; e.g. Hajnal 1965, 1982). Together with the reconstructions
in Chapters 4 and 5, the present analysis suggests that the widespread co-occurrence in
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the region of the defining elements of this family type — monogamy and neolocality —
may be an artefact of descent, rather than the result of “the individualistic or nuclear
tendencies of the European family system” (Smith 1993, p. 328). Consistently, the
reconstructions in Chapter 5 show that neolocal residence was secondary to virilocal
residence throughout the history of IE-speaking societies; by definition, virilocality
results in extended family organization.
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, the emergence of monogamous marriage is typically
attributed to the development of features of social organization viewed as indicators of
“societal complexity” and “modernization”, based on the prevalence of this marriage
strategy among the “complex”, “modern” societies of Eurasia. The emergence of
neolocality is similarly attributed to features of social structure characteristic of
“complex”, “modern” societies (Levinson and Malone 1980, pp. 37–38; e.g. van den
Berghe 1990, pp. 109–110): cross-cultural analyses have focused, for example, on the
relationship of neolocal residence with commercialization and industrialization (e.g.
de Leeuwe 1971; Ember 1967). Yet the historical evidence (discussed in Smith 1993;
e.g. Laslett 1977) and the reconstructions in Chapter 5 point to an earlier origin for
this residence strategy across European societies, and across IE-speaking societies more
generally. Unless social and/or ecological determinants of neolocality can be identified
that account for both its distribution and history, the widespread occurrence of this
practice across Europe must be seen as contingent upon the nexus of descent linking
societies in the region.
We currently lack a theoretical framework for understanding variation in residence
strategies, both across and within societies. Theoretical work on the evolution of
sex-biases in dispersal focuses on the complex interactions between (i) the costs of
inbreeding, (ii) the inclusive fitness benefits of co-operating with kin, for example in
the acquisition of resources (e.g. mates or food), and (iii) the inclusive fitness costs
of competing with kin for those same resources (see review in Lawson Handley and
Perrin 2007); extension of this framework to residence strategies may shed light on the
evolutionary significance of this feature of social organization. Within this framework,
various aspects of human dispersal across communities (that is, not necessarily in the
context of residence changes at marriage) have been shown to vary in predictable ways
with social and ecological factors affecting the availability of resources: for example, in
agrarian societies the availability of land affects the sex of the disperser and the timing
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and rate of dispersal (e.g. Beise and Voland 2008; Clarke and Low 1992; Strassmann
and Clarke 1998; Towner 1999, 2001, 2002; Voland and Dunbar 1995). This suggests
that in humans, as in other species, dispersal is linked to the acquisition of resources;
unlike in other species, however, the acquisition of resources may be partly effected
through marriage and inheritance. Across species of birds and mammals, female-
biased dispersal characterizes social systems in which males compete over access to
females based on their ability to defend resources critical for reproduction: in these
“resource-defence” mating systems, the benefits of philopatry (e.g. familiarity with the
natal territory) are greater to males than to females (Greenwood 1980). This notion
has been invoked to explain female biases in dispersal in the land-based societies of
Europe (e.g. Beise and Voland 2008; Clarke and Low 1992; Voland and Dunbar 1995);
analogous considerations may explain the prevalence of virilocal residence throughout
the history of IE-speaking societies (Chapter 5), and across human societies more
generally (Koenig 1989). Sixty-four percent of societies in the SCCS practise prevailing
virilocality (Murdock and Wilson 1972), and the incidence of this strategy is higher
among societies with subsistence based on agriculture and pastoralism compared to
foragers (Marlowe 2004; Wilkins and Marlowe 2006).
Intra-societal variability in residence strategies may also be explained within this
framework; the reconstructions in Chapter 5 indicate that such variability likely
characterized early IE society, with neolocality practised alongside virilocality in several
descendants of PIE (Section 5.4). As discussed in Section 6.1.2, Alexander’s (1987,
pp. 70–71) hypothesis views neolocality as reducing the conflict of interests between
spouses, by limiting opportunities for co-operation of spouses with their respective kin.
A factor not considered by Alexander (1987) is that, at the same time, neolocality
limits opportunities for competition of spouses with their kin; competition between
relatives can alter the evolutionary dynamics in important ways, even to the point
of negating the effect of kin selection for co-operation where local competition is
intense (West et al. 2002). Crucially, the relative costs and benefits of foregoing co-
operation and avoiding competition with kin will depend on other aspects of social
organization besides the marriage strategy itself, notably the pattern of marital endo-
and exogamy across groups, and the ability of individuals within groups to monopolize
reproductive opportunities (i.e. the degree of reproductive skew; Emlen 1995, 1997).
Recent developments in the theory of social evolution stress the need to focus on the
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net effect of co-operation and competition between relatives in the study of social
interactions (see review in West et al. 2007a); incorporating these developments into
the analysis of kinship and marriage systems holds great promise for furthering our
understanding of the evolution of human social behaviour.
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Conclusion
The work presented in this thesis contributes to the development of what Hughes (1988,
p. 21) envisioned as “a biologically based social anthropology.” It is “biologically based”
in that it is grounded in evolutionary biology; it constitutes “social anthropology”
because its concern is the study of the social systems of the human species. The
general themes that emerge from this work represent the substantive contributions of
the thesis to the study of kinship and marriage systems.
The theoretical analysis in Chapter 2 shows that the practice of monogamous
marriage can be understood within the framework of inclusive fitness theory. This
result challenges previous explanations for the evolution of monogamous marriage, and
explanations for the evolution of marriage strategies more generally: the former assume
the implication of group-level processes, while both assume that male reproductive
success is always maximized by polygynous marriage or, equivalently, that variance in
male reproductive success is always greater under polygynous than under monogamous
marriage. The framework developed in Chapter 2 makes both assumptions unnecessary.
Rather, it shows that where resources are transferred across generations and are linked
to fitness, whether monogamous or polygynous marriage represents the optimal strategy
for males depends on whether the value of resources is depleted through division among
multiple heirs; some form of division is inevitable if multiple wives are involved.
The excessive focus on variance in male reproductive success as the prime deter-
minant of male-female interactions, and the consequent neglect of female behaviour, is
evident also in evolutionary explanations for variation in transfer strategies. These
rely on the notion that natural selection will favour males who allocate resources
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strategically, based on their level of paternity (e.g. Alexander 1974; Greene 1978;
Kurland 1979). The analysis in Chapter 2 extends this paradigm to incorporate
the strategic behaviour of females: if selection favours males who allocate resources
strategically, based on their level of paternity, it is also likely to favour females who
allocate paternity strategically, based on the level of male investment in their offspring.
This simple extension has important implications for analysis of the evolution of
marriage strategies, leading to a situation where both males and females stand to gain
from monogamous marriage: males benefit from investing resources “safely” in the
individuals in the next generation that provide the greatest potential fitness returns,
that is, their wife’s offspring; females, in turn, benefit from exclusive investment of
their husband’s resources in their own offspring. In a similar way, this extension is
likely to have important implications for analysis of the evolution of other aspects
of social organization that are linked to transfer strategies: for example, the notion of
strategic male behaviour in this context underlies current explanations for the evolution
of descent systems (see review in Cronk and Gerkey 2007).
In testing hypotheses about of the evolution of marriage strategies, previous cross-
cultural analyses have relied heavily on the bias in focus towards male behaviour —
what Hrdy and Williams (1983) term the “double standard” of behavioural biology (see
Clutton-Brock 2007 for a more general discussion). Typically, the degree of polygyny
captured by a society’s marriage strategy has been used as a proxy for mating strategy
or, equivalently, for variance in male reproductive success (Low 1988); this may explain
why cross-cultural studies have generally failed to identify clear social or ecological
correlates of monogamous marriage (see review in Low 2003, 2007). By contrast,
the cross-cultural analysis in Chapter 3 does not assume that monogamous marriage
involves monogamous mating, thus keeping distinct the “social” category of marriage
from the “biological” category of mating. The pattern identified by the analysis in
Chapter 3 provides support for the association between monogamous marriage and the
transfer of property to wife’s offspring predicted by the theoretical analysis in Chapter 2.
The analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 provide a robust framework for interpretation of
the evidence — archaeological, historical, and ethnographic — on the emergence and
cross-cultural distribution of monogamous marriage. Crucially, by situating variation
in marriage strategies in the context of variation in ecological factors, this framework is
compatible with a relatively early historical origin of monogamy; in this fundamental
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respect it contrasts with evolutionary and non-evolutionary explanations that, implic-
itly or explicitly, link the emergence of monogamous marriage to the development of
markers of “societal complexity” and “modernization”, or to “societal complexity”
and “modernization” per se. In contrast to these explanations, but in line with the
framework developed in Chapters 2 and 3, the cross-cultural analysis in Chapter 4
reconstructs a prehistoric origin for monogamous marriage in societies speaking Indo-
European languages. Further, the cross-cultural analysis in Chapter 6 shows that,
across these societies, the observed association between monogamous marriage and
neolocal residence may be the artefact of a history of descent from a common ancestor;
neolocality is itself viewed as a marker of “societal complexity” and “modernization”.
Consistently, the cross-cultural analysis in Chapter 5 reconstructs a prehistoric origin
for neolocality, albeit secondary to virilocality, in Indo-European-speaking societies.
Together, the reconstructed histories of the two defining features of the “nuclear
family”, monogamy and neolocality, challenge theoretical claims to the centrality of
this family type to European and, more generally, to “western” social organization. In
turn, this challenges explanations that ascribe the “nuclear tendencies” of the European
family to the influence of Christian ideology on kinship and marriage systems (Smith
1993). The cross-cultural analysis in Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence in support
of the association between monogamous marriage and Christianization assumed by
these explanations; at the same time, however, it shows that the relationship between
monogamous marriage and transfer of land to wife’s offspring is not confounded with
the interaction of marriage strategy with religious affiliation. In line with the available
evidence on the history and diffusion of Christianity, this suggests that the standard
“cultural infection” scenario, whereby monogamous marriage spread “passively” along-
side Christianity, is too simplistic. The available evidence is, at present, anecdotal;
quantitative historical and ethnographic data will be required to formally evaluate
the alternative pathways that may have produced the observed association between
monogamous marriage and Christianization. This will constitute an important test of
widely-held assumptions about the history of kinship and marriage systems and, more
generally, about the interactions between micro- and macro-evolutionary processes that
shaped the observed pattern of cultural variation (Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2006).
Finally, together with previous analyses (Fortunato et al. 2006; Fortunato and Mace
2009), the reconstructions of early Indo-European social organization in Chapters 4
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and 5 point to a society practising monogamy, virilocality with neolocality, and
dowry. On the ethnographic evidence, this type of social structure is compatible with
interpretations of the linguistic evidence that attribute to Indo-European society an
economy based on domesticated plants and animals, with use of the plough, a settled
lifestyle, and possibly some form of social ranking based on social status differentiation
(Mallory and Adams 2006, p. 284). The reconstructions seem harder to reconcile with
interpretations of the linguistic evidence that tend to emphasize elements pointing to a
pastoral economy and nomadic lifestyle; these interpretations provide the basis for the
traditional view that Indo-European languages propagated across Eurasia with warlike
nomadic pastoralists (e.g. Anthony 2007; Gimbutas 1991; Mallory 1989), but are being
criticized also on linguistic grounds (e.g. Krell 1998). In fact, the traditional view
has strongly influenced reconstructions of other aspects of early Indo-European social
life; in turn, these reconstructions have been used to substantiate the traditional view
of Indo-European origin (Renfrew 1987, pp. 260–262). The analyses in Chapters 4
and 5 avoid this circularity because the inferences are derived entirely from the cross-
cultural data, in conjunction with the model of population history captured by the
linguistic evidence; consequently, the inferential process is relatively assumption-free
with regards to early Indo-European social organization. One implicit assumption is
that practices observed in the “ethnographic present” can be used to characterize early
Indo-European social structure. The analytical categories used in Chapters 4 and 5 are
based on the simplest possible conceptualization of marriage and residence strategies;
as such, they apply to the range of social systems found in the ethnographic record.
They are therefore likely to apply also to the range of social systems involved in the
history of dispersal of Indo-European-speaking societies from a common ancestor.
Overall, the findings in Chapters 3 to 6 emphasize the importance of using system-
atic and, where possible, explicitly historical approaches to cross-cultural comparison.
The formulation of analytical categories that are theoretically justifiable and empirically
useful is one of many advances that derive from extension of the philosophical,
theoretical, and methodological foundations of evolutionary biology to the study of
kinship and marriage systems. More generally, placing variation in human social
systems in the wider context of variation in animal social systems offers a unique
opportunity for progressing the analysis of human behaviour beyond debates about
whether or not our species evolved “by genes alone” (e.g. Richerson and Boyd 2005).
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These debates are trite, futile, and easily dismissed: they stem from confusion of the
ultimate and proximate levels of explanation or, more prosaically, from not keeping
clearly in mind that genes are segments of nucleic acid that direct the synthesis of
amino acids (Turke 1984). At the ultimate level of analysis considered in this thesis
there is no evidence to show, nor any reason to assume, that the “biological” paradigm
is less suited to explaining human behaviour than it is to explaining the behaviour of
other species. On this premise, any distinctly human features are viewed as part of
the repertoire of species-specific proximate mechanisms through which the “biological”
paradigm is effected; with regards to kinship and marriage systems, these include
the use of linguistic and symbolic categories to conceptualize behaviours linked to
relatedness and reproduction, and to encode these behaviours in social norms. Only
within the wider context of variation in animal social behaviour it becomes apparent
that distinctive species-specific traits exist, by definition, in any species: this represents
the very principle upon which taxonomic classification of the living world is based! In
contrast, too narrow a focus on proximate mechanisms when searching for evolutionary
explanations generates the impression that the species under investigation is somehow
“special” — an impression that is used to justify the assumption that the species’
behaviour can only be explained through “special” ultimate causes. While this may be
a legitimate conclusion that cannot be excluded a priori, it is not a legitimate starting
point in a sound scientific framework: by taking this proposition as a given at the
outset, one renounces the possibility to demonstrate it.
Put differently, the pervasiveness of socially transmitted behaviour in our species
does not invalidate application of the “biological” paradigm to the analysis of human
social systems, nor does it validate the claim that “culture transformed human
evolution” (e.g. Richerson and Boyd 2005). Whether the predisposition for cultural
behaviour in humans is indeed unique, in degree if not in kind, and how genetic
and cultural processes interacted to shape human evolution are important questions;
substituting these questions for questions about the survival value of human behaviour
is an egregious mistake.
A “mature science of society” will comprise general principles applicable to any
species, and specific principles applicable to individual taxonomic groups (Hughes 1988,
p. 141); together, they will need to account for the ultimate causes of behaviour and for
its proximate determinants, as well as for the interactions between genetic and cultural
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processes in any species with social transmission (Rogers 1988). Given the emphasis
on cultural evolution in the study of human behaviour (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1985;
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981), this will likely involve “a mutual transformation” of
biology and anthropology (Wilson 1979). This, in turn, will represent an indispensable
step towards integration of evolutionary approaches to the analysis of human behaviour
(reviewed in Laland and Brown 2002), culminating in the development of a biologically
based social anthropology.
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Appendix A
Inclusive fitness analysis
A.1 Theoretical framework
A.1.1 Male and female strategies
We consider a population with n males and n females, in which individuals marry either
monogamously (M) or polygamously (P). We use w ≥ 1 to denote the number of wives
for males and h ≥ 1 the number of husbands for females; males and females marry with
probabilities Ω and Φ , respectively, which are derived in Section A.1.2.
Each female produces one male and one female offspring. Unmarried females
transfer their resources, denoted δf , to their own offspring, whereas unmarried males
transfer their resources, denoted δm, to their sister’s offspring. The resources of married
females are controlled by their husbands, i.e. a male controls his own δm and a share
1/h of the δf of each of his w wives. Males transfer resources “vertically” to their wife’s
(or wives’) offspring (V), with probability mV, or “diagonally” to their sister’s offspring
(D), with probability mD; each male transfers either vertically or diagonally, i.e. mV
and mD take values 0 or 1, and mV = 1 −mD. To simplify the notation, we assume
that individuals in the parent generation transfer resources to sibling pairs rather than
to individuals in the offspring generation. Each sibling pair inherits resources δ, with
δ = δm + δf = 1 for the offspring of a monogamous couple in a monogamous population
in which all males transfer vertically. The fitness of each sibling pair is given by δz, with
z > 0. δB′ and δF′ denote the resources inherited by sibling pairs B′ and F′, respectively
(Figure 2.1).
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A.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The probability p that a male is the biological father of his wife’s offspring depends
on the behaviour of females. Females give their husbands either “high” paternity pH
(H) or “low” paternity pL (L), with 0 < pL < pH ≤ 1. Females obtain an additional
generic advantage α from mating with other males besides their husbands; for example,
α may represent genetic benefits which lead to increased offspring survival or resource
benefits such as nuptial gifts (Kokko 1999; Reynolds 1996). We assume that αL > αH,
and αH = 0 for pH = 1. For simplicity, we further assume that 0 < α < 1/2, such that
its fitness value is small relative to the value of the resources transferred to the offspring
generation, and does not affect the amount of resources males transfer to their wives’
or sister’s offspring.
Both males and females know their spouses’ marriage strategy. The transfer strategy
of males may be conditional upon the marriage and paternity strategies of females. A
“suspicious” male (S) transfers vertically if his wives are monogamous and provide
paternity pH, diagonally otherwise. An “ingenuous” male (I) transfers diagonally if his
wives are monogamous and provide paternity pH, vertically otherwise. These strategies
require that males have cues about paternity (e.g. Kokko 1999): in humans, these
include direct phenotypic cues or indirect behavioural cues (e.g. the conformity of
females to cultural norms regulating their sexual behaviour). The paternity strategy
of females may be conditional only upon the marriage strategy of males. An “astute”
female (A) provides paternity pH if her husbands marry monogamously, pL otherwise.
A “naive” female (N) provides paternity pL if her husbands marry monogamously, pH
otherwise.
Table A.1 presents a summary of the strategies included in the game. We use XY
to denote the marriage strategy X and transfer strategy Y for a male, XZ to denote the
marriage strategy X and paternity strategy Z for a female, and (XY, XZ) to denote a
pair of male and female strategies. For example, (MV, MH) represents the interaction
of a monogamous male who transfers vertically, MV, with a monogamous female who
always provides “high” paternity, MH. Table A.2 presents a summary of all the symbols
used in the model.
A.1.2 Marriage probabilities
For simplicity, we assume that polygamous individuals either marry w or h spouses,
or do not marry at all. Denoting mM and mP the frequencies of monogamous and
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Table A.2: Symbols used in the model
Notation Description
X marriage strategy (of males and females); can be M, P (Table A.1)
Y transfer strategy (of males); can be V, D, S, I (Table A.1a)
Z paternity strategy (of females); can be H, L, A, N (Table A.1b)
n number of individuals of each sex in the population
Ω, Φ marriage probability for a male and for a female
mM, mP frequency of monogamous and of polygynous males in the population
fM, fP frequency of monogamous and of polyandrous females in the population
w, wP number of wives for a male (generic and for a polygynous male)
h number of husbands for a female (generic)
δ, δB′ , δF′ resources inherited by a sibling pair in the offspring generation (generic,
by sibling pair B′, and by sibling pair F′) (Figure 2.1)
δm, δf relative male and female contribution to δ
z describes the relationship between inherited resources and fitness, given
by δz
mV, mD probability that a male transfers vertically and diagonally
p, pH, pL probability that a female’s husband is the biological father of her offspring
(generic, for a female who provides “high” paternity, and for a female who
provides “low” paternity)
α, αH, αL advantage to a female of mating with other males besides her husbands
(generic, for a female who provides “high” paternity, and for a female who
provides “low” paternity)
M, F focal male and female (or sibling to the focal individual) (Figure 2.1)
A F’s husband
B M’s wife
C B’s brother
B′ B’s offspring
F′ F’s offspring
EM, EF inclusive fitness for a focal male and for a focal female
βi, φi resources transferred to B′ and to F′ (Figure 2.1)
rxy coefficient of relatedness of focal individual x (M or F) to heir y (B′ or F′)
˚ denotes any attribute that may depend on the relevant strategy for the
focal individual
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polygynous males in the population, and fM and fP the frequencies of monogamous
and polyandrous females, a focal monogamous male marries with probability
ΩM =

fM
[
mM · 1 +mP n(n− 1)w + 1
]
+ fP
[
mM · 1 +mP nh(n− 1)w + 1
]
if
nh
(n− 1)w + 1 ≤ 1
.
fM
[
mM · 1 +mP n(n− 1)w + 1
]
+ fP[mM · 1 +mP · 1]
if
nh
(n− 1)w + 1 ≥ 1
This is derived as follows:
• in a population of monogamous females and monogamous males there are n
females, each requiring one husband, and n males, each requiring one wife; thus,
the focal male marries with probability ΩM = 1;
• in a population of monogamous females and polygynous males there are n females,
each requiring one husband, n − 1 resident polygynous males, each requiring w
wives, and the focal monogamous male, requiring one wife; thus, the focal male
marries with probability ΩM = n/[(n− 1)w + 1];
• in a population of polyandrous females and monogamous males there are n
females, each requiring h husbands, and n males, each requiring one wife; thus,
the focal male marries with probability ΩM = 1;
• in a population of polyandrous females and polygynous males there are n females,
each requiring h husbands, n − 1 resident polygynous males, each requiring w
wives, and the focal monogamous male, requiring one wife; thus, the focal male
marries with probability ΩM = nh/[(n−1)w+ 1] if the number of potential wives
is smaller than the number of wives required, i.e. if nh/[(n−1)w+1] ≤ 1, or with
probability ΩM = 1 if the number of potential wives is greater than the number
of wives required, i.e. if nh/[(n− 1)w + 1] ≥ 1.
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By similar reasoning, a focal polygynous male marries with probability
ΩP =

fM
[
mM
n
(n− 1) + w +mP
1
w
]
+ fP
[
mM · 1 +mP h
w
]
if
h
w
≤ 1
.
fM
[
mM
n
(n− 1) + w +mP
1
w
]
+ fP
[
mM · 1 +mP · 1
]
if
h
w
≥ 1
Assuming that n is large relative to h and w, ΩM and ΩP simplify to
Ω =

fM
(
mM · 1 +mP 1
w
)
+ fP
(
mM · 1 +mP h
w
)
if
h
w
≤ 1
,
fM
(
mM · 1 +mP 1
w
)
+ fP
(
mM · 1 +mP · 1
)
if
h
w
≥ 1
which, assuming that h = w, simplifies to
Ω = fM
(
mM +
mP
w
)
+ fP.
The probability of marrying for females is derived by analogous reasoning. Assum-
ing that n is large relative to h and w, a focal female marries with probability
Φ =

mM
(
fM · 1 + fP 1
h
)
+mP
(
fM · 1 + fPw
h
)
if
w
h
≤ 1
,
mM
(
fM · 1 + fP 1
h
)
+mP
(
fM · 1 + fP · 1
)
if
w
h
≥ 1
which, assuming that h = w, simplifies to
Φ = mM
(
fM +
fP
h
)
+mP.
A.1.3 Inclusive fitness payoffs
We use˚to indicate any attribute that may depend on the relevant strategy for the focal
individual, such that its value may differ from the corresponding value for the resident
population. For example, w˚ ≥ 1 denotes the number of wives for a focal male M, with
w˚ 6= w for a mutant focal male whose marriage strategy differs from the strategy of
resident males, and w˚ = w in all other cases. With reference to Figure 2.1, the inclusive
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fitness payoff for a focal male M can be written as
EM = w˚
{[
Ω m˚V
(
δm + w˚
δf
h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β1
+ Ω w˚ mV(h− 1)
(
δm
w
+
δf
h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β2
+ Ω w˚ (1− Ω)δm︸ ︷︷ ︸
β3
+ Ω w˚ΩmD
(
δm + w
δf
h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β4
]
/w˚
}z
rMB′
+
[
(1− Ω)δm︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ1
+ Ω m˚D
(
δm + w˚
δf
h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ2
+ (1− Φ)δf︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ3
+ ΦhmV
(
δm
w
+
δf
h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ4
]z
rMF′ ,
where βi represents resources inherited by the offspring B′ of his w˚ wives and φi
represents resources inherited by his sister’s offspring F′; the subscript i = 1, . . . , 4
denotes the pathway through which resources are transferred to the heir. rMB′ and
rMF′ represent the coefficients of relatedness between M and, respectively, B′ and F′, as
derived in Section A.1.4.
β1, β2, β3, and β4 are only relevant if M marries, while φ4 is only relevant if F
marries. Specifically:
β1 represents the resources M transfers to B′ if his transfer strategy is V; this includes
his δm and a share 1/h of the δf of each B;
β2 represents the resources transferred to B′ by the other h − 1 husbands of each
B, excluding M, if the transfer strategy of resident males is V; for each husband,
this includes a share 1/w of his δm and a share 1/h of B’s δf ;
β3 represents the resources each C transfers to B′ if he does not marry;
β4 represents the resources each C transfers to B′ if he marries and his transfer
strategy is D; this includes his δm and a share 1/h of the δf of each of his w wives;
φ1 represents the resources M transfers to F′ if he does not marry;
φ2 represents the resources M transfers to F′ if he marries and his transfer strategy
is D; this includes his δm and a share 1/h of the δf of each B;
φ3 represents the resources F transfers to F′ if she does not marry;
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φ4 represents the resources each A transfers to F′ if the transfer strategy of resident
males is V; this includes a share 1/w of his δm and a share 1/h of F’s δf .
The inclusive fitness payoff for a focal female F is derived by analogous reasoning,
and can be written as
EF = w
{[
ΩmV
(
δm + w
δf
h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β1
+ ΩwmV(h− 1)
(
δm
w
+
δf
h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β2
+ Ωw (1− Ω)δm︸ ︷︷ ︸
β3
+ ΩwΩmD
(
δm + w
δf
h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β4
]
/w
}z
rFB′
+
[
(1− Ω)δm︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ1
+ ΩmD
(
δm + w
δf
h
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ2
+ (1− Φ)δf︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ3
+ Φ h˚ m˚V
(
δm
w
+
δf
h˚
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ4
]z
rFF′ + α˚,
where βi represents resources inherited by the offspring B′ of her brother’s w wives
and φi represents resources inherited by her offspring F′; as in the previous case, the
subscript i = 1, . . . , 4 denotes the pathway through which resources are transferred
to the heir. rFB′ and rFF′ represent the coefficients of relatedness between F and,
respectively, B′ and F′, as derived in Section A.1.4. α˚ 6= α for a mutant focal female
whose paternity strategy differs from the strategy of resident females, and α˚ = α in all
other cases.
As in the previous case, β1, β2, β3, and β4 are only relevant if M marries, while φ4 is
only relevant if F marries. In this case, F’s husbands transfer vertically with probability
m˚V because the transfer strategy of males may depend on the marriage and paternity
strategies of females (males XS and XI, Table A.1a). If this is the case, m˚V 6= mV for a
mutant focal female whose marriage and/or paternity strategy differs from the strategy
of resident females. m˚V = mV in all other cases.
A.1.4 Coefficients of relatedness
For simplicity, we assume that the biological fathers of the offspring of a promiscuous
female are not related, and that the h husbands of a polyandrous female are not related
and have equal probability of fathering her offspring. Under these assumptions, and
assuming that p in the parent generation is equal to p in the previous generation,
a female is related to her offspring by 1/2, a male to his wife’s offspring by an
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average of p/2h, and siblings by an average of (1 + p2/h)/4. Thus, rFF′ = 1/2,
rFB′ = (p/2h)[(1 + p2/h)/4], and rMF′ = (1/2)[(1 + p2/h)/4].
rMB′ must accommodate the fact that the paternity strategy of females may depend
on the marriage strategy of males (females XA and XN, Table A.1b). If this is the
case, p˚ 6= p for a mutant focal male whose marriage strategy differs from the strategy
of resident males. p˚ = p in all other cases. Because a female’s h husbands have equal
probability of fathering her offspring, the coefficient of relatedness between a focal male
M and his wife’s offspring B′ is affected both by the paternity strategy his wife plays
against him, and by the paternity strategy she plays against her other h− 1 husbands.
This can be written as
rMB′ =
(1/h)p˚+ [(h− 1)/h]p
2h
=
p˚+ (h− 1)p
2h2
,
which reduces to p/2h for p˚ = p.
A.2 Stability of social monogamy
The possible combinations of male and female strategies differ in inclusive fitness
payoffs; given these payoffs, we can derive evolutionarily stable equilibria consisting
of pairs of male and female strategies that cannot be invaded by rare mutants playing
alternative strategies (Maynard Smith 1982). The software Mathematica (Wolfram
Research, Inc. 2007) was used to perform the numerical analysis and to produce the
stability plots.
Only two pairs of pure stable strategies result in social monogamy: (MS, MH) and
(MS, MA). Because the model does not yield simple analytical solutions, we describe in
detail the analytical results for the simplest case, pH = 1; these are plotted in Figure 2.2.
Figure A.1 shows graphical results obtained with numerical methods for pH = 0.5.
A.2.1 Stability of (MS, MH)
In the first scenario, (MS, MH), resident males are monogamous and suspicious, that
is, they transfer vertically if females are monogamous and provide “high” paternity,
diagonally otherwise. Resident females are monogamous and always provide “high”
paternity. This combination of male and female strategies results in monogamous
marriage, vertical transfer, and “high” paternity (Table A.1).
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(a) With monogamous females who always provide “high” paternity
(b) With “astute” monogamous females
Figure A.1: Stability of “suspicious” monogamous males against mutant males with wP = 2,
wP = 4, or wP = 8, for pH = 0.5; wP denotes the number of wives for polygynous males,
and pH the paternity level of males with females who always provide “high” paternity and of
monogamous males with “astute” females. δm represents the relative male contribution to the
resources transferred to the offspring generation; z describes the relationship between resources
and individual fitness; pL represents the paternity level of polygynous males with “astute”
females. In (a) social monogamy is stable in the darker area, where all conditions are met;
a is the condition for stability against monogamous males who transfer diagonally, b against
polygynous males who transfer vertically, c against polygynous males who transfer diagonally.
In (b) social monogamy is stable throughout the volume shown.
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(MS, MH) is a weak equilibrium, because resident males MS are neutral with males
MV, and resident females MH are neutral with females MA. For pH = 1, males MS are
stable for
z <
log 3
log 2
against males MD and MI, (A.1a)
wP
(
δm
wP
+ δf
)z
< 1 against males PV and PS, and (A.1b)
(2δm + δf + wPδf)z < 3 against males PD and PI, (A.1c)
where wP > 1 denotes the number of wives for a polygynous male.
These conditions are derived by comparing the inclusive fitness payoff for a resident
male to the payoff for mutant males. The payoff for a resident focal male M is given by
the resources β1 = δm+δf = 1 he transfers to B′, and by the resources φ4 = δm+δf = 1
his sister’s husband A transfers to F′ (Figure 2.1). Thus, δB′ = δm + δf = 1 and
δF′ = δm+δf = 1, with inclusive fitness value for M (δm+δf)z(1/2) and (δm+δf)z(1/4),
respectively. Because δB′ = 1 and δF′ = 1, the inclusive fitness value of these resources
is not affected by z (i.e. δzB′ = 1 and δ
z
F′ = 1).
The payoff for a mutant focal male M who is monogamous and transfers diago-
nally (males MD and MI in this population; Table A.1a) is given by the resources
φ2 = δm + δf = 1 he transfers to F′, and by the resources φ4 = δm + δf = 1 male A
transfers to F′ (Figure 2.1). Thus, δB′ = 0, while δF′ = 2δm + 2δf = 2, with inclusive
fitness value for M (2δm + 2δf)z(1/4). Note that δzF′ > 2 for z > 1, that is, values
of z > 1 result in a greater than twofold increase in fitness for F′. Condition (A.1a)
specifies that vertical transfer can be advantageous where the benefit to a mutant male
of providing extra resources to his sister’s offspring is offset by their lower relatedness
relative to wife’s offspring (i.e. for z < log 3/ log 2).
The payoff for a mutant focal male M who is polygynous and transfers verti-
cally (males PV and PS in this population; Table A.1a) is given by the resources
β1 = (δm + wPδf)/wP he transfers to each B′, and by the resources φ4 = δm+δf = 1 male
A transfers to F′ (Figure 2.1). Thus, δB′ = (δm +wPδf)/wP and δF′ = δm + δf = 1, with
inclusive fitness value for M wP[(δm+wPδf)/wP]z(1/2) and (δm+δf)z(1/4), respectively.
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Note that δB′ < 1 if M contributes at least part of the resources transferred to the next
generation (i.e. if δm > 0), thus δzB′ < 1 for z > 1, that is, values of z > 1 result
in a reduction in the fitness value of the resources. Condition (A.1b) specifies that
monogamous marriage can be advantageous if the fitness value of resources is depleted
through division (i.e. for δm > 0 if z > 1), and becomes increasingly advantageous as
each female provides a relatively smaller share of the resources inherited by her offspring
(i.e. as δm increases and/or wP decreases).
Finally, the payoff for a mutant focal male M who is polygynous and transfers
diagonally (males PD and PI in this population; Table A.1a) is given by the resources
φ2 = δm + wPδf ≥ 1 he transfers to F′, and by the resources φ4 = δm + δf = 1 male
A transfers to F′ (Figure 2.1). Thus, δB′ = 0, while δF′ = 2δm + δf(wP + 1) ≥ 2, with
inclusive fitness value for M [2δm + δf(wP + 1)]z(1/4). Note that, as for (A.1a), δzF′ > 2
for z > 1, that is, values of z > 1 result in a greater than twofold increase in fitness
for F′. Condition (A.1c) specifies that vertical transfer can be advantageous where the
benefit to a mutant male of providing extra resources to his sister’s offspring is offset by
their lower relatedness relative to wife’s offspring; additionally, it becomes increasingly
advantageous as each female provides a relatively smaller share of the resources
inherited by her offspring (i.e. as δm increases and/or wP decreases). Condition (A.1c)
reduces to (A.1a) for δm = 1.
For pH = 1, the payoff for females MH includes the fitness contribution by their
offspring and the fitness contribution by their brother’s wife’s offspring. Because
resident males are suspicious, this is always greater than the payoff for mutant females
who are polyandrous and/or provide “low” paternity (females XL, XN, PH, and PA
in this population; Table A.1b), which is limited to the fitness contribution by their
brother’s wife’s offspring (and possibly αL).
Thus, (MS, MH) is stable for values of δm and z for which conditions (A.1a) to
(A.1c) are satisfied simultaneously (Figure 2.2a). The upper limit to the range of
values of z is given by condition (A.1c), marked c in Figure 2.2a, and the lower limit by
condition (A.1b), marked b in Figure 2.2a; condition (A.1a), marked a in Figure 2.2a,
is always satisfied where (A.1c) is satisfied.
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A.2.2 Stability of (MS, MA)
In the second scenario, (MS, MA), resident males are monogamous and suspicious, that
is, they transfer vertically if females are monogamous and provide “high” paternity,
diagonally otherwise. Resident females are monogamous and astute, that is, they
provide “high” paternity if males are monogamous, “low” paternity otherwise. As
for (MS, MH), this combination of male and female strategies results in monogamous
marriage, vertical transfer, and “high” paternity (Table A.1).
(MS, MA) is a weak equilibrium, because resident males MS are neutral with males
MV, and resident females MA are neutral with females MH. For pH = 1, males MS are
stable for
z <
log 3
log 2
against males MD and MI, (A.2a)
wP
(
δm
wP
+ δf
)z
pL < 1 against males PV and PI, and (A.2b)
(2δm + δf + wPδf)z < 3 against males PD and PS. (A.2c)
As in the previous case, these conditions are derived by comparing the inclusive
fitness payoff for a resident male to the payoff for mutant males. The inclusive fitness
payoff for a resident focal male M is identical to the payoff derived for the previous
scenario.
Condition (A.2a) is the condition for the stability of resident males MS against
invasion by mutant males who are monogamous and transfer diagonally (males MD
and MI in this population; Table A.1a), and is identical to (A.1a).
As for (A.1b), the payoff for a mutant focal male M who is polygynous and transfers
vertically (males PV and PI in this population; Table A.1a) is given by the resources
β1 = (δm + wPδf)/wP he transfers to each B′, and by the resources φ4 = δm + δf = 1
male A transfers to F′ (Figure 2.1). Thus, δB′ = (δm +wPδf)/wP and δF′ = δm + δf = 1;
because in this case resident females give polygynous males paternity pL, these resources
have inclusive fitness value for M wP[(δm + wPδf)/wP]z(pL/2) and (δm + δf)z(1/4),
respectively. As for (A.1b), δB′ < 1 if M contributes at least part of the resources
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transferred to the next generation (i.e. if δm > 0), thus δzB′ < 1 for z > 1, that is,
values of z > 1 result in a reduction in the fitness value of the resources. However,
because of the reduction in relatedness between polygynous males and their wives’
offspring, condition (A.2b) specifies that monogamy can be advantageous irrespective
of whether the fitness value of resources is depleted through division (i.e. for z > 0).
As for (A.1b), monogamy becomes increasingly advantageous as each female provides a
relatively smaller share of the resources inherited by her offspring (i.e. as δm increases
and/or wP decreases). Additionally, monogamy becomes increasingly advantageous as
the relatedness between a polygynous male and his wives’ offspring decreases (i.e. as
pL decreases); for pL < 1/wP, any potential fitness benefit to polygyny is offset by the
reduction in relatedness to wives’ offspring, such that monogamy is stable for all values
of δm.
Finally, condition (A.2c) is the condition for stability against mutant males who are
polygynous and transfer diagonally (males PD and PS in this population, Table A.1a),
and is identical to (A.1c).
For pH = 1, the payoff for females MA is always greater than the payoff for mutant
females who are polyandrous and/or provide “low” paternity (females XL, XN, PH, and
PA in this population; Table A.1b): as in the previous scenario, the former includes
the fitness contribution by own offspring and brother’s wife’s offspring, while the latter
is limited to the fitness contribution by brother’s wife’s offspring (and possibly αL).
Thus, (MS, MA) is stable for values of δm, z, and pL for which conditions (A.2a)
to (A.2c) are satisfied simultaneously (Figure 2.2b). The upper limit to the range
of values of z is given by condition (A.2c) and the lower limit by condition (A.2b);
condition (A.2a) is always satisfied where (A.2c) is satisfied.
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Appendix B
Cross-cultural data
In this appendix I present the cross-cultural data used for the log-linear analysis in
Chapter 3 (Section B.1) and for the phylogenetic comparative analyses in Chapters 4
to 6 (Section B.2); maps of their geographical distribution are, respectively, in Fig-
ures B.1 and B.2. The maps are shown on the same scale to illustrate the difference in
scale of analysis afforded by the two approaches.
B.1 SCCS data
Table B.1 includes the recoded data in binary form on marriage strategy, transfer
strategies for land and for movables, and religious affiliation, for the 186 societies in the
SCCS (Section 3.2.1). Only the 87 societies with data on all variables were included
in the log-linear analysis; the corresponding entries are italicized in Table B.1 and
represented by dots in Figures B.1b to B.1e.
Information on language family is included in Table B.1 to illustrate the distribution
of SCCS societies across linguistic phyla.
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Table B.1: Recoded SCCS data
SCCS identifiers1 Marriage2 Land3 Movables4 Religion5 Language family6
Code Name
1 Nama Hottentot Polygynous Other Vertical Other Khoisan
2 Kung Bushmen Polygynous Other Other – Khoisan
3 Thonga Polygynous Other Vertical – Niger-Congo
4 Lozi Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Niger-Congo
5 Mbundu Polygynous Vertical Other – Niger-Congo
6 Suku Polygynous Other Other – Niger-Congo
7 Bemba Polygynous Other Other Other Niger-Congo
8 Nyakyusa Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Niger-Congo
9 Hadza Polygynous Other Vertical Other Khoisan
10 Luguru Polygynous Other Vertical – Niger-Congo
11 Kikuyu Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Niger-Congo
12 Ganda Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Niger-Congo
13 Mbuti Pygmies Polygynous Other Vertical Other Niger-Congo
14 Nkundo Mongo Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Niger-Congo
15 Banen Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Niger-Congo
16 Tiv Polygynous Other Vertical – Niger-Congo
17 Ibo Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Niger-Congo
18 Fon Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Niger-Congo
19 Ashanti Polygynous Other Other Other Niger-Congo
20 Mende Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Niger-Congo
21 Wolof Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Niger-Congo
22 Bambara Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Niger-Congo
23 Tallensi Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Niger-Congo
24 Songhai Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Nilo-Saharan
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: Recoded SCCS data (continued from previous page)
SCCS identifiers1 Marriage2 Land3 Movables4 Religion5 Language family6
Code Name
25 Fulani Polygynous Other Vertical Other Niger-Congo
26 Hausa Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Afro-Asiatic
27 Massa Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Afro-Asiatic
28 Azande Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Niger-Congo
29 Fur Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Nilo-Saharan
30 Otoro Nuba Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Niger-Congo
31 Shilluk Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Nilo-Saharan
32 Mao Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Nilo-Saharan
33 Kafa Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Afro-Asiatic
34 Masai Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Nilo-Saharan
35 Konso Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Afro-Asiatic
36 Somali Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Afro-Asiatic
37 Amhara Monogamous Vertical Vertical Christianized Afro-Asiatic
38 Bogo Polygynous Vertical Vertical Christianized Afro-Asiatic
39 Nubians Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Nilo-Saharan
40 Teda Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Nilo-Saharan
41 Tuareg Monogamous Other Vertical Other Afro-Asiatic
42 Riffians Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Afro-Asiatic
43 Egyptians Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Afro-Asiatic
44 Hebrews Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Afro-Asiatic
45 Babylonians Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Afro-Asiatic
46 Rwala Bedouin Polygynous Other Vertical Other Afro-Asiatic
47 Turks Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Altaic
48 Gheg Albanians Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Indo-European
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: Recoded SCCS data (continued from previous page)
SCCS identifiers1 Marriage2 Land3 Movables4 Religion5 Language family6
Code Name
49 Romans Monogamous Vertical Vertical – Indo-European
50 Basques Monogamous Vertical Vertical Christianized Isolate
51 Irish Monogamous Vertical Vertical Christianized Indo-European
52 Lapps Monogamous Vertical Vertical Christianized Uralic-Yukaghir
53 Yurak Samoyed Polygynous – – Christianized Uralic-Yukaghir
54 Russians Monogamous Other – Christianized Indo-European
55 Abkhaz Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Caucasian
56 Armenians Monogamous Vertical Vertical Christianized Indo-European
57 Kurd Polygynous Vertical – Other Indo-European
58 Basseri Polygynous Other Vertical Other Indo-European
59 Punjabi Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Indo-European
60 Gond Polygynous Other Other Other Dravidian
61 Toda – Other Vertical Other Dravidian
62 Santal Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Austroasiatic
63 Uttar Pradesh Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Indo-European
64 Burusho Polygynous – – Other Isolate
65 Kazak Polygynous Other Vertical Other Altaic
66 Khalka Mongols Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Altaic
67 Lolo Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Sino-Tibetan
68 Lepcha Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Sino-Tibetan
69 Garo Polygynous Other Other – Sino-Tibetan
70 Lakher Monogamous Vertical Vertical – Sino-Tibetan
71 Burmese Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Sino-Tibetan
72 Lamet Polygynous Other Vertical – Austroasiatic
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: Recoded SCCS data (continued from previous page)
SCCS identifiers1 Marriage2 Land3 Movables4 Religion5 Language family6
Code Name
73 Vietnamese Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Austroasiatic
74 Rhade Monogamous – – – Austronesian
75 Khmer Polygynous – – Other Austroasiatic
76 Siamese Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Daic
77 Semang Polygynous Other Vertical Other Austroasiatic
78 Nicobarese Polygynous Other Vertical – Austroasiatic
79 Andamanese Monogamous Other – Other Andaman
80 Vedda Monogamous Vertical Vertical – Indo-European
81 Tanala Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Austronesian
82 Negri Sembilan Polygynous Other Other Other Austronesian
83 Javanese Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Austronesian
84 Balinese Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Austronesian
85 Iban Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Austronesian
86 Badjau Polygynous – – – Austronesian
87 Toradja Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Austronesian
88 Tobelorese Monogamous Vertical Vertical Christianized West Papuan
89 Alorese Polygynous – – – Trans New Guinea
90 Tiwi Polygynous Other – – Australian
91 Aranda Polygynous Other Vertical Other Australian
92 Orokaiva Polygynous – – – Trans New Guinea
93 Kimam Polygynous Vertical Other – Trans New Guinea
94 Kapauku Polygynous – – – Trans New Guinea
95 Kwoma Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Sepik-Ramu
96 Manus Polygynous Other Other Christianized Austronesian
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: Recoded SCCS data (continued from previous page)
SCCS identifiers1 Marriage2 Land3 Movables4 Religion5 Language family6
Code Name
97 New Ireland Polygynous – Other Other Austronesian
98 Trobrianders Polygynous Other Other – Austronesian
99 Siuai Polygynous Other Vertical Christianized East Papuan
100 Tikopia Polygynous Vertical – Christianized Austronesian
101 Pentecost Polygynous Other Vertical Christianized Austronesian
102 Mbau Fijians Polygynous – Vertical – Austronesian
103 Ajie Polygynous – – – Austronesian
104 Maori Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Austronesian
105 Marquesans – Vertical Vertical Other Austronesian
106 Samoans Polygynous – – – Austronesian
107 Gilbertese Polygynous Vertical Vertical Christianized Austronesian
108 Marshallese Polygynous Other Other Christianized Austronesian
109 Trukese Polygynous Vertical Vertical Christianized Austronesian
110 Yapese Polygynous Other Other Christianized Austronesian
111 Palauans Polygynous Other Vertical Christianized Austronesian
112 Ifugao Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Austronesian
113 Atayal Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Austronesian
114 Chinese Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Sino-Tibetan
115 Manchu Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Altaic
116 Koreans Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Isolate
117 Japanese Monogamous Vertical Vertical Other Isolate
118 Ainu Polygynous – Vertical – Isolate
119 Gilyak Polygynous Other Vertical Other Isolate
120 Yukaghir Monogamous Other Vertical – Uralic-Yukaghir
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: Recoded SCCS data (continued from previous page)
SCCS identifiers1 Marriage2 Land3 Movables4 Religion5 Language family6
Code Name
121 Chukchee Polygynous Other Vertical – Chukchi-Kamchatkan
122 Ingalik Polygynous Other Vertical – Na-Dene
123 Aleut Polygynous Other Vertical – Eskimo-Aleut
124 Copper Eskimo Polygynous Other Vertical – Eskimo-Aleut
125 Montagnais Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Algic
126 Micmac Polygynous – – – Algic
127 Saulteaux Polygynous – – Christianized Algic
128 Slave Monogamous Other Other Christianized Na-Dene
129 Kaska Polygynous – Vertical – Na-Dene
130 Eyak Polygynous – Other – Na-Dene
131 Haida Polygynous Other Other – Na-Dene
132 Bellacoola Polygynous Other Vertical – Salish
133 Twana Polygynous Other Other Other Salish
134 Yurok Polygynous – Vertical – Algic
135 Pomo Polygynous Other Vertical Other Hokan
136 Yokuts Polygynous Other – – California and plateau Penutian
137 Paiute Polygynous Other Other Other Uto-Aztecan
138 Klamath Polygynous Other Other – California and plateau Penutian
139 Kutenai Polygynous Other Vertical Other Isolate
140 Gros Ventre Polygynous Other Other – Algic
141 Hidatsa Polygynous – Vertical Other Siouan
142 Pawnee Polygynous Other Other – Caddoan
143 Omaha Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Siouan
144 Huron Monogamous – – – Iroquian
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: Recoded SCCS data (continued from previous page)
SCCS identifiers1 Marriage2 Land3 Movables4 Religion5 Language family6
Code Name
145 Creek Polygynous – Vertical Other Natchez-Muskogean
146 Natchez Polygynous – – – Natchez-Muskogean
147 Comanche Polygynous Other Other Other Uto-Aztecan
148 Chiricahua Polygynous Other Other – Na-Dene
149 Zuni Monogamous Other Vertical – Isolate
150 Havasupai Polygynous Vertical Other – Hokan
151 Papago Polygynous Vertical Other Other Uto-Aztecan
152 Huichol Polygynous Vertical Vertical Christianized Uto-Aztecan
153 Aztec Polygynous Vertical Vertical Other Uto-Aztecan
154 Popoluca Polygynous Vertical Vertical Christianized Macro-Mayan
155 Quiche Monogamous Vertical Vertical Christianized Macro-Mayan
156 Miskito Polygynous – – Christianized Chibcha-Misumalpan
157 Bribri Polygynous Other Vertical – Chibcha-Misumalpan
158 Cuna Polygynous – – – Chibcha-Misumalpan
159 Goajiro Polygynous – Other – Macro-Arawakan
160 Haitians Polygynous Vertical Vertical Christianized Indo-European
161 Callinago Polygynous – – Other Macro-Arawakan
162 Warrau Polygynous Other – – Macro-Paezan
163 Yanomamo Polygynous Other – Other Macro-Panoan
164 Carib Polygynous – – – Tupi-Carib
165 Saramacca Polygynous – Other Other Indo-European
166 Mundurucu Polygynous Other Other – Tupi-Carib
167 Cubeo Polygynous Other Vertical Other Tucanoan
168 Cayapa Monogamous – – – Macro-Paezan
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: Recoded SCCS data (continued from previous page)
SCCS identifiers1 Marriage2 Land3 Movables4 Religion5 Language family6
Code Name
169 Jivaro Polygynous Other Vertical Other Jivaroan
170 Amahuaca Polygynous Other Other – Macro-Panoan
171 Inca Polygynous Other Vertical Other Quechumaran
172 Aymara Monogamous Vertical Vertical Christianized Quechumaran
173 Siriono Polygynous Other Other Other Tupi-Carib
174 Nambicuara Polygynous Other Other – Nambiquaran
175 Trumai Polygynous Other – Other Macro-Arawakan
176 Timbira Monogamous Other Vertical – Macro Ge
177 Tupinamba Polygynous – – Other Tupi-Carib
178 Botocudo Polygynous Other – – Macro Ge
179 Shavante Polygynous Other Other Other Macro Ge
180 Aweikoma Polygynous Other Other – Macro Ge
181 Cayua Polygynous – – Other Tupi-Carib
182 Lengua Polygynous Other – – Mascoian
183 Abipon Polygynous Other – – Guaykuruan
184 Mapuche Polygynous Vertical Vertical – Araucanian
185 Tehuelche Polygynous Other – Other Araucanian
186 Yahgan Polygynous Other Other – Isolate
1 After Murdock and White (1969). Only the 87 entries in italics were included in the log-linear analysis (Section 3.3).
2 Marriage strategy. Recoded from SCCS variable 79 (Section 3.2.1.1).
3 Transfer strategy for land. Recoded from SCCS variable 278 (Section 3.2.1.2).
4 Transfer strategy for movables. Recoded from SCCS variable 279 (Section 3.2.1.2).
5 Religious affiliation. Recoded from SCCS variables 713 and 2002 (Section 3.2.1.3).
6 After Burton (1999).
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(a) SCCS code
Figure B.1: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded SCCS data in Table B.1. Entries included in the log-linear
analysis are italicized in Table B.1.
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(b) Marriage strategy
Figure B.1: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded SCCS data in Table B.1. Entries included in the log-linear
analysis are marked by dots; colours express the marriage strategy (white: monogamous; black: polygynous; grey: missing).
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(c) Transfer strategy for land
Figure B.1: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded SCCS data in Table B.1. Entries included in the log-linear
analysis are marked by dots; colours express the transfer strategy for land (white: vertical; black: other; grey: missing).
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(d) Transfer strategy for movables
Figure B.1: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded SCCS data in Table B.1. Entries included in the log-linear
analysis are marked by dots; colours express the transfer strategy for movables (white: vertical; black: other; grey: missing).
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(e) Religious affiliation
Figure B.1: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded SCCS data in Table B.1. Entries included in the log-linear
analysis are marked by dots; colours express the religious affiliation (white: Christianized; black: other; grey: missing).
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B.2 EA data
Table B.2 includes the recoded data on marriage strategy and residence strategy
(prevailing and alternative modes) for the 27 societies in the EA that could be matched
to speech varieties in Dyen et al.’s (1992) linguistic database (Section 4.2.1).
The prevailing and alternative modes of residence are shown, respectively, in
Figure B.2c and Figure B.2d; Figure B.2e shows the same data in binary form, combined
as neolocal/non-neolocal and over the two modes of residence (Section 6.2.1).
As indicated in the captions to Figures B.2b to B.2e, the colour schemes match
those used in the relevant figures in Chapters 4 to 6.
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Table B.2: Recoded EA data
Key1 Speech variety2 EA identifiers3 Marriage strategy4 Residence strategy5
Code Name Prevailing mode Alternative mode
1 Afghan Ea11 Afghans Polygynous Virilocal Virilocal
2 Albanian G Ce1 Gheg Polygynous Virilocal Virilocal
3 Armenian Mod Ci10 Armenians Monogamous Virilocal Uxorilocal
4 Bengali Ef2 Bengali Polygynous Virilocal Virilocal
5 Bulgarian Ch5 Bulgarians Monogamous Virilocal Neolocal
6 Byelorussian Ch6 Byelorussians Monogamous Ambilocal Neolocal
7 Czech Ch3 Czechs Monogamous Virilocal Neolocal
8 Dutch List Cg1 Dutch Monogamous Ambilocal Neolocal
9 Greek MD Ce7 Greeks Monogamous Virilocal Neolocal
10 Gujarati Ef9 Gujarati Polygynous Virilocal Virilocal
11 Hindi Ef11 Uttar Pradesh Polygynous Virilocal Virilocal
12 Irish B Cg3 Irish Monogamous Virilocal Neolocal
13 Italian Ce5 Neapolitans Monogamous Neolocal Uxorilocal
14 Kashmiri Ef8 Kashmiri Polygynous Virilocal Virilocal
15 Lithuanian ST Ch9 Lithuanians Monogamous Virilocal Neolocal
16 Ossetic Ci6 Osset Polygynous Virilocal Virilocal
17 Panjabi ST Ea13 Punjabi Monogamous Virilocal Virilocal
18 Persian List Ea9 Iranians Polygynous Virilocal Neolocal
19 Portuguese ST Ce2 Portuguese Monogamous Virilocal Neolocal
20 Rumanian List Ch10 Romanians Monogamous Neolocal Virilocal
21 Russian Ch11 Russians Monogamous Neolocal Neolocal
22 Serbocroatian Ch1 Serbs Monogamous Virilocal Neolocal
23 Singhalese Eh6 Sinhalese Monogamous Virilocal Uxorilocal
24 Spanish Ce6 Spaniards Monogamous Neolocal Neolocal
Continued on next page
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Table B.2: Recoded EA data (continued from previous page)
Key1 Speech variety2 EA identifiers3 Marriage strategy4 Residence strategy5
Code Name Prevailing mode Alternative mode
25 Ukrainian Ch7 Ukrainians Monogamous Virilocal Neolocal
26 Walloon Cg5 Walloons Monogamous Neolocal Neolocal
27 Waziri Ea2 Pathan Polygynous Virilocal Virilocal
1 Refers to the numbers in Figure B.2a.
2 After Dyen et al. (1992) (Section 4.2.1).
3 After Gray (1999) (Section 4.2.1).
4 Recoded from EA variable 9 (Section 4.2.1).
5 Recoded from EA variable 12 for prevailing mode and 14 for alternative mode (Section 5.2.1).
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(a) Key
Figure B.2: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded EA data in Table B.2. Numbers correspond to entries in the
relevant column in Table B.2.
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(b) Marriage strategy
Figure B.2: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded EA data in Table B.2. Colours express the marriage strategy
(white: monogamous; black: polygynous), as per Figure 4.4.
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(c) Residence strategy (prevailing mode)
Figure B.2: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded EA data in Table B.2. Colours express the residence strategy
(white: neolocal; grey: uxorilocal; black: virilocal), as per Figure 5.4a.
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(d) Residence strategy (alternative mode)
Figure B.2: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded EA data in Table B.2. Colours express the residence strategy
(white: neolocal; grey: uxorilocal; black: virilocal), as per Figure 5.4b.
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(e) Residence strategy (binary)
Figure B.2: Map illustrating the geographic distribution of the recoded EA data in Table B.2. Colours express the residence strategy
(white: neolocal; black: non-neolocal), as per Figure 6.2b.
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Appendix C
BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete
In this appendix I provide additional information on the phylogenetic comparative
method used for the analyses presented in Chapters 4 to 6. I introduce the Bayesian
approach to phylogenetic comparative analysis in Section C.1, and the Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation techniques used in this framework in Section C.2; in
Section C.3 I provide details on implementation of the method in BayesMultistate and
BayesDiscrete. For clarity, the discussion focuses on the simplest case of one binary
trait, as in the analysis in Chapter 4; this is easily extended to the case of one ternary
trait, as in the analysis in Chapter 5, or to the case of two binary traits, as in the
analysis in Chapter 6. The specifics of these cases are detailed in the methods sections
of the relevant chapters (Sections 4.2.3, 5.2.3 and 6.2.3). A general introduction to the
Bayesian MCMC approach to phylogenetic comparative analysis is in Section 1.2.3.2.
BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete are available as part of the BayesTraits package
(Pagel and Meade n.d.) from http://www.evolution.rdg.ac.uk/BayesTraits.html.
Unless otherwise specified, the information in this appendix is based on Pagel and
Meade (2005, 2006), Pagel et al. (2004), and on the BayesTraits manual (Pagel and
Meade n.d.).
C.1 The Bayesian approach
BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete attempt to discover the evolutionary pathways that
resulted in the observed distribution of states for the trait(s) of interest across a sample
of taxa. This requires a phylogenetic tree model representing the evolutionary history
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of the taxa, and a model of how the trait(s) have evolved on the tree(s). BayesMultistate
and BayesDiscrete use a continuous-time Markov model to describe the evolution of the
trait(s) along the branches of a tree. Under this model, a discrete trait can switch
repeatedly between its possible states in any of the branches of the tree. For example,
in the simplest case of one binary trait taking states 0 and 1, the trait can switch
repeatedly between its two states, with rate parameters q01 and q10 measuring the
instantaneous rates of change respectively from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 0. The rate
parameters are used to define the probabilities of these changes, the character states
at internal nodes on the tree, and the likelihood of the data, that is, the probability of
the data given the tree and the model of trait evolution specified by the rates (Pagel
1994, 1997, 1999). Four model categories are possible for one binary trait taking states
0 and 1, described by the rate parameters q01 and q10: q01 and q10 may take distinct
positive values, they may take the same positive value, or either one may be set to
zero while the other takes a positive value. The number of rate parameters increases
rapidly with number of states per trait and with number of traits: for example, there
are six rate parameters for one ternary trait, and eight rate parameters for two binary
traits. Consequently, the number of possible model categories also increases rapidly,
with 21,146 possible categories for two binary traits.
The maximum-likelihood implementation of BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete at-
tempts to find the values of the rate parameters and of ancestral states of the trait(s)
at internal nodes on the tree that are most likely to have produced the observed data
(Pagel 1994, 1997, 1999). The Bayesian implementation uses the likelihood to estimate
the posterior probability of the rate parameters and of ancestral states, that is, their
probability given the data and model of trait evolution. The posterior probability
of a parameter value is a quantity proportional to the product of its likelihood and
prior probability. The prior probability of a parameter value is specified a priori, i.e.
without reference to the data, to reflect one’s belief about the parameter; estimation of
the posterior probability amounts to “updating” this belief in light of the information
contained in the data, as measured by the likelihood (Lewis 2001). For example, using
a uniform prior distribution on the rate parameters means that all values of the rate
parameters are believed a priori to be equally likely (Section C.3).
Posterior probabilities represent a more intuitive measure of the fit between the
data and the model of evolution than likelihood estimates (Huelsenbeck et al. 2002;
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Lewis 2001). However, they cannot be computed analytically in a phylogenetic context.
For the purpose of phylogenetic comparative analysis, calculation of the posterior
probability of a parameter value involves integration over all values of the parameter.
Additionally, in order to account for the effect of phylogenetic uncertainty on the
posterior probability of the parameter, it involves a summation over all possible tree
topologies representing how the taxa are related; in turn, for each of the possible
topologies, it involves integration over all possible values of the branch lengths and other
parameters in the model of evolution used to infer the tree. Phylogenetic comparative
analysis in a Bayesian framework is therefore performed through MCMC simulation, as
described in Section C.2. Similarly, phylogenetic tree-building analysis in a Bayesian
framework is performed through MCMC simulation (see Felsenstein 2004, Chapter 18
and Yang 2006, Chapter 5): this produces a posterior probability sample of trees, that
is, a sample in which trees are present in proportion to their posterior probability;
the posterior probability of a tree represents the probability that the tree is correct
(Huelsenbeck et al. 2001; Section 4.2.2). Alfaro and Holder (2006) review issues linked
to the selection of prior probabilities in this context.
C.2 MCMC methods
Given a posterior probability sample of trees, BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete esti-
mate the posterior probability distributions of rate parameters and of ancestral states
through a Markov chain implementing the model of trait evolution. For one binary
trait taking states 0 and 1, the model of evolution is defined by the rate parameters
q01 and q10, the likelihood function, the prior probability distributions of the rates, and
the posterior probability distribution of trees in the tree sample.
Mathematically, a Markov chain is a random process in which the next state depends
only on the current state, that is, the next state is independent of where the process
was previously (Felsenstein 2004, p. 293). MCMC methods are a class of algorithms for
sampling from a probability distribution, based on constructing a Markov chain that
has as its stationary distribution the desired distribution (Huelsenbeck et al. 2001); for
BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete, this is the posterior probability distribution of the
parameters of interest to the comparative question. Specifically, BayesMultistate and
BayesDiscrete use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Hastings 1970; Metropolis et al.
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1953) to simulate a random walk across the universe of possible states in the model
of trait evolution, and to periodically sample from the states visited. States in the
chain correspond to a set of parameters values and a tree drawn from the tree sample.
Schematically, starting from a random state, at each step in the chain a tree is drawn
at random from the sample of trees, and values are proposed for rate parameters and
for ancestral states. Whether a new state is accepted, and thus added to the sample, is
determined by comparing the likelihood of the new state to the likelihood of the current
state in the chain. States with better likelihood are always accepted, whereas states
with worse likelihood are accepted only a proportion of the time equal to the ratio of
the likelihood of the new state to the likelihood of the current state; if the new state
is rejected, the current state is added to the sample again. Through this process, the
chain visits states in proportion to their posterior probability; therefore, if the chain is
run for a large number of steps, the distribution of states in the sample produced by the
chain closely approximates their posterior probability distribution. Consequently, the
proportion of the time that any state appears in the sample is a valid approximation
of its posterior probability (Holder and Lewis 2003; Lewis 2001).
A particular implementation of MCMC methods, reversible jump (RJ) MCMC
(Green 1995), can be used to additionally estimate the posterior probability distribution
of the possible model categories; in this case, at each step in the chain q01 and q10
are assigned the same positive value, distinct positive values, or either one is set to
zero while the other is assigned a positive value. Thus, an RJ-MCMC chain samples
simultaneously from the posterior probability distributions of model categories and of
the parameters in the model of trait evolution.
Combining estimates over the sample produced by the chain corresponds to “aver-
aging” inferences over uncertainty in the phylogeny, in the parameters of the model of
trait evolution, and, in the RJ-MCMC case, in the model itself. Crucially, the validity
of the inferences depends on convergence of the chain to its stationary distribution,
that is, to the posterior probability distribution of the parameters of interest to the
comparative question; in turn, this depends on the ability of the chain to wander
through “state space” effectively (Section C.3).
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C.3 Implementation
MCMC chains are constructed to ensure that they converge to their stationary distri-
bution. In BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete, the chain specifications described in this
section are determined through a series of preliminary runs, using the programmes in
both maximum-likelihood and MCMC mode.
At each step in an MCMC chain BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete change the values
of the rate parameters by an amount specified by the rate deviation parameter, set
through the ratedev command. The rate deviation parameter is adjusted iteratively
to produce an acceptance rate of between 20 and 40% of the proposed changes: at lower
rates, the chain may fail to explore state space effectively; at higher rates, the chain
would accept nearly all proposed states, such that successive states would be highly
correlated. In any case, some degree of auto-correlation between successive states is
inevitable; therefore, the chain is “thinned” through the sample command, which sets
the interval for sampling the states visited by the chain. Wide intervals ensure the
near-independence of successive states sampled by the chain.
Because the chain is started from a random state, it will usually take some time to
find regions of state space with high posterior probabilities. Convergence of the chain to
the posterior probability distribution, that is, to its stationary distribution, is assessed
by plotting the loge(likelihood) values of the sampled states against iteration. In a
typical run the loge(likelihood) values increase steadily and then fluctuate randomly
up and down around a stable value. States sampled during the initial climbing phase,
known as “burn-in period”, are discarded; in BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete the
length of the burn-in is set through the burnin command. Whether the chain does
reach convergence largely depends on the length of the walk, which is set through
the iterations command in BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete. However, the random
nature of the process means that it is not possible to know in advance how long it
takes for the chain to reach convergence — hence the reference to the Monte Carlo
casino in the name of the procedure (Felsenstein 2004, p. 292). Relatedly, the chain
may fail to explore state space effectively, producing a sample that does not reflect
the posterior probability distribution even after very long runs. For example, a chain
may be “stuck” in one region of state space for a large number of iterations after the
burn-in phase, failing to visit regions with higher posterior probabilities. Therefore,
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a number of separate chains are run, each started from a different random state; if
the chains produce comparable samples, they likely converged to the same region in
state space, i.e. to their stationary distribution — in this case, it is safe to assume
that the distribution of states in the samples approximates the posterior probability
distribution.
As noted in Section C.1, the posterior probability of a parameter value is a quantity
proportional to its likelihood and prior probability. At present, BayesMultistate and
BayesDiscrete implement three prior probability distributions on the rate parameters:
uniform, exponential, and gamma. A uniform prior, specified by a range, is used if
all values of the rate parameters are believed to be equally likely. An exponential
prior, specified by a mean, is used if small values of the rate parameters are believed
to be more likely than large ones. A gamma prior, specified by a mean and variance,
is used if the distribution of parameter values is believed to be right skewed, with
small or small to intermediate values of the rate parameters more likely than large
ones. Selection of prior probability distributions represents an issue for concern in the
Bayesian approach, because it involves some degree of arbitrariness. One option is to use
uniform (“uninformative”) priors; unless the signal in the data is particularly strong,
however, this strategy may result in the chains not visiting state space effectively.
“Informative”, i.e. non-uniform, priors are used in this case. Having specified the
shape of the prior distribution (exponential or gamma), one can remain agnostic about
the values of its parameters (i.e. about the value of the mean for the exponential and of
the mean and variance for the gamma), by making BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete
estimate them from the data. This requires specification of a “hyperprior”, itself a
uniform distribution specified by a range; BayesMultistate and BayesDiscrete draw values
at random from the hyperprior and use them to seed the parameters of the desired prior
distribution.
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